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After the Confederate surrender at Forts Hatteras and Clark in August of 1861, the Union 
took control of Pamlico Sound.  Confederate soldiers, however, remained in control of an 
outpost on nearby Roanoke Island.  This was their last line of defense against Union dominance 
of eastern North Carolina.  In September 1861, Union forces set up an outpost at Chicamacomico 
(present-day Rodanthe on Hatteras Island).  Once the Confederates discerned the Union’s 
presence at Chicamacomico, they launched an attack to retake Pamlico Sound.  Both Union and 
Confederate forces engaged each other on land and at sea.  There were few casualties and the 
balance of power did not shift between the two sides. 
The “Chicamacomico Encounter” (also known as the “Chicamacomico Affair,” and 
“Chicamacomico Races”) has been documented in the historical record; however there has not 
been extensive archaeological study of the battlefield.  This may be because it represents a 
challenge to battlefield archaeologists.  The area of conflict is not only inundated with sand and 
vegetation, but it has also gone through drastic coastal change.  Moreover, its marine battlescape 
is potentially expansive, and lies within exceptionally shallow water -- requiring the adaptation 
 
 
and combination of terrestrial and underwater archaeological surveying techniques to study it. 
The present study is an archaeological analysis of the battlescape which utilized the principles of 
KOCOA survey techniques from the American Battlefield Protection Program (ABPP) to 
reconstruct battlefield behavior, analyze tactics and strategy, and in doing so considered the pros 
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The “Chicamacomico Races” was a brief skirmish during the Civil War that occurred 
along North Carolina’s coastal barrier islands, the Outer Banks.  This event involved the Union’s 
20th Indiana Infantry against the Confederacy’s 3rd Georgia Infantry.  The Union’s 9th New 
York Infantry, and 20th New York Infantry Regiments and Confederate 8th North Carolina 
Infantry were also in the area during the event; however, were not directly involved in the Races.  
The Races was supposed to be a decisive battle between Confederate and Union forces for 
controlling Pamlico Sound as Confederates forces were trying to keep the Union army from 
advancing toward Roanoke Island from Hatteras Inlet.  Occupation of Pamlico Sound would 
extend towards Roanoke Sound which provided access to Albemarle Sound and the back-door 
approaches to southeastern Virginia (Trotter 1989:1-2, 153; Carbone 2001:xxiv; Oxford 
2013:15).  Pamlico Sound is situated inside the Outer Banks of North Carolina, south of 
Roanoke Island (NOAA 2016a).  Pamlico Sound is fed by the Neuse River as well as the 
convergence of both the Pamlico and Pungo Rivers, as well as several creeks (Figure 1).   
Pamlico Sound was a strategic location during the early Civil War as both armies 
considered it a gateway to the rest of North Carolina.  Navigable rivers run well into the state 
providing access to the railway network as well as the state’s interior communications beyond 
the sound.  Access to the rail and communication networks were considered one of the more 
important strategic factors during the Civil War and often influenced what events took place 
along North Carolina’s coast.  Thus, the Outer Banks was quite active during the beginning of 
the Civil War.  In autumn 1861, Union and Confederate forces engaged each other at the village 
2 
 
of Chicamacomico in what would later become known as the “Chicamacomico Races.”  The 
Chicamacomico Races is unique in that there were many Civil War firsts that took place; among 
them were the first amphibious assault made by the Confederate Army and Navy as well as the 
first Confederate capture of an armed Union vessel, USS Fanny (Trotter 1989:1; Oxford 
2013:15). 
 
Figure 1.  Map of Pamlico Sound showing the location of strategic locations during 1861 (by Karl Musser and 
USGS). 
Outer Banks Natural History  
North Carolina’s unique coastline helped shape most of its early history.  The coastline 
extends 300 miles between the borders of Virginia to South Carolina, and just off the coast, there 
is a chain of sandbank islands.  These islands are not much wider than three miles at any point; 
they extend from the Virginia mainland and continue over 175 miles to the south.  These 
sandbanks are collectively known as the Outer Banks (Carbone 2001:xv; Pompe 2010:1; Riggs 
et al. 2011:10). 
Situated between the Outer Banks and the North Carolina mainland are several shallow 
bodies of water called sounds.  These sounds include the Albemarle, Bogue, Core, Croatan, 
Currituck, Roanoke, and Pamlico.  Various rivers such as the Alligator, Chowan, Neuse, 
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Pasquotank, Roanoke, Pungo, and Tar-Pamlico empty from the mainland into the sounds.  
Pamlico Sound is the largest sound and among the largest wetland estuaries within the 
continental United States.  It is directly west of Hatteras Island and drains into the Atlantic 
Ocean via four waterways, Oregon, New, Hatteras, and Ocracoke Inlets (Yearns et al. 1980:28; 
Pilkey, et al. 1998:39; Carbone 2001:xix; Powell 2006:857-58; Babits et al. 2015:3). 
The Outer Banks are considered barrier islands to the sounds and mainland in the sense 
that they act as a natural energy buffer.  The Outer Banks environment consists of large deposits 
of sand that form dunes on top of sedimentary rock formations where various types of plant life 
grow.  Trees such as cedars, oaks, and pines can also be found throughout.  Additionally, 
subtropical grasses grow throughout these islands where they thrive in the sandy soil, salt spray, 
and high winds.  The Outer Banks are among the most dynamic land/water interfaces in the 
world and are considered particularly remarkable because they are continuously changing 
because the sand dunes comprising a large part of these barrier islands are constantly shifting 
(Pilkey et al. 1998:39, 49; Carbone 2001:xv; Riggs and Ames 2003:23; Babits et al. 2015:3).  
Additionally, the coastline outside the Outer Banks is shallow with shifting sediments and 
migratory inlets that can change in a matter of hours due to storms (Stick 1983:281; Carbone 
2001:xix; Pompe 2010:5; Riggs 2011:24; Riggs et al. 2011:2-3).  This is characteristic of 
Chicamacomico, an area made up of several sand dunes with limited plant life in present-day 
Rodanthe.  The word “Chicamacomico” originates from the Algonquin language group meaning, 
“a land of disappearing sands” or “place swept over.”  It is also said among those of Croatoan 
descent that it means, “place of sinking down sand” (Powell and Hill 2010:11; Oxford 2013:65; 
Garrity-Blake and Amspacher 2017:125; Richards and Parker 2017:3).  These are apt 
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descriptions describing the Outer Banks at Chicamacomico.  A Union soldier who was involved 
in the Chicamacomico Races described the area as follows; 
We trod North Carolina soil, or rather, I should say, sand, for the first time 
yesterday.  I am not in the least disappointed at the dreary prospect, as it is just 
about the kind of place I expected to find; that is, a long, low strip of sand between 
two oceans, the actual coast of North Carolina not being in sight, producing just 
that impression.  Some distance up there are evidence of trees or shrubbery, though 
what they can be from soil like this, is hard to imagine (Johnson 1861:46). 
 
Previous Research 
To date, this project is only the second archaeological investigation into the 
Chicamacomico area focusing on Civil War history.  The first archaeological survey was 
conducted by a team led by Dr. Lawrence Babits in the fall of 2014.  The intent was to 
investigate a possible Civil War fortification and camp in present-day Waves, North Carolina 
(Babits et al. 2015:i).  Babits and team were looking to determine whether it was the site of 
Camp Live Oak.  The survey, however, was inconclusive. 
The fieldwork for the current project was conducted in Pamlico Sound just off Hatteras 
Island at Little Kinnakeet (present-day Avon) with the objective of capturing archaeological 
signatures using remote sensing equipment, specifically a side-scan sonar and a marine 
magnetometer, to digitally recreate USS Monticello’s bombardment of a cluster of Confederate 
vessels.  Additional data was examined from secondary areas where data had already been 
collected and could be re-assessed for integration into this study.  This includes an area surveyed 
in 2014 by the UNC-Coastal Studies Institute under a NC Department of Transportation 
(NCDOT) grant.  Their objective was to assess the present-day Rodanthe to Stumpy Point Ferry 
channel and consider what innovative uses of dredged sediment could occur if the channel were 
widened and deepened (the need for the widening and deepening precipitated by periodic 
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closures of Bonner Bridge which traverses Oregon Inlet).  The interdisciplinary grant was geared 
more toward the geological and ecological consequences of dredging and subsequent deposition, 
but it also included a marine debris survey led by Dr. Nathan Richards utilizing side-scan sonar 
and magnetometer, as well as visual inspection and metal detection techniques in the area off 
present-day Black Mar Gut (see Richards and Parker 2017; White et al. 2017).  The idea here 
was simple; reanalyze the data to deduce whether any anomalies found in the survey area were 
possibly ordnance from the Chicamacomico encounter as well as the gunboat Fanny capture.   
Research Questions 
With these objectives in mind, the project looked to answer questions about this Civil 
War naval encounter through a maritime archaeological survey, historical research, forensic 
analysis of projectiles, and recreation of the battlefield utilizing GIS.  The study asked the 
question, “Using the military actions from the ‘Chicamacomico Affair’ as a case study, what are 
the best approaches for reconstructing ephemeral maritime battlefield events from the Civil 
War?”  Additionally, different methodologies were implemented during fieldwork to answer the 
following secondary questions:  
• What is the potential of magnetic remote sensing techniques (magnetometry and 
metal detection) for identifying the existence of ordnance and its pattern of 
distribution associated with a submerged Civil War battlefield? 
• What is the potential of acoustic remote sensing techniques (side-scan sonar) for 
identifying the existence of ordnance and its pattern of distribution associated with a 
submerged Civil War battlefield? 
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• What is the potential of using visual search techniques (diver- or snorkel-based 
survey) for identifying the existence of ordnance and its pattern of distribution 
associated with a submerged Civil War battlefield? 
• What is the benefit of utilizing a combination of remote sensing technologies to 
identify the existence of ordnance distribution within a submerged Civil War 
battlefield?  
Thesis Structure  
This thesis was challenged with analyzing the Chicamacomico Races by recreating the 
battle geospatially utilizing various archaeological field methods in conjunction with the 
historical record.  After the introductory chapter, Chapter 2 contains discussions of middle-range 
theoretical frameworks that bridge the gap between the historical and archaeological records.  
Historical data pertaining to the Civil War leading up to the Chicamacomico Races is presented 
in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 describes the methodologies employed during this study.  A detailed 
battle narrative and the results of data collection during archaeological fieldwork are discussed in 
Chapter 5. Chapter 6 presents a concise analysis of the combined data sets collated during this 
study through the analytical tools described in Chapter 2.  Chapter 7 concludes this thesis with 
final remarks concerning the research questions set forth at the beginning of this study, a 
statement of difficulties and issues encountered with the study, and future research potential. 
The Chicamacomico Races is an interesting case study because it provides an opportunity 
to study a Civil War battle through a set of middle range principles including examination of the 
battlescape through the lens of KOCOA and Battlefield Pattern analysis (both tenets of 
battlefield archaeology that will be discussed further in Chapter 2) coupled with behavioral 
archaeological perspectives focused on examining site formation processes.  In this thesis, 
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battlescape refers to the landscape within which the battle occurred (the area within which the 
archaeological signatures of a battle are created), and is differentiated from battlespace, which 
refers to the dimensions that must be understood in order to apply military force or complete the 
mission.  Battlespace dimensions include: land, sea, air, space, time, electromagnetic and 
information (Libicki and Johnson 1995:5; Veninger 2015:20; Ministry of Defence 2013:1-2).  
Additionally, the Chicamacomico Affair was selected as a case study because of the skirmish’s 
uniqueness as well as the unique geographical features that make up the area.  Furthermore, it 
was selected to reassess the sparse historical data concerning the Chicamacomico Affair, as well 
as reconsider the military tactics used and potentially recreate the encounter based on 








This chapter examines the naval aspect of a Civil War military encounter with multiple 
theoretical applications, with the objective of determining which archaeological approach is best 
for detecting archaeological signatures of military actions (and to reconstruct the engagement’s 
battlescape).  As previously discussed, the Chicamacomico Affair was selected as a case study to 
reconsider the military tactics used and potentially recreate the encounter based on 
archaeological findings.  To do this, this study, like other similar studies (see, for example: 
Bright 2012; Simonds 2013; Parker 2015), relied on analytical tools derived from battlefield 
archaeology (which grew from historical archaeology), and utilized concepts from behavioral 
archaeology. 
Battlefield archaeology is concerned with the identification and study of sites where 
battle events occurred, and the archaeological signatures of those events (Carmen 2014:41-42).  
Battlefield archaeology as a field of study, has several different operational frameworks or 
analytical tools such as KOCOA, Battlefield Pattern, Principles of War and METT-T, that 
archaeologists use to develop a better understanding of military actions, decisions, and tactics on 
the battlefield (see Fox and Scott 1991; Babits 2010; McKinnon and Carrell 2011; Bright 2012; 
Simonds 2013; Parker 2015).  Battlefield archaeology has its roots in historical archaeology, 
therefore as in most studies of this type the historical record provided the starting point for the 
project.  From there, this study followed the same methodological approaches as Doug Scott, a 
historical archaeologist who began working on historic battlefields and whose research 
innovations in this area have significantly influenced the growth of battlefield-focused theory in 
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dealing with terrestrial battlefield re-creation studies.  His approach to battlefield studies is 
showcased in his work at the June 1876 Battle of Little Big Horn site.  The book, Archaeological 
Perspectives on the Battle of Little Big Horn (Scott et al. 1989), outlines his implementation of 
historical-battlefield focused archaeology.  Since this study is concerned with battlefield re-
creation, Scott’s approach of utilizing analytical tools from battlefield archaeology was 
determined to be the best approach to answer this study’s research questions.  Similar approaches 
have been successful in recent research conducted at East Carolina University (see, for example: 
Simonds 2013 and Parker 2015) as well as other battlescape studies (see, for example: Scott 
1989; Haecker 2009; Heckman 2009; Babits 2010).   
Approaches from Battlefield Archaeology 
The initial phase of this study involved examination of both primary and secondary 
sources to identify where to focus this project’s archaeological fieldwork activities.  Scott et al. 
(1989) stated, “if history turns pages, then, archaeology turns the ground.” Historical 
archaeology, as the name implies, does both.  He further outlined that records and documents are 
crucial components in historical archaeology, but no more so than knowledge obtained from 
artifacts discovered in the archaeological record.  In his Little Big Horn study, Scott (1989:5) 
stated that written records concerning the Battle of Little Big Horn were used in conjunction with 
archaeological findings, much in the same way a criminal investigation would be conducted.  
The “testimony or evidence” can then be tested by analyzing the archaeological record, which 
contains historical clues in the form of physical remains. Scott and his team claimed that these 
include artifacts and their contextual relationships. They further stated that these relationships 
and the spatial distribution of artifacts could tell a great deal about what happened at a site (Scott 
et al. 1989:5). 
10 
 
The study into the Chicamacomico Races took a similar approach to Scott et al. (1989) 
where the historical written records and maps were used as the “witness testimony” while the 
archaeological findings (in this case, the completed remote sensing site survey, the geospatial 
recreation, and the sitemap) served as the study’s “evidence” to compare what was found in the 
historical record.  At times, researchers have found that history and archaeology do not agree, 
which makes it necessary for revisions in current perceptions of historical events (Scott et al. 
1989:5; Whitehorne 2010:3).  As Scott (1989:5) put it, “historical archaeology provides an 
important mutual checks and balances between two data sets, allowing for a more complete 
approach to understanding historical events.”  This agrees with James Delgado’s perspective on 
historical archaeology.  Delgado (1991:90), stated that historical archaeology provides physical 
data that serve to confirm, augment, or revise the written record or fill major gaps in 
understanding the knowledge of past events where no written record is available.  With that said, 
it was important to carefully analyze the data extracted from the historical record while 
researching this case study, as well as closely scrutinize data pulled from the remote sensing 
surveys representing the archaeological record.  It was hoped that by analyzing the 
Chicamacomico Races through historical archaeology, a more accurate historical narrative could 
be provided. 
Application of Battlefield Archaeology 
Battlefields across the country and abroad often serve as symbols of national identity, and 
thus their landscapes have been preserved and studied extensively by archaeologists (Whyte 
2013:58-59).  Battlefield archaeology is a relatively new field but has steadily grown over the 
last 30 years and is sometimes considered the anthropological study of warfare (Geier et al. 
2010:26).  Since its inception, several battlefield archaeology studies have been completed (see, 
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for example: Scott et al. 1989; Conlin and Russell 2006; Haecker 2009; Heckman 2009; Babits 
2010; Bright 2012; Simonds 2013; Parker 2015).   
Researchers using this approach within their respective battlefield studies strive to 
understand the factors that influence the outcome of historic battles (Conlin and Russell 2006:21; 
Simonds 2013:7).  Recent battlefield archaeology projects focus on the event of a battle and the 
associated archaeology, viewing battlefields as a part of landscapes that may be analyzed with 
powerful terrain analysis tools such as GIS (Scott et al. 2009:3).  This contrasts with military 
history which often focuses solely on the history, the causes of conflicts, or the politics 
surrounding the events (Sutherland 2005:7).  Hence, battlefield archaeology is often specific and 
usually concerns the study of a single battlefield. For example, battlefield studies may focus on 
one aspect of a battle, such as weaponry or the movement of troops through a field of conflict 
(Carmen 2012:25).   
The earliest battlefield archaeology studies were concerned with terrestrial battlefields 
(see, for example: Harrington 1957; Scott et al. 1989).  It was not until recently that battlefield 
archaeology started to be implemented in a nautical context to examine military actions in naval 
warfare (see, for example: Lydecker and James 2005; Conlin and Russell 2006; Haecker 2009; 
Babits 2010; McKinnon and Carroll 2011).  Additionally, the influence of battlefield 
archaeology upon underwater archaeology and maritime studies has been utilized in several East 
Carolina (ECU) MA thesis projects as well (see, for example: Bright 2012; Simonds 2013; 
Parker 2015).   
The first ECU MA study, titled “The Last Ambush: An Adapted Battlefield Analysis of 
the U-576 Attack Upon Allied Convoy KS-520 Off Cape Hatteras During the Second World 
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War” conducted in 2012 by John Bright, focused on adapting terrestrial battlefield survey 
techniques to analyze a naval engagement.  Bright’s study used the 15 July 1942 attack on the 
KS-520 as a case study for his research.  The second study conducted by Lucas Simonds in 2013, 
titled, “‘A Determination Worth of a Better Cause’: Naval Action during the Battle of Roanoke 
Island, 7 & 8 February 1862,” had two objectives study and assess cultural resources left from 
the battle and compare two battlefield archaeology analytical tools and their usefulness in naval 
warfare studies.  The third battlefield archaeology graduate student study conducted at ECU was 
conducted by Adam Parker in 2015.  The study titled “‘Dash at the Enemy!’ The Use of Modern 
Naval Theory to Examine the Battlefield at Elizabeth City, North Carolina,” focused on an 
archaeological analysis of the battlescape.  Parker’s objective was to apply the KOCOA analysis 
to the battle of Elizabeth City to explore whether KOCOA was useful in analyzing naval 
battlescapes over other battlefield archaeology analytical tools.  Additionally, he sought to use 
these analyses to verify or augment the historical record. 
As discussed, battlefield archaeology has various operational frameworks or analytical 
tools (KOCOA, Battlefield Pattern, Principles of War and METT-T) that archaeologists utilize to 
interpret archaeological data from battlefield sites.  These analytical tools assist researchers with 
organizing information pertaining to battle to help understand battle events.  Each has similar 
methodological approaches but are very distinct because they address different research 
objectives.  For example, the Battlefield Pattern analysis primarily focuses on the overall 
progress of battle by analyzing both the spatial and temporal aspects of a battle (Fox and Scott 
1991:92).  This was the approach Scott utilized at Little Big Horn, as he was concerned about re-
creating the movements of troops based on material evidence (such as bullets and shell cases) 
discovered.  KOCOA (an acronym that stands for Key Terrain, Observation and Fields of Fire, 
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Cover and Concealment, Obstacles, and Avenues of Approach), on the other hand, seeks to 
understand the battle elements by examining command decisions based on landscape and other 
physical factors (Lowe 2000:7; Fonzo 2008:2).  Since this study will analyze the signatures of 
material evidence (potential ordnance thought to be representative of battle) as well as physical 
battlescape factors to recreate the battle (to address research questions) it will utilize both the 
KOCOA and Battlefield Pattern analytical tools. 
Battlefield Pattern 
As previously mentioned, Battlefield Pattern analyzes the temporal and spatial 
characteristics of battle where the focus is on individual and unit behaviors discerned through 
examination of the archaeological record.  Battlefield Pattern utilizes two different patterns 
outlined by Fox and Scott (1991:93): gross patterning and dynamic patterning.  Gross patterning 
refers to the systemic-fixed location of material evidence.  From here, interpretations about unit 
or individual behavior can be made from the distribution of material culture.  For instance, if 
there is a cluster of objects in one area, that could be indicative of a stationary encounter.  If the 
material evidence is more spread out, this could be evidence of a more active event or perhaps 
mobile fighting (Fox and Scott 1991:93).  Dynamic patterning, on the other hand refers to the 
“signatures” of battle and is concerned with having a thorough understanding of projectiles fired 
during an engagement through comparative analysis (Fox and Scott 1991:92-93).  In this study, 
the pBlock modeling tool (more on this later) serves as a comparative tool to analyze the 
signatures of material evidence representative of battle.  Additionally, Battlefield Pattern 
integrates history and archaeology where the historical record facilitates research questions and 
guides planning of archaeological fieldwork.  Furthermore, analysis through this framework 
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provides clues on why certain behaviors were carried out by units and individuals (Fox and Scott 
1991:92).   
KOCOA 
The KOCOA analytical tool is used by the National Park Service’s (NPS) American 
Battlefield Protection Program (ABPP) for surveying and documenting battlefields (Lowe 
2000:7).  KOCOA, (originally known by OCKOA) is an acronym developed by the U.S. Army 
for quick assessment of battlefield terrains (Simonds 2013:13).  The military use of this acronym 
puts observation and fields of fire first, then cover and concealment, before identifying key 
terrain.  Archaeologists changed the acronym from KOCOA because the ABPP places a lot of 
emphasis on the landscape, therefore putting Key Terrain first.  Additionally, this was done 
because it was easier for archeologists to remember (Lowe 2000:1; Babits 2010:7; Parker 
2015:16).   
Within the ABPP there are three goals that any study engaged in battlefield research must 
strictly adhere to, this study being no exception.  First and foremost, protect battlefield sites that 
influenced the course of American history.  Second, encourage preservation and the 
interpretation of historic and archaeological sites.  Last, raise public awareness of battlefield site 
preservation.  This allows the archaeologist to view the battle through a military lens, or as David 
Lowe (2000:13) puts it, through soldier’s eyes, and ensures that battlefield studies are 
comparable for ABPP.  The KOCOA evaluation system is a set of five elements; Key Terrain, 
Observation and Fields of Fire, Cover and Concealment, Obstacles, and Avenues of Approach 
which are helpful in assisting those without military training to be able to grasp the fundamental 
concepts with a better understanding of tactical military planning (Lowe 2000:13; Simonds 
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2014:8).  This study relied on previous ECU studies as guides towards adapting the principles of 
KOCOA to naval warfare (see Bright 2012; Simmonds 2013; Parker 2015).   
The first element in the KOCOA framework is Key Terrain.  This is described as the 
portion of the battlefield that gives an advantage to the possessor; examples are high ground, 
bridges, and road junctures (Lowe 2000:14; Fonzo 2008:2).  Adapting this element to a nautical 
context could be described as having the “weather gauge” in early naval warfare.  In a modern 
context, it could also be described as water depth or tidal behaviors.  Terrestrial terrain features 
usually remain consistent across time; however naval features do not.  They are subject to wind 
and tidal changes, often on an hourly basis.  Dr. Lawrence Babits (2010:3) stated that key terrain 
is often very subtle in the coastal plain areas, where many naval engagements occurred.  A naval 
terrain feature can be a dune ridge’s height, which can enhance or deter visibility across tidal 
flats (Babits 2010:3).  This element can also be applied to navigable rivers and creeks because 
they can provide vessels with easy access to terrestrial targets within their fields of fire.   
The second element in the KOCOA analysis is Observation and Fields of Fire.  In a 
report submitted to the National Park Service in 2008, Stephen Fonzo described this as any point 
on the landscape that allows observation of movements, deployments, and activity of enemy 
forces that is not necessarily key terrain.  He further stated that this offered opportunity to see 
over an area to acquire targets and noted that high ground is an example of this element (Fonzo 
2008:2).  The description from Fonzo mainly applies to a terrestrial study.  In terms of this study, 
this element was amended for use in nautical analysis.  For a naval battle, Babits (2010:3) stated 
that observation is less important than it would be in a terrestrial battle.  Ships are highly visible 
in open water where observation by the enemy is usually uninhibited.  Instead, Babits (2010:3) 
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states that fields of fire are more complex in a naval battle and that it refers more to the 
capabilities of a ship’s weapons and the ability to bring the ship to a tactical position to engage 
the enemy.  He further adds that this may fluctuate during battle due to winds, tidal behavior, 
channel obstructions, and enemy fire (see also Parker 2015:137).   
The third element in the KOCOA framework is Cover and Concealment.  Here, cover is 
considered protection from enemy fire whereas concealment is protection from enemy sight.  
Features such as landforms or landscapes can act as both but at times only work as one.  
Examples of this element are riverbanks, forests, and trenches (Fonzo 2008:2).  In a nautical 
context and in instances of naval warfare the vessel itself could be considered cover and 
concealment.  Dunes, forts, and ridges could also be considered cover and concealment if it is a 
land-sea engagement (Babits 2010:3).  The fourth element, Obstacles is any feature or element 
that hinders movement and affects the course of battle.  Examples of this element are rivers, 
forts, and walls (Fonzo 2008:2).  In a naval setting, obstacles can range from sandbars, wind, and 
even the water itself, as tidal behavior can become an obstacle for any ship in a naval battle 
(Babits 2010:3).  The fifth and final element of KOCOA is Avenues of Approach and 
withdrawal/retreat.  This element represents corridors used for troop movement and transport.  In 
a terrestrial battlescape, examples of this element are roads, canals, rivers, and railroads (Fonzo 
2008:2).  In a naval setting, this element is considered the channel or anywhere where the tides, 
depth, and wind give access to approach or withdrawal (Babits 2010:4).   
Usually, terrain features in a terrestrial land engagement do not change much over time.  
However, Lucas Simonds’ thesis (2013), stated that this is not the case in naval engagements, as 
terrain can vary between different types of naval engagements as he demonstrated with shoreline 
17 
 
changes along Roanoke Island between 1862 and today.  Furthermore, the differences can be 
offshore versus nearshore or from shore to offshore, and they can also vary across time.  
Simonds (2013:8) further stated that naval engagements vary across space and time due to rapid 
increases in naval technology and previous researchers have had to amend or redefine the 
KOCOA framework so that it could be tailored to a naval study, such as Babits in his 2010 study. 
This study was no different and followed suit by amending the principles of KOCOA to 
assist with analysis of the “Chicamacomico Affair” and its shallow water landscape.  Doing this 
was just one avenue for understanding the events that transpired at Chicamacomico as well as the 
battle-related signatures which gave insight into interpreting the site formation process.  
Furthermore, outlining these elements spatially provided reference points for ship positions and 
fields of fire.  By having this spatial outline, remote sensing activities were planned with more 
certainty and precision. 
Approaches from Behavioral Archaeology  
Behavioral archaeology, a product of processual archaeology from the 1970s is 
concerned with archaeological site formation processes.  It is the study of how artifacts move 
from their systemic (use) context to their archaeological context (the state they are found in when 
examined by archaeologists) (Johnson 2010:65).  Michael Schiffer, the founder of this body of 
knowledge, discussed how the archaeological record is a “distorted reflection of past behavioral 
systems.” (1976).  Distortions result from the physical formation process; learning to understand 
these distortions assists in creating a comprehensive image.  In doing so, it enhances the 
researcher’s understanding of an archaeological site.  Simply put, Schiffer believed that the 
challenge was to eliminate distortion to gain a more accurate understanding of human behavior 
(Schiffer 1972:156-165; Trigger 2006:426).  Schiffer concluded that the site formation process 
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for any site consists of two factors, both of which are equally important while conducting 
research or fieldwork at an archaeological site.  The first factor influencing the site formation 
process is culturally influenced or created, these are referred to as “c-transforms.”  C-transforms 
refer to human behavior and can be any type of human activity such as warfare, settlement, or 
hunting.  The second type of site formation processes are “natural” or “non-cultural” in origin, 
these are referred to as “n-transforms”.  N-transforms could be weather-related phenomenon or 
geological occurrences that may affect a site’s formation or condition (Schiffer 1983:692; 
Trigger 2006:426-428). 
The analysis of the Chicamacomico battlescape was concerned with an interpretation of 
both categories of site formation process.  Understanding n-transforms of the survey area was 
necessary because the Chicamacomico landscape is heavily influenced by frequent geological 
changes (Riggs and Ames 2003:23; Riggs 2011:24).  The elements of KOCOA can also be 
directly analyzed by a thorough understanding of non-cultural site formation process of 
Chicamacomico.  There was also focus placed on c-transforms because the areas that were 
surveyed have been heavily affected by human activity for the last several hundred years.  
Fishing and crabbing activities are very prevalent throughout the sounds; therefore, the 
likelihood exists that these activities have affected the site’s formation, post-deposition.  
Additionally, this area was quite with warfare activity during the Civil War’s early years.  This 
study was concerned with understanding the signatures of battle that influenced the site 
formation process, therefore analyzing any possible debris or ordnance from the battle provided a 
better understanding of events that transpired.  Other studies have taken a similar approach (see, 
for example: Scott et al. 1989; Sivilich 1995; Reeves 2010). 
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Utilizing the KOCOA framework provides an understanding of human behaviors (c-
transforms) that occurred on the battlescape.  In addition, historical records may provide 
information about climate or terrain factors (n-transforms) that influenced certain human 
behaviors (c-transforms).  Together, these forces create the battlescape -- they are the 
transformational processes that shift the systemic (battle) context into the archaeological (site or 
record) context.  Once that occurs, over time other “c” and “n” transforms could alter the 
archaeological deposits/record. Therefore, by utilizing the principles of KOCOA, signatures of 
battle, and site formation process, there is a stronger likelihood of successfully recreating the 
battlescape. 
Remote sensing was the primary methodology carried out during fieldwork.  “Remote 
sensing” is the recording, observing, and sensing of objects in far-away places (Bowens 
2009:217; Weng 2009:1).  In a way, the remote sensing data was used as a middle range theory, 
meaning a magnetic signature may represent a cultural anomaly that might equate to evidence of 
the Chicamacomico Races which would then allow for battlescape assessment (and the site 
formation processes that created it).  Remote sensing signatures can be directly related to the 
signatures of site formation, as it is often used as a tool for studying the site formation process.  
Initially, remote sensing in the form of metal detection was used in a prospecting capacity (see 
Scott et al.1989 Little Big Horn study), meaning the activity was primarily concerned with 
locating and discovering artifacts and features of archaeological interest (Thompson et al. 
2011:195).  In the case of maritime studies, the traditional activity concerned with remote 
sensing applications has been the location and discovery of shipwrecks.  Within the scope of this 
study, remote sensing will be utilized differently, where it will be used as a means of searching 
for potential ordnance.  Thompson et al. (2011:195-196) stated that as technological advances 
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have been made, remote sensing has become more common in archaeological work and for this 
application to be more widely accepted, it must be linked with broader theoretical concepts.  
They have termed this inquiry-based archaeogeophysics (Thompson et al. 2011:195-196).   
This study differs because it is concerned with battlefield recreation using battlefield 
archaeology (KOCOA and battlefield pattern analysis) and site formation theories, making the 
application of remote sensing both prospecting and inquiry-based.  The project has specific 
research questions that pertain to inquiry-based archaeology; however, it is conducted in much 
the same way as the (1989) Little Big Horn study.  Where this study will utilize a side-scan 
sonar, a magnetometer, and hand-held metal detectors to search for potential ordnance 
representative of battle, Scott utilized hand-held metal detectors to locate weaponry.  He then 
mapped the distribution of ordnance to recreate the battlescape, which this study also intends to 
do.  In addition to this technology being utilized as a tool for site formation studies in maritime 
studies (see, for example: Anuszkiewicz 1989). 
John Broadwater (2010) stated that physical remains on land are invaluable to 
interpreting actions that occurred on land.  The same holds true for physical remains under the 
sea (Broadwater 2010:177-179).  Therefore, remote sensing has become an extremely important 
tool within archaeology because it gives the archaeologist the ability to observe the 
archaeological record without excavation, or at least with minimal site disturbance.  It has proven 
to be an invaluable tool to the underwater archaeologist because it serves as the eyes and ears to 
observe objects unreachable by humans on SCUBA applications (see, for example: Ballard and 
Archbold 1987).  Additionally, it gives archaeologists the ability to gather data without having to 
excavate artifacts because of depth limits or artifact size.  Furthermore, remote sensing 
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applications such as side-scan sonar and magnetometry have the potential to be great resources 
for searching for objects embedded in the sea floor or for examining site formation processes. 
Productive use and application of remote sensing tools in archaeology usually involves 
specific archaeological questions, such as the ones outlined in this study.  This goes back to 
Thompson et al.’s (2011) argument that these types of research agendas must be linked with 
broad theoretical concepts.  They further proposed three categories of research that relate to this 
topic.  The first is continuity and discontinuity in the use of space.  Secondly, there is 
construction variation and constancies in the use of space.  Lastly, there is the study of both 
natural and cultural modifications over time and space (Thompson et al. 2011:195, also see 
Schiffer 1983). 
Conclusion 
During the Civil War, there was a shift in the cultural and physical landscapes throughout 
the United States.  These include where armies were present and how the landscapes were 
drastically altered as a result (Balicki 2010:57).  Sites could range from the earthen forts seen at 
Fort Fisher in North Carolina to the remnants of small temporary campsites such as Camp Live 
Oak at Chicamacomico.  Many sites, such as Chicamacomico, extend out into the maritime 
landscape, therefore, researches must pay attention to both their terrestrial and maritime 
components.  This necessitates the need for various methodologies and theoretical applications to 
adequately study the archaeological record. 
This study contributes to the growing field of nautical battlefield archaeology and 
provides an opportunity to recreate a battlescape of an ephemeral Civil War skirmish.  Utilizing a 
theoretical framework allows the author to pose research questions that could offer new insights 
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into the movements of regiments involved, troop placement, ship placements, and fields of fire 








 This chapter will present a brief historical narrative of events preluding the 
Chicamacomico Races to include the capture of Fanny.  The first portion of this chapter 
discusses the strategic importance of coastal North Carolina and the objectives both sides sought 
in the Outer Banks.  The discussion then shifts to focus on preparations made for coastal defense, 
as well as the battle for Hatteras Inlet, which although a much larger event, was a precursor to 
the Chicamacomico Races.  The capture of Fanny just offshore Chicamacomico and the fall out 
will also be discussed during this chapter. 
The historical narratives purpose is to present the historical research, provide context to 
the reader, and detail troop and ship movement during the races.  This will provide a foundation 
for the GIS model used to recreate the battlescape geospatially, which was used to plan and 
coordinate archaeological fieldwork activities.  The historical data compiled within this chapter 
was pulled from a wide array of sources, including both primary and secondary.  The processes 
and methodologies for conducting research and gathering data will be discussed in Chapter 4. 
Strategic Advantage of North Carolina’s Outer Banks 
In May 1861, North Carolina was the penultimate state to secede from the Union and join 
the Confederate States of America.  The decision was met with a reluctant response as well as a 
lack of enthusiasm among the general population, especially from those along the coast (Yearns 
et al. 1980:18; Carbone 2001:1).  Shortly after North Carolina joined the Confederacy, it was a 
frequent stage for Civil War activity and would remain so throughout the war.  Much of this 
activity occurred along the coast in the Outer Banks, as both sides fought for control over the 
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state’s strategic assets.  The Outer Banks barrier islands were considered important points during 
the war as they protected inland waters that were considered access points to the state’s assets as 
well as the backdoor to Norfolk (Harpers Weekly 1861b:599; Trotter 1989:1-2; Oxford 2013:58, 
93). 
Both the North and South believed that North Carolina had great strategic importance, 
and both sides felt that gaining control over North Carolina would give them a useful advantage.  
The Union naval base at Hampton Roads’ proximity to the mouth of Chesapeake Bay, gave the 
Union a unique vantage point, as it put them within easy striking distance of Confederate forces 
in North Carolina.  The Union’s campaign for the Outer Banks resulted from Confederate 
privateering raids against Union shipping that originated in the sounds and the Federal counter to 
them.  Privateering raids additionally sought to interdict transportation and supply up and down 
the coast as well as prevent the Union from accessing the North Carolina mainland.  
Furthermore, the privateering raids sought to protect the state’s waterways, communication 
networks, and the state’s rail system which had grown to become a major supply route during the 
war.  The belief was that whoever controlled access to the sound also controlled the rivers, thus 
giving them access to the coastal railway system, especially the bridges.  Union domination of 
Southern railway systems would be a huge strategic victory as it would choke resources coming 
to Richmond from other Confederate states.  On the other hand, if the Confederacy maintained 
control of coastal North Carolina, then it retained a valuable gateway to foreign sources of aid, 
the resources of rich agricultural inland counties, and a communication network suited for 
delivering food and supplies (Trotter 1989:1-2; Carbone 2001:xxiv; Babits et al. 2015:13). 
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Although the state had significant strategic importance during the Civil War, this was not 
always the case.  The unusual geographical configuration created by the Outer Banks resulted in 
North Carolina initially failing to develop a large stable commercial economy before the Civil 
War.  For this reason, North Carolina was unable to create a successful entrepôt in the upper 
Outer Banks and did not enjoy the same wealth that came into the ports of Charleston, South 
Carolina, and Chesapeake, Virginia (Carbone 2001:xxi).   
The state’s economic plight changed, however, prior to the Civil War, when North 
Carolina made attempts to boost its economic position among fellow states.  This was 
accomplished by improving transportation along the coast via railroads and waterways.  The 
investment into the transportation infrastructure by establishing railroads was one of the state’s 
biggest improvements toward developing a flourishing commercial network along the coast.  
This made control of North Carolina a key objective during the war as railroads now connected 
the larger port states, such as South Carolina and Virginia, to North Carolina.  The result was a 
huge surge in North Carolina’s foreign export trade as the state had a valuable agricultural 
production system as well as high antebellum productivity in the shad and herring fisheries.  
Labor was also considered an important resource and was an important contribution to the 
Confederate war effort as one-ninth of the Confederacy’s population lived in North Carolina.  
Building up the rail network also added to North Carolina’s importance as agricultural 
production, antebellum productivity, and labor were transported via the railroads to southern 
ports such as Louisiana, South Carolina, and Florida (all with ports accessing foreign trade).  
Furthermore, the railroads became a valuable supply route for Confederate forces in Virginia, 
where it was believed supplies and resources were needed the most, making the state more 
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valuable to defend (Powell 1989:309; Trotter 1989:1; Carbone 2001:xxi-xxiv; Browning 
2011:17). 
In addition to building up the railroad infrastructure, North Carolina also invested in its 
waterways by utilizing the Pamlico and Albemarle Sounds to create an extensive intra-coastal 
waterway system for easier commerce and travel.  Both Pamlico and Albemarle Sounds are 
natural bodies of water situated between the North Carolina mainland and the Outer Banks.  
These sounds link the Atlantic Ocean with the state’s coastal rivers.  Albemarle also connects to 
Virginia via the Great Dismal Swamp Canal as well as the Albemarle and Chesapeake Canal.  
The Dismal Swamp Canal was created by a joint venture between North Carolina and Virginia 
when the two states came to an agreement that resulted in digging and dredging the canal to 
connect the two coastal regions.  The Albemarle and Chesapeake Canal also served as a route to 
Virginia.  It was created further to the east was and served as a more direct route to Norfolk by 
connecting the Elizabeth River with Currituck Sound.  These canals were considered strategic 
access points to Norfolk, Virginia, which made securing the canals a key objective for the South.  
Likewise, gaining access to the canal was a key objective for the North (Daily National 
Intelligencer 1861b:2; Trotter 1989:1-2; Carbone 2001:xxi-xxiv). 
If the North succeeded in gaining control over North Carolina’s Outer Banks, they would 
gain a significant edge over the South as they would have access to the states internal 
communication and transport networks as well as threaten the Confederate’s position at Roanoke 
that provided backdoor access to Norfolk.  Furthermore, if the North were to take Hatteras, they 
would effectively gain control of main access points throughout the sound, which would allow 
them to stop the privateers and establish a port for blockaders.  The South knew this and 
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understood that the Outer Banks were extremely important, unfortunately, they did not prioritize 
this importance when it came to North Carolina’s coastal defenses (Barrett 1963:42; Trotter 
1989:1-2, 153; Oxford 2013:93). 
Preparation for Coastal Defense 
The Confederate command structure was based in Norfolk where they created two 
departments for coastal defense.  These were supervised by Brigadier Generals Walter Gwynn 
and Theophilus Holmes, who oversaw the northern coastal defenses for the Confederacy (Babits 
et al. 2015:13).  As mentioned, the South did not prioritize coastal defense of North Carolina in 
the way that they should have.  Instead, emphasis was placed more on Norfolk rather than coastal 
North Carolina.  There were those in the Confederacy, however, who realized the Outer Banks 
(Roanoke Island specifically), was a valuable position to protect because it stood between 
Albemarle and Pamlico Sounds and thus covered access to Norfolk, Virginia, as well as North 
Carolina’s interior, and thought it should be protected (Oxford 2013:93). 
By May 1861, troops arrived at Hatteras Island to defend the coast and to protect the 
lighthouse, however, their numbers were not adequate, as there were less than 600 soldiers 
allocated to defend the entire Outer Banks (Yearns et al. 1980:28).  Nevertheless, the objective 
for the South was to secure the five freely navigable inlets along the Outer Banks.  From north to 
south, these include Oregon Inlet, New Inlet, Hatteras Inlet, Ocracoke Inlet, and Beaufort Inlet 
(Carbone 2001:xix).  These became a priority for Confederate forces to protect, so construction 
immediately began on several coastal forts (Trotter 1989:134-135; Sauers 1996:17-18; Pullen 
2001:23; Babits, et al. 2014:13).  Most of these forts were of earthen mound construction 
because soil was readily available; brick and wood were not, thus they were constructed quickly 
(Eldridge 1996:36-37).  Additionally, construction of earthen mound forts consisted of walls 
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made of earth and sand supported with wooden timbers, sandbags, mudbrick, and wickerwork 
because these were on hand.  Earthen forts proved to be more resilient than brick and masonry 
forts because they absorbed the energy from artillery projectiles rather than transmit it 
throughout the structure, which usually resulted in much more damage (Trotter 1989:134-135; 
Eldridge 1996:36-37).  The fort’s construction was described by one of Hawkin’s Zouaves in a 
diary entry: 
The forts are constructed of swamp-turf or sod (peat), brought from some distance 
above, and no better material can be found to resist either ball or bombshell, it 
being spongy yet strong and as solid as bailed cotton or India rubber (Johnson 
1861:47-49). 
 
Fort Fisher in Wilmington at the mouth of the Cape Fear River was the first of these 
types of forts built due to its strategic location for foreign ships (Carbone 2001:5).  Several 
additional forts were strategically constructed near unguarded inlets throughout the Outer Banks 
which gave Confederate forces control over the access points to Pamlico Sound.  Fort Oregon 
was constructed at Oregon Inlet and Fort Ocracoke was constructed inside Ocracoke Inlet. On 9 
May 1861, construction began on two additional forts at Hatteras Inlet, named Fort Clark and 
Fort Hatteras.  Fort Hatteras was completed first, followed by Fort Clark in late June.  The two 
were considered the most important of all the forts built in the Outer Banks because they guarded 
the main and most-reliable deep-water inlet to the sounds (Harpers Weekly 1861b:599; Sloan 
1883:109; Merrill 1952:207; Yearns et al. 1980:28; Carbone 2001:5, Pullen 2001:23).  The forts 
were situated in a way that they would be able to catch enemy ships in a crossfire as they 
attempted to navigate Hatteras Inlet (Merrill 1957:17). 
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In addition to the small number of forts defending the coast, the state created a small 
naval flotilla which served as their second line of defense.  This small fleet, later nicknamed the 
“Mosquito Fleet,” acted in the sounds and rivers and were instructed to seize all enemy shipping 
interests (primarily Union merchants) that might venture into these waters.  The Mosquito Fleet 
originally consisted of four vessels: Winslow, Ellis, Raleigh, and Beaufort.  Winslow was a side-
wheel steamer considered the most notorious privateer operating in the sounds, while the last 
three were small, propeller-driven riverboats that confined their operations to sounds and rivers 
(Merrill 1952:208; Barrett 1963:35; Yearns et al. 1980:28; Carbone 2001:5).   
This small fleet was soon turned over to the Confederacy and became part of the 
Confederate States Navy.  In addition to this small flotilla, several other light-draft vessels were 
eventually contracted for service by the South and armed with various types of guns.  These 
included the CSS Curlew, CSS Cotton Plant, CSS Empire, CSS Junaluska, and the CSS Sea 
Bird.  These vessels, along with the newly commissioned CSS Raleigh, were commanded by 
Captain William F. Lynch.  Under his command, these vessels except Ellis and Winslow 
ventured into Pamlico Sound on 1 October 1861 and captured the USS Fanny, instigating the 
affair known as the Chicamacomico Races (Oxford 2013:94-97).   
Battle for Hatteras Inlet ‘a precursor event to the events at Chicamacomico’ 
As the South became more focused on protecting the Outer Banks coastline, the Union 
was aware of their presence, as well as the construction of the earthen forts and the small flotilla. 
Eventually, Confederate privateering against Union vessels became a point of contention in 
Washington as several Northern vessels were captured and seized, resulting in Northern 
merchants having difficulties ensuring vessels and cargo.  This put immense pressure on the 
Union government to act against the Outer Bank forts that guarded the privateering bases 
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(Merrill 1952:208; Barrett 1963:36; Yearns et al. 1980:28).  In response, Union forces looked to 
put a stop to this by seizing the forts at Hatteras and the surrounding barrier islands in to control 
the inlet, thus denying the privateers use of water passage to the Atlantic (Harpers Weekly 
1861b:599; Butler 1892:282; Silverstone 2001:xiii).  The assault was a combined operation of 
both the Union Army and Navy that later became known as the “Butler Expedition.”  The force 
was comprised of USS Cumberland, USS Fanny, USS Harriet Lane, USS Minnesota, USS 
Monticello, USS Pawnee, USS Susquehanna, and USS Wabash (Harpers Weekly 1861a:578; 
Sloan 1883:168; Butler 1861:581-86; Scharf 1887:372; Merrill 1952:210; Barrett 1963:37, 44; 
Yearns et al. 1980:28-29; Olson 2006:10-12; Oxford 2013:47). 
On 26 August 1861, the expedition rendezvoused off Hatteras Inlet, roughly 15 miles 
below the cape and waited until the following morning to attack.  On the morning of 27 August 
1861, Colonel Hawkins’ 20th New York Infantry attempted a landing while the fleet provided 
cover fire.  Heavy surf prevented the infantry from landing at their planned position, therefore, 
they landed three miles away, and then, only a small number of men made it ashore successfully 
(Harper’s Weekly 1861a:578; Whitney 1866:53; Oxford 2013:47).  Although few infantrymen 
landed, they managed to be effective.  Fort Clark fell when Confederate forces ran out of 
ammunition which allowed Union forces already ashore to advance on the fort.  Overwhelmed 
by this assault, Confederate forces fled to nearby Fort Hatteras (Harpers Weekly 1861a:578; 
Sloan 1883:170; Merrill 1957:21; Barrett 1963:43; Sauers 1996:17-18).  Unfortunately for the 
Confederates, they were unable to put up much of a defense against continuous, close-range fire 
from the Union fleet just off the beach; Fort Hatteras surrendered on 29 August 1861 (Figure 2) 
(Scharf 1887:372-373).  The Confederate commander, Flag Officer Samuel Barron accepted and 
formally signed the terms of surrender.  By the next day, the Federal plan of suppressing the 
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Confederate forces at Hatteras came to fruition as they took control of Fort Clark and Fort 
Hatteras (Harpers Weekly 1861a:673; Whitney 1866:53; Butler 1892:284; Clark 1901:629; 
Barrett 1963:43-44; Trotter 1989:34; Olson 2006:10-12; Tucker 2006:81-84; Oxford 2013:47; 
Babits et al. 2015:14;).   
News of Union victory at Hatteras Inlet broke immediately; the Union was overjoyed 
with this victory as they had just suffered an embarrassing defeat at Bull Run (referred to as 
Manassas throughout the South).  The North considered the South’s surrender at Hatteras to be a 
decisive victory, as they now had a foothold on the Outer Banks.  Holding Hatteras meant they 
now controlled the main inlet into Pamlico Sound and now held a strategic position to bolster 
their blockading efforts (Harpers Weekly 1861b:599; Merrill 1952:204-205; Barrett 1963:45).   
In the South, however, the situation was grim; Congress was irate and demanded answers 
for the surrender of Forts Hatteras and Clark as it was considered a crushing defeat for them.  
Although casualties were low, some 700 men were captured and supplies such as cannon and 
munitions were now in Union hands.  This defeat also put an end to Confederate privateering.  
Further frustration came when they realized that the only presence between the Union and the 
backdoor to Norfolk was at Roanoke (Merrill 1952:204-205; Barrett 1963:45). 
After the loss of Hatteras, Confederate forces abandoned their forts at Oregon and 
Ocracoke Inlets and withdrew to Roanoke Island in hopes of concentrating their force to hold the 
Outer Banks.  The Confederate Army was fully aware of what the loss of Pamlico Sound meant 
for their chances of maintaining control over eastern North Carolina.  Thus, they established a 
position at Roanoke Island where they started to build up their numbers.  This force allowed 
them to maintain control over both Croatan and Roanoke Sounds, which linked Pamlico and 
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Albemarle Sounds, and posed a threat to Union traffic in and out of Pamlico Sound.  
Additionally, this base served as the last forward defense against Federal advances and their 
seizing full control of the sounds and access to the eastern North Carolina mainland (Hawkins 
1861a:607-09; Barrett 1963:48-49; Yearns et al. 1980:29; Babits et al. 2015:14; Zatarga 
2015:47).   
 
 
Figure 2. View of Fort Hatteras just before the surrender on 29 August 1861. (Original image published in Harper’s 
Weekly September 21, 1861. Image courtesy of Outer Banks History Center). 
 
Occupation of Hatteras Inlet gave the North a strategic advantage in the Outer Banks 
because they now controlled the main access point to Pamlico Sound, which was the first step in 
occupying the rest of the state.  Originally, General Butler was to remain at Hatteras and oversee 
using Fort Hatteras as a base for future naval operations inside the Outer Banks.  Instead, he 
opted to leave Hatteras for Washington to deliver news of the expedition’s success.  In his stead, 
he left Colonel Hawkins in command with the 9th and 20th New York Regiments (Butler 
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1861:583-584; Barrett 1963:48; Trotter 1989:33-38; Sauers 1996:19-21; Oxford 2013:47; Babits 
et al. 2014:14).  Colonel Hawkins stationed himself at Fort Clark and appointed Colonel Max 
Weber to oversee operations at Fort Hatteras while allocating part of the 20th New York to 
accompany him (Hawkins 1861a:607-9; Whitney 1866:54; Graham 1900:84; Oxford 2013:47).   
Once situated at Hatteras, Hawkins proclaimed that he would restore peace and order 
throughout the Outer Banks by suppressing Confederate forces he viewed were promoting 
rebellion amongst the locals (Hawkins 1861b).  To accomplish this, the Federals set their focus 
towards the enemy’s position at Roanoke Island as those in command understood that to fully 
control Pamlico Sound, they must take Roanoke Island (Rowan 1861a:240-41; Zatarga 2015:47). 
Colonel Hawkins believed Confederate forces were increasing their numbers at Roanoke.  He 
was concerned their intent was to launch a counteroffensive against Hatteras to recapture the 
forts and predicted they would attempt to land forces at Chicamacomico.  He further suspected 
they would move south to destroy the lighthouse.  His suspicions were validated the morning of 
21 September 1861, when two fugitives, claimed that they had regular contact with a colonel 
from the 3rd Georgia Regiment and, allegedly, that they were privy to a planned attack on 
Hatteras Island (Hawkins 1861a:617-20; Oxford 2013:49-53).   
With the new intelligence, Colonel Hawkins realized the enemy was building up their 
fleet to launch an assault.  He speculated that the attack would occur at the northern end of 
Hatteras.  As a result, Hawkins moved a force up the island to maintain outposts. In September 
1861, Hawkins established one outpost at Chicamacomico. Located north of Hatteras lighthouse, 
the village of Chicamacomico was just south of Loggerhead Inlet.  Around this same time, two 
additional ships were ordered to join the Union flotilla at Hatteras; the USS Ceres and the USS 
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General Putnam.  Hawkins was certain that the enemy was going to attempt a landing at 
Chicamacomico and he was adamant about protecting his position on Hatteras Island as well as 
the local inhabitants (Welles 1861:234; Whitney 1866:59; Barrett 1963:48-49; Olson 2006:12; 
Oxford 2013:54, 58).  He made the following declaration:  
To-night I shall start for Chicamacomico for the purpose of selecting a suitable 
ground for a camp, after which I shall return and send up all the force I have to 
spare, with two pieces of artillery.  This force will be encamped there permanently, 
unless otherwise ordered by yourself.  I know that there is great objection to 
separating so small a command as mine, but these people, who have taken the oath 
of allegiance, must be protected, though at the cost of every life under my 
command.  What may not be said of a government which is too weak or unwilling 
to protect its own loyal subjects its own rebels?... I hope you will send me at least 
1,000 men within the next four or five days, and one or two rifled guns, if you have 
them to spare (Hawkins 1861a:619). 
 
Meanwhile, Confederate forces at Roanoke were indeed building up their numbers and 
planning an assault on Hatteras Island in a joint venture with the Confederate Navy.  If the 
opportunity presented itself, they would push on to attack Hatteras Inlet and retake the forts.  
They were joined by the 3rd Georgia Infantry commanded by Colonel Ambrose R. Wright 
(Oxford 2013:77-84; Babits et al. 2015:14).  The 3rd Georgia Infantry arrived at Roanoke Island 
to assist in building fortifications, which proved quite an endeavor as evidenced by a letter 
written by Asa Winn from the 3rd Georgia on 4 October 1861 (Winn 1861).  Morale in the 3rd 
Georgia was high because they knew that if they could muster up enough support and personnel, 
they could regain control of Hatteras Inlet, thus they were eager to engage the Union Army 
(Babits et al. 2014:15).  The following is a response to the Union outpost in Chicamacomico 
illustrating the 3rd Georgia Infantry’s eagerness, “as soon as I can …will endeavor to capture the 
Federals encamped at Chicamacomico” (Wright 1861:597).   
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Capture of the Union Gunboat, Fanny 
In response to the growing Confederate force at Roanoke, Hawkins arranged to have the 
20th Indiana Infantry from Fort Monroe establish an outpost at Chicamacomico.  Hawkins 
viewed this as a top priority and as soon as possible, the 20th Indiana made their way towards 
Hatteras aboard the USS Spaulding.  Spaulding; however, had too deep a draft to get through 
Pamlico Sound all the way to Chicamacomico.  Therefore, three armed steamers (Fanny, 
General Putnam, and Ceres) were ordered to take them from Hatteras to Chicamacomico.  All 
but seventy-five men were transferred to the armed steamers.  They arrived at Chicamacomico 
with few tents and only two days’ food and supplies (Daily National Intelligencer 1861a:3; 
Merrill 1869:486; Oxford 2013:63).   
The 20th Indiana were outnumbered and outgunned by enemy forces situated at Roanoke.  
Tension within the camp began to mount when they realized how far away their supporting 
forces were.  The closest back up was over 40 miles away at Forts Clark and Hatteras.  In 
addition to being far from reinforcements, they also lacked adequate artillery and rifles (Brown 
1861a; Logansport Journal 1861).  The tension was felt most by Colonel Brown who was 
concerned about the lack of support, men, and artillery.  He realized the chances of holding 
Chicamacomico were in jeopardy and felt they were unable to successfully maintain their 
position at Camp Live Oak let alone launch any kind of offensive against the enemy without 
additional support.  Colonel Hawkins attempted to ease tensions when he guaranteed Colonel 
Brown that he would supply the 20th with additional men, cannons, and gunboats (Oxford 
2013:70).   
Unfortunately, Camp Live Oak, Colonel Hawkins’ promises for additional support to 
Colonel Brown and his men were embellished as he was unable to muster the support he 
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promised.  Hawkins inflated the number of men he stated were coming from Fort Monroe.  He 
also led them to believe that additional artillery and supplies were on the way but had two pieces 
of field artillery available; any additional artillery was either not ready for battle or unavailable.  
To make matters worse, ammunition at Hatteras was in short supply.  The ammunition they had 
on hand, had been waterlogged from the landing during the assault on the forts at Hatteras.  The 
situation was further exacerbated for Colonel Brown and his men as they were running low on 
food rations.  They arrived at the camp with only two days’ worth and they were now 
approaching day three (Oxford 2013:70, 75).  
Union forces at Hatteras realized that they needed to expedite supplies and support to 
Chicamacomico, so they sent the USS Fanny (Daily National Intelligencer 1861a:3; Barrett 
1963:49).  Fanny was a small tugboat, that was pressed into service by the Union army in 1860.  
Fanny had an iron hull with dimensions of 145 tons, 115 long, and 18 feet wide (Oxford 
2013:55).  Sources differ on what artillery Fanny was equipped with while in Union service.  
Some sources state Fanny was equipped with one 6-pounder James Gun and one 9-pounder 
Sawyer rifled cannon (Moore 1861:155).  The Richmond Daily Dispatch (1861b) indicated 
Fanny was equipped with a single 24-pounder rifled cannon.  According to the Naval History 
and Heritage Command (NHHC) (2015) online database, Fanny was equipped with one 32-
pounder on the bow and one 8-pounder on the stern after it was captured by Confederate forces.  
Regardless of armament, sending supplies aboard Fanny was a risky venture as there was a 
shortage of capable navy men and officers.  Therefore, Union forces were unable to send 
assistance with Fanny resulting in the small gunboat heading north alone.  Fanny was at a further 
disadvantage as its Sawyer gun was transferred to the USS General Putnam.  General Putnam 
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was ordered to stay in Croatan Sound to enforce a blockade, leaving Fanny vulnerable and 
without naval support (Moore:1861:156; Rowan 1861b:270-71; see also Oxford 2013:71, 75-76).   
Meanwhile, Confederate forces continued to gain strength on Roanoke Island as Flag 
Officer William F. Lynch took command.  Lynch fully understood the military importance of 
Roanoke’s proximity to Norfolk.  He knew that if Roanoke were to fall, the enemy would have 
easy access to Norfolk.  Therefore, he made it a top priority to hold Roanoke (Oxford 2013:93-
94).  On 1 October 1861, Lynch received credible intelligence that there was an enemy gunboat 
near the shore, south of Chicamacomico (Yellowley 1861; The Richmond Daily Dispatch 1861f; 
Turner 1864; Scharf 1887:377; see also Oxford 2013:96).  This prompted Lynch to send three 
gunboats to engage the vessel.  The expedition consisted of some 200 men from the 3rd Georgia 
regiment dispersed aboard CSS Curlew, CSS Raleigh, and CSS Junaluska.  Within a few hours, 
as they approached Chicamacomico, the Union gunboat (Fanny) came into view (The Richmond 
Daily Dispatch 1861f; Turner 1864; Andrews 1865; Scharf 1887:377-378; Wright 1891:596-7; 
Barrett 1963:49-50; Trotter 1989:44; Olson 2006:13; Oxford 2013:96-99). 
Earlier that day, the Federals at Hatteras loaded Fanny with supplies and additional 
troops and sent the vessel alone towards Camp Live Oak (Daily National Intelligencer 1861a:3).  
On the way to Chicamacomico, Fanny met up with the General Putnam steaming south from 
Croatan Sound.  Together they made way to a point roughly three miles off Chicamacomico at 
around 1:00 p.m. and anchored in 6-8 feet of water (Harpers Weekly 1861c:668; Mansfield 
1861:595; Morrison 1861:276; The New York Herald 1861; Ridgely 1861).  Based on a report to 
Hawkins, the windmill towards the north was visible from their position.  The windmill in 
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reference was reportedly adjacent to Camp Live Oak and has been referenced as a marker to the 
alleged location of the Union encampment (Oxford 2013:99-100, 195-96). 
General Putnam’s commander, Master Hotchkiss, had orders to remain with Fanny while 
supplies were unloaded at Camp Live Oak.  While at anchor, Hotchkiss returned the Sawyer gun 
which he borrowed earlier.  Once the gun was returned, Hotchkiss raised anchor and left for 
Hatteras Inlet, ignoring orders to stay (Mansfield 1861:595: Oxford 2013:100).  Thus, Fanny was 
left alone in the sound without adequate support.  A few later, at 4:00 p.m., in a turn of 
unfortunate circumstances for Fanny and those on board, they encountered a small Confederate 
flotilla (Lynch’s fleet).  Before they could unload many supplies and ammunition, they were 
engaged by the Confederates.  There was a short artillery exchange between Fanny and the 
Confederate flotilla which ultimately led to Fanny’s capture (Figure 3).  It is speculated that 
those aboard Fanny managed to offload some supplies destined for Camp Live Oak before 
Fanny was captured.  The 20th Indiana watched helplessly from shore as Fanny was taken (Daily 
National Intelligencer 1861a:3; Harpers Weekly 1861c:668; Johnson 1861:54; Mansfield 
1861:595; Morrison 1861:276; The New York Herald 1861; Whitney 1866:59-60; Barrett 




Figure 3. Illustration of USS Fanny’s capture on 1 October 1861 (Harpers Weekly 1861c:668). 
During the capture, Curlew began the assault on Fanny, followed up by Raleigh.  
Junaluska, however, was unable to get into range to effectively fire (Morrison 1861:276; New 
York Herald 1861; The New York Herald 1861; Oxford 2013:106).  Unfortunately for Fanny, 
there was no viable escape route because it had been run aground.  Outgunned by the enemy, 
Fanny only fired nine shots with no effect before succumbing to Confederate forces. (Daily 
National Intelligencer 1861a:3; Harper’s Weekly 1861b:668; The Richmond Daily Dispatch 
1861f; Scharf 1887:379; Oxford 2013:106-108; Parker 2015:48-49).   
During the chaos of Fanny’s capture, the crew and some soldiers pitched supplies 
overboard so that they would not be taken.  This was stopped before the guns and additional 
ammunition could be tossed overboard.  Soon after, the civilian crew managed to escape in a 
small boat.  In the aftermath, over 40 prisoners were taken after Fanny ran aground.  
Additionally, supplies, including winter overcoats for an entire regiment, meant for those at the 
camp fell into Confederate hands (Comly 1861; Daily National Intelligencer 1861a:3; Harpers 
Weekly 1861c:668; Johnson 1861:54; Morrison 1861:276; The New York Herald 1861; The 
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Richmond Daily Dispatch 1861b,f; Rowan 1861a:275-76; Scharf 1887:379; Barrett 1963:50-51; 
Trotter 1989:44-45; Oxford 2013:108-111; Parker 2015:48-49). 
The Fanny capture was a significant blow to Union forces and certainly discouraging for 
the 20th Indiana, who watched helplessly from shore while waiting for the much-needed 
supplies.  Although a setback for the Union, this was a major victory for the Confederates and 
the first capture of a Federal vessel by the Confederacy (Barrett 1963:51; Trotter 1989:45).  The 
significance of Fanny’s capture was illustrated by Colonel Claiborne Snead from the 3rd Georgia 
when he wrote, “This was the first naval success in North Carolina, the first capture made by our 
arms of an armed vessel; and more than all, it was a naval victory achieved by infantry marines” 
(Scharf 1887:379; see also Oxford 2013:110).  Additionally, they considered capturing Fanny a 
huge success because it was General Butler’s flagship (The Richmond Daily Dispatch 1861b; 
Trotter 1989:45; Oxford 2013:111).  There were expectations among some that a Union attack or 
some form of retaliation against their forces at Roanoke was eminent (The Richmond Daily 
Dispatch 1861f).   
Union soldiers, on the other hand, witnessing the capture of Fanny from shore saw this as 
a devastating blow which resulted in further deteriorated morale within the camp.  They watched 
helplessly as their fellow soldiers were attacked and subsequently captured.  Furthermore, the 
supplies they desperately needed were now in Confederate hands (New York Times 1861b; 
Barrett 1963:51; Trotter 1989:45; Oxford 2013:111).   
Fallout from the Fanny capture 
During the capture of Fanny over forty men were taken prisoner in addition to equipment 
and provisions meant for the 20th Indiana at Camp Live Oak.  These included overcoats, 
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blankets, and shoes, as well as medical supplies, food, and ammunition.  The captured goods 
were estimated to be valued as high as $100,000 (Comly 1861; The New York Herald 1861; The 
Richmond Daily Dispatch 1861a, c, f; Barrett 1963:50-51; Trotter 1989:45; Oxford 2013:116).  
After the capture of Fanny, Flag Officer Lynch decided to anchor at the site instead of making 
way back to Roanoke, deciding that they would head back the next day with their prize.  Fanny 
became the newest addition to his small fleet and was commissioned as CSS Fanny (Oxford 
2013:113-14). 
After Fanny’s capture, Lynch and his men were more determined and ready to engage the 
small Union force at Chicamacomico.  They knew that Chicamacomico was the last post 
between Roanoke and the Federal position at Hatteras.  Lynch’s plan involved a multiple step 
approach.  First, he intended to land a force north of the Twentieth’s position close to the inlet, 
then land another force further south near Kinnakeet.  He hoped to sandwich the Indianans 
between the two landings.  The next phase involved marching further south to destroy the 
Hatteras lighthouse.  The final phase involved an attack on Union-held Forts Clark and Hatteras 
to retake the inlet (Yellowley 1861; Andrews 1865; Barrett 1963:51-53; Trotter 1989:45; Oxford 
2013:125). 
Meanwhile, at Forts Hatteras and Clark, Union forces were blockading the inlet when 
news arrived about Fanny’s capture.  Those at the forts were startled by the news and were eager 
to retaliate as evidenced by the following statement from Charles Johnson from the 9th New 
York; 
Our camp has just been startled by the intelligence that the tug Fanny has been captured 
by the enemy while underway with the quartermaster’s commissary stores for the 
Twentieth Indiana at Chicamacomico.  Well we have been quiet so long, what if we 




Upon hearing the news, Colonel Brown sent word to Hawkins that the enemy took prisoners and 
supplies during the assault on Fanny.  He also relayed to Hawkins that there were several sick 
men at the camp and they were unable to adequately provide care for them (Oxford 2013:119). 
In response, Hawkins requested that a regiment be sent to Chicamacomico at once to 
reinforce the 20th Indiana at Camp Live Oak, and the Federals forces spent the day preparing for 
this expedition as well as possibly retake the gunboat Fanny.  Hawkins recruited twenty-five 
men, two officers, and the tugs USS Ceres and General Putnam.  He put Lieutenant J.P. 
Bankhead from the USS Susquehanna in command with orders to steam for Chicamacomico the 
next morning (Rowan 1861a:275-76; Goldsborough 1861:260; Merrill 1869:488; see also 
Oxford 2013:120). 
Union forces land at Chicamacomico  
Bankhead’s small expedition consisting of Ceres, General Putnam, and one of 
Susquehanna’s small boats towed by Ceres, arrived at Chicamacomico on the afternoon of 3 
October.  Once on site, they unloaded provisions, tents, and supplies.  As the 20th Indiana 
welcomed the newly arrived provisions, Colonel Brown began loading the sick aboard General 
Putnam and Ceres.  Varying accounts suggest that during this time, a rebel steamer became 
visible and General Putnam and Ceres chased it away.  Other reports suggest they saw nothing 
and simply returned towards Hatteras or were given other tasks.  Either way, the two vessels 
were reportedly not seen again by anyone at Camp Live Oak (New York Tribune 1861b; Merrill 




The events leading up to the Chicamacomico Races was the result of two opposing 
strategies which involved controlling the sounds inside the Outer Banks.  After the events at 
Hatteras Inlet, there were those within the Confederate command who now fully understood the 
importance of coastal North Carolina.  They realized the position at Roanoke was the only thing 
between Norfolk and invading Union forces now situated at Hatteras Inlet.  Likewise, the 
Unionists fully understood the importance of holding Hatteras Inlet, for they knew it effectively 
eliminated Confederate privateering activities as well as giving the Union a strategic position 
from which they could threaten interior North Carolina.  The Northern expansion began by 
establishing an outpost at Chicamacomico (Camp Live Oak) in response to growing enemy 
forces at Roanoke.  Once Confederate forces learned of a Union presence at Chicamacomico, 
they directed a small fleet of boats to engage, and capture, Fanny, while it was on a routine 
supply mission to Camp Live Oak.  This resulted in one of the most confusing encounters of the 




Methodological Approach to Investigating the Chicamacomico Races 
 
Introduction 
This thesis was concerned with determining and assessing the best archaeological 
approaches (theory, methodologies, and tools) for detecting archaeological signatures of a naval 
engagement in shallow water.  Similar studies (see Simonds 2014 and Parker 2015) have 
conducted surveys within North Carolina’s shallow waters, the key difference here is that this 
study conducted an archaeological survey in extremely shallow water (1-4 feet deep).  The 
archaeological data was then used to recreate the Chicamacomico Races naval battlescape.  A 
multistep methodological approach was necessary, corresponding with the theoretical approach 
discussed in the previous chapter.  These steps included: historical research, integration of 
Geographic Information System (GIS) software, archaeological fieldwork, consisting of a visual 
shoreline inspection coupled with three-fold remote sensing and final analysis.  The fieldwork 
consisted of hand-held metal detection and towed remote sensing surveys utilizing side-scan 
sonar and magnetometer technology. 
With the principles of KOCOA in mind, the first step was creating a historical narrative 
from primary and secondary sources to create a GIS model representing the Chicamacomico 
Races battlescape.  This model illustrated the activity that occurred at Chicamacomico during the 
period of 1-5 October 1861 as well as the potential fields of fire during the engagement.  This 
was done to determine the best places to conduct survey activities to search for ordnance.  Since 
the analysis is vessel focused, the focus of the surveys included only areas where potential 
ordnance would have landed.  The next phase involved the archaeological fieldwork which 
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consisted of two parts: visual shoreline inspection coupled with handheld metal detection and a 
remote sensing survey over water.   
The final phase involved integrating archaeological survey data into the GIS model for 
analysis which allowed for a final battlescape re-creation using the operational frameworks 
outlined in Chapter 2.  This had two purposes, validate or disprove the historical record and 
determine which archaeological approach was the best method for detecting archaeological 
signatures of a naval battlescape in shallow water.  This analysis will be discussed in more depth 
in Chapters 5 and 6.   
Historical Research  
Research into the Chicamacomico Races proved to be quite challenging as there is not 
much historical discussion concerning the event.  Furthermore, primary source material on the 
event is particularly sparse in comparison to other North Carolina engagements such as the Battle 
at Hatteras Inlet.  Therefore, much time was spent meticulously examining research material 
available at both Joyner Library at East Carolina University (ECU) and Randall Library at the 
University of North Carolina-Wilmington (UNCW) to gather information in the form of letters, 
official reports, officer statements, and maps.   
While visiting university libraries as well as reviewing their online databases, the 
following sources were frequently consulted: The United States War Department’s, The War of 
the Rebellion Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (1880-1901) and the United 
States Naval War Record’s Office’s, Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in 
the War of the Rebellion (1894-1921), which proved to be great sources of information.  There 
were several other primary sources available through the universities such as Harpers Weekly 
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1861, New York Times 1861, New York Herald 1861, The Richmond Daily Dispatch 1861, 
Charles Andrews’ (1865) Third Georgia Regiment: History of its Campaigns from April 26th 
1861 to April 9th 1865, Matthew Graham’s (1900) The Ninth Regiment New York Volunteers 
(Hawkin’s Zouaves), Being a History of the Regiment and Veteran Association from 1860 to 
1900.  Additional sources investigated include, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War: Being for 
the Most Part Contributions by Union and Confederate Officers (available through the library of 
General Rush C. Hawkins, of New York via ECU library), J. Thomas Scharf’s (1887) History of 
the Confederate States Navy from its Organization to the Surrender of its Last Vessel, John A. 
Sloan’s (1883) North Carolina in the War Between the States, and J.H.E. Whitney’s (1866) The 
Hawkin’s Zouaves (Ninth N.Y.V.) Their Battles and Marches.  The Henry T. King collection 
(1825-1865; 1887-1931) was used, which included the Edward C. Yellowley papers and the 
Confederate States of America, as well as North Carolina Infantry Regiment, 8th, and Edward C. 
Yellowley’s (1901) “Chicamacomico, 4 October 1861.”, and Letter dated Roanoke Island, 8 
October 1861, “Histories of the Several Regiments and Battalions from North Carolina in the 
Great War 1861-’65.” 
Visiting the Outer Banks History Center in Manteo, North Carolina proved to be fruitful 
in searching for information regarding the Chicamacomico Races as transcripts of handwritten 
accounts of soldiers were available in the archives.  These include Asa Win (September 6, 1861 
and October 4, 1861), 8th North Carolina Infantry Letter (October 8, 1861), and William Miller 
(November 14, 1861).  Additionally, there was access to the September 14, 1861 and September 
21, 1861 editions of Harper’s Weekly newspaper which contained information on events leading 
up to the battle.  Other newspapers such as Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper, November 2, 




With limited primary source material on the topic available, much of the research into the 
Chicamacomico Races relied on any secondary sources that mentioned the affair to shape the 
historical narrative.  Examination of secondary research material was challenging because 
several authors touched on the subject briefly while covering a much larger topic (see Merrill 
1952, 1957; Trotter 1989; Carbone 2001; Pullen 2001; Zatarga 2015).  Secondary sources 
consulted include Rodney Barfield’s (1995) Seasoned by Salt: A Historical Album of the Outer 
Banks, John Barret’s (1963) The Civil War in North Carolina, Judkin Browning’s (2011) 
Shifting Loyalties: The Union Occupation of Eastern North Carolina, John Carbone’s (2001) 
The Civil War in Coastal North Carolina, Drew Pullen’s (2001) Portrait of the Past: The Civil 
War on Hatteras Island, North Carolina: a Pictorial Tour, James Merrill’s (1952) article, “The 
Hatteras Expedition, August 1861” in North Carolina Historical Review and (1957) The Rebel 
Shore: The Story of Union Sea Power in the Civil War, Richard Sauers’ (1996) A Succession of 
Honorable Victories: The Burnside Expedition in North Carolina, William Trotter’s (1989) 
Ironclads and Columbiads: The Civil War in North Carolina The Coast, Buck Yearn and John 
Barrett’s (1980) North Carolina Civil War Documentary, and Michael Zatarga’s (2015) The 
Battle of Roanoke Island: Burnside and the Fight for North Carolina.  These sources provided 
only a brief outline of the affair, and the Fanny capture often dominated the discussion.  Most 
neglected or only touched on the subsequent events such as the USS Monticello assault upon 
Confederate troops at Kinnakeet.  Collectively their discussions into the affair seemed to provide 
a transitional discussion of events between the Battle of Hatteras Inlet Batteries (1861) and the 
Battle for Roanoke Island (1862).  Furthermore, it is often portrayed as a comical event where 
there was no clear victor and no ground was gained by either side. 
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None of the secondary sources reviewed gave the Chicamacomico Races the same focus 
as Lee Oxford (2013) did in his book, The Civil War on Hatteras: The Chicamacomico Affair 
and the Capture of the U.S. Gunboat Fanny.  Oxford put together a comprehensive historical 
account of the Chicamacomico Races utilizing a wide variety of primary and secondary sources 
and discussed the capture of Fanny, the amphibious assault by the Confederate Army and Navy, 
and the Union encampment at Live Oak.  This source proved to be invaluable in the historical 
research phase as it was the only secondary source solely dedicated to the Chicamacomico Races 
and Fanny’s capture.  Additionally, it proved to be a great guide for further research into this 
skirmish.  The decision on where to coordinate archaeological activities was largely based on 
historical research and information contained within Oxford’s book.  Oxford identified the 
skirmish area in the following three figures (Figures 4-6).  These figures essentially delineate the 
extent of the entire event.  Critically, he identified a concentration of activity at Camp Live Oak 
and pinpointed its location as having been at the north end of Chicamacomico, at present-day 
Rodanthe (Oxford 2013:196).  Oxford also identified the location of Midyett’s Windmill which 












The location of this windmill has been heavily debated by a local historian, Mr. Mel 
Covey, and was the subject of a terrestrial archaeological investigation led by Dr. Lawrence 
Babits (Babits et al. 2014).  This search for an alternative location of Camp Live Oak at Waves, 
North Carolina, eventually ruled out the Covey theory of Waves being the site of Camp Live 
Oak. Dr. Babits’ study is relevant because, in the process of spelling out a logical narrative, it 
tends to confirm Oxford’s initial identification and establishes an important area of the conflict. 
 





Figure 7. Location of Midyett’s windmill as illustrated in Oxford (2013:196). 
 
Oxford concluded that Camp Live Oak was immediately north and east of the windmill, 
which stood at 35° 35’ 54.5” North to 75° 28’ 19.3” West (Figure 7 above).  He reached this 
conclusion by having a composite map prepared by NOAA’s Office of Coast Survey that 
includes the 1852 Hull-Adams coastal survey map overlaid with a 2012 satellite image (Oxford 
2013:196).  The historical data available places part of the 20th Indiana Regiment in this location 
in October 1861, so it is reasonable to assume this area is part of the historic Chicamacomico 
Races battlefield site.  Additionally, the present study found that the historical evidence lends 
support to Lee Oxford’s theory on the location of Camp Live Oak, as well as supporting 
evidence from Dr. Babits’ archaeological findings, which exclude any other location for the 
camp.  Therefore, archaeological fieldwork activities for this project were based on historical 
research and Oxford’s theory on the location of Camp Live Oak. 
One last piece of historical research that was carried out before creating the GIS model 
focused on researching the capabilities of artillery involved in the affair.  This was an important 
step since the primary goal of this project was to investigate which method is best suited for 
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detecting archaeological signatures of a naval engagement in shallow water.  It was necessary to 
determine the capabilities and ranges of artillery utilized during the battle so that this information 
could be incorporated into the GIS model to create the fields of fire and narrow down survey 
locations.  The archaeological fieldwork carried out for this project was primarily concerned with 
the events of 5 October 1861, when the USS Monticello bombarded on retreating Confederate 
troops, therefore the research focused on the USS Monticello’s artillery capabilities.  Additional 
sources were consulted to assist with setting up the fields of fire in the GIS model.  These 
sources were especially useful in discussing naval aspects of the affair.  These include Eugene 
Canfield’s (1960 and 1969) works, Notes on Naval Ordnance of the American Civil War, 1861-
1865 and Civil War Naval Ordnance, Donald Canney’s (1998) Lincoln’s Navy: The Ships, Men 
and Organization 1861-1865, Kevin Dougherty’s (2010) Strangling the Confederacy: Coastal 
Operations of the American Civil War, U.S. Navy History Division’s (1959) Dictionary of 
American Naval Fighting Ships, vols. 1-4, Christopher Olson’s (2006) article, “The Curlew: The 
Life and Death of a North Carolina Steamboat, 1856-1862” in North Carolina Historical 
Review, Paul Silverstone’s (2001) The Civil War Navies, 1855-1883, Spencer Tucker’s (2006) 
Blue and Gray Navies: The Civil War Afloat, Spencer Tucker et al. (2011) The Civil War Naval 
Encyclopedia, and the US Navy Historical Center’s (2011) Confederate Ships Afloat. 
GIS Model 
Before conducting any archaeological fieldwork, a GIS model representing the 
Chicamacomico Races was created based on the historical narrative to illustrate points of 
interest, theorized ship placement, and fields of fire to narrow down where to conduct 
archaeological survey activities.  This proved a challenging task because of scant primary source 
material available as well as the lack of information in secondary source material.  Therefore, the 
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GIS model was heavily influenced by the location of Camp Live Oak as noted on the 1852 Hull 
Adams map. This map (Figure 11) shows the Windmill at Chicamacomico and was used by 
Oxford in his historical account of the battle (Oxford 2013:195-196).  As a result, the GIS model 
looked very similar to the battlefield overview created by Oxford (Figures 4-6) but allowed for 
an assessment of other factors, such as proximity to other landmarks and bathymetry, that were 
incorporated into the cartographic (GIS) representation.  Landmarks and bathymetry factors also 
assisted in determining areas of high probability to have in situ cultural material where remote 
sensing operations should focus.  The GIS model focused on an expansive area that included 
present-day Rodanthe southward toward Frisco (Figure 8).   Within this area the events of 1 
October 1861 through 5 October 1861 were illustrated; these included the capture of Fanny, the 
assault on Camp Live Oak, and the USS Monticello’s bombardment upon the withdrawing 3rd 
Georgia.  
In a manner similar to previous maritime battlefield studies conducted at East Carolina 
University, the historical data was integrated into the GIS model to create a geospatial 
presentation of the battle (see, for example: Bright 2012, Simonds 2014, and Parker 2015). 
ArcMap 10.4, a software program developed by ESRI and licensed by East Carolina University 
for student use, was utilized to generate the GIS model.  This process involved integrating the 
historical data, georectifying historic maps with modern National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA) charts, digitizing both modern and historic landscapes and bathymetry, 
and creating imagery showing vessels involved for placement in their approximate locations 
based on historical data and supporting theories by Oxford.  The final step involved in recreating 




Figure 8. 1861 U.S. Coast Survey (USCS) chart depicting the Coast of North Carolina, with the "Chicamacomico 




The first aspect within the GIS model illustrated activity that took place on 1 October 
1861; the engagement and eventual capture of Fanny.  Based on the historical narrative, the point 
where Fanny was engaged by the Confederate flotilla is believed to have occurred two to three 
miles west of Camp Live Oak’s location.  The point at which the vessel was eventually captured 
is approximately five miles south-southwest of that point, which would put its capture 
approximately three miles west of present-day Salvo (Mansfield 1861:595; Merrill 1869:488; 
Oxford 2013:195-196). 
No major naval activity occurred on 2-3 October 1861, so the next model increment 
illustrates activity that occurred on 4 October 1861.  It should be noted here that although a GIS 
model was created for the entire engagement (including Fanny’s capture), archaeological 
activities were planned based only on naval events of 4 October 1861 and 5 October 1861.  
The GIS model for 4 October 1861 shows the two successful and one attempted 
Confederate landings on Hatteras Island.  The first landing occurred near Union pickets in 
proximity to Loggerhead Inlet which was north of Camp Live Oak.  The second landing was at 
Camp Live Oak itself while a third was attempted below Kinnakeet.  The final aspect of the GIS 
model illustrated activity that occurred on 5 October 1861.  This shows the USS Monticello 
firing on the retreating 3rd Georgia beginning at Bald Beach in Kinnakeet. 
Ship placement in the GIS model is approximate based on primary accounts.  When 
referring to primary accounts such as Lieutenant Braine’s, (commanding officer of Monticello) 
account of the distance from shore off Kinnakeet, a degree of caution is warranted.  Monticello 
could have been closer to shore or slightly further away (Braine 1861:291-292; Johnson 1861:54; 
Trotter 1989:44-45; Oxford 2013:151, 171).  The same holds true for all ship locations within the 
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GIS model.  As mentioned in previous studies (Simonds 2013:28; Parker 2015:62-63, 138), a 
certain degree of error is expected when utilizing GIS models to illustrate and interpret historic 
battlefields.  There are certainly limitations present when creating GIS models as is emphasized 
by the following statement from Lucas Simonds’ (2013:28) study: 
First and foremost, the purpose of compiling data into a GIS was to produce an 
approximate digital model of the landscape of the battlefield [in its historic context].  
This digital model serves primarily as a means of exploring the relationship between the 
elements of that landscape and the combatants to better understand the influence of those 
relationships on human behavior during the battle.  The model is based on historic charts 
and descriptions from primary accounts and is not intended to present a perfectly accurate 
representation of the details of the historic landscape (also quoted by Parker 2015:62).   
Parker (2015:63) adds, “imperfections between the modern landscape and the historic landscape 
are to be expected.”  He further states, “GIS models are not without merit…” and that they “… 
are interpretive tools based off historical data and archaeological evidence”. 
Creating the Historic Landscape in a Digitized Format 
The first step in the actual GIS creation involved extracting the correct modern-day charts 
of the study area for a base map; this required two base maps.  The northern point of the study 
area is where the two base maps meet.  Both base maps were readily available through the 
National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) (NOAA 2016, charts 11555 
and 12204).  These charts provided modern-day depth and landscape information, as well as 
navigational aids.  They depict the area from Roanoke Island southward towards Hatteras Inlet, 
as well as Pamlico Sound and the Atlantic Ocean (Figures 9 and 10).  Historic maps were also 
available for downloading through NOAA’s historic map database.  For this study, the 1852 Hull 
Adams US Coast Survey map was used as well as the 1861 US Coast Survey map and the 1883 
Pamlico Sound Coast Chart No. 142.   
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The next phase required georectifying historic maps to the modern-day NOAA base 
maps.  This was completed by downloading the historic maps as raster images and importing 
them into the GIS model template (Figures 11-13).  These charts did not include any geospatial 
information within them so georectification required the images to be rectified (rubber-sheeted) 
to an extent so that they could match up with the modern charts.  The 1852 Hull Adams map was 
the first to be georectified.  This proved an easy task because this map depicted a smaller area 
than the 1861 map; therefore, distortions were not as drastic.  Although this map depicted a small 
area (the northern end of Hatteras Island), it was necessary to include because it referenced 
Midyett’s windmill.  This is important because primary source material places the location of 
Camp Live Oak slightly north-northeast of this windmill.   
 




Figure 10. NOAA Coastal Chart 12204, Currituck Beach Light to Wimble Shoals (NOAA 2016). 
 
The next step was to geo-rectify the 1861 chart.  This map was used because it was 
published very close to the when the Chicamacomico Races occurred, therefore, it was deemed 
the best to represent the area from that time.  The 1861 raster image proved to be a bit more 
difficult to geo-rectify to the NOAA base map.  It took several points to georeference it, and in 
the end, it was still not perfect.  The distortions and imperfections are evident in the map that 
shows Hatteras Inlet.  Several attempts were made to correct this; however, attempts proved 
futile, in part because of the dynamic nature of the inlet, as corrections would distort the map’s 
north end.  As a result, it was decided to match the north end near Rodanthe as close as possible 




Figure 11. (Left) 1852 Hull Adams US Coast Survey Map from NOAA historic chart collection (NOAA 2016), 




Figure 12. (Left) 1861 US Coast Survey map from NOAA historic chart collection (NOAA 2016). (Right) 1861 US 
Coast Survey map geo-rectified to modern-day NOAA base maps. 
 
 The final historic map to geo-rectify was the 1883 Coast Chart No. 142.  (See Figure 13). 
This map was used because it contained sounding data necessary to understand the historic 
bathymetry to assist with ship location when creating fields of fire.  Although the Outer Banks 
have been known to change physically in short periods of time, this map was the closest useable 
map containing depth information for the time-period in this study.  Like the 1861 map, it was 
challenging to geo-rectify.  It took several points to georeference the map to the modern-day 





Figure 13. (Left) 1883 Pamlico Sound Coast Chart No. 142 from NOAA historic chart collection (NOAA 2016) 
(Right) 1883 Coast Chart No. 142 geo-rectified to modern-day NOAA base maps.   
 
Once the 1852, 1861, and 1883 maps were geo-referenced as closely as possible to the 
modern-day NOAA charts, the next step was to illustrate the historic landscape.  This was done 
in a fashion similar to Parker’s (2015) methodology for his GIS model of the Battle of Elizabeth 
City, North Carolina.  This involved creating several different layers which included; water, 
land, marshland, and trees.  For this task, the “Feature to Polygon” tool was utilized.  The water 
layer was the first.  The transparency was set to 50% so that charts underneath could be seen 
when creating the additional layers.  The next layers were completed in the following order using 
a combination of the polygon and freehand drawing tool: land, marshland, and trees (Figures 14 
and 15).   
Additional layers, such as roads and historic points of interest, were then added to the 
GIS model.  Roads were not illustrated on the 1852 Hull Adams map; they were, however, 
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illustrated on the 1861 historic chart.  For this reason, roads were included into the GIS model.  
The roads were created utilizing the line feature in ArcGIS.  There were additional points of 
interest included in the GIS model which were based on the historic maps.  The 1852 map 
depicts a windmill north of modern-day Black Mar Gut in present-day Rodanthe.  Working from 
Lee Oxford’s theory and primary source material this is allegedly Midyett’s Windmill (see 
Oxford 2013:195-196).  As mentioned earlier the Union encampment (Camp Live Oak) is 
reported to have been near the mill.  
The next point of interest included in the GIS model is the approximate location of Camp 
Live Oak sited using the 1852 Hull Adams map depicting the windmill’s location as well as the 
Oxford (2013:195-196) maps.  Additional points of interest included in the GIS model include 
the gunboat Fanny’s location during its capture.  Oxford (2013:195) states that the 1852 Hull 
Adams map was used in planning the Civil War marker located approximately at mile marker 
53.6 in Salvo.  The first point of interest marks the actual marker’s location at 35°32’3.6” North 
latitude.  Oxford points out that the marker contains an error; it includes an arrow illustrating 
“you are here,” but that point on the map does not match coordinates on the actual marker.  The 
“you are here” on the marker points to the coordinate 36°34’41.1 North Latitude; this has been 
marked as a point of interest in the GIS model.  With that said, there is a margin of error of 
roughly 2 miles between the two points.  These markers are important because they are supposed 
to illustrate that Fanny was finally captured three miles west of the correct point after having 
drifted from its original point two miles off Camp Live Oak (Oxford 2013:195).  This was 
included in the GIS model for a couple reasons; first and foremost, it shows how events of 1 
October 1861 may have transpired.  Secondly, these points were selected as a secondary survey 
area for archaeological fieldwork if the first area did not work out due to extremely shallow 
63 
 
water depths.  Furthermore, it is good to record these points of interest for anyone considering an 
additional archaeological investigation into the Chicamacomico Races and Fanny capture.  The 
points of interest were plugged into the GIS model by using the go to XY feature to plug in the 
coordinates of each point of interest. 
Hatteras Lighthouse was also added to the GIS model as a point of interest.  Shortly after 
the fall of Forts Hatteras and Clark, the lighthouse became a target for Confederate forces.  
Earlier that summer, the lighthouse Fresnel lens had been removed by Rebel forces (Oxford 
2013:39).  During the Chicamacomico Races, the lighthouse is where the 20th Indiana set up 
camp after retreating from Camp Live Oak on 4 October 1861.  Civilian residents of 
Chicamacomico also arrived here after fleeing invading Confederates (Oxford 2013:133-135).  
Adding this point of interest to the GIS model proved to be challenging for a few reasons.  First, 
the lighthouse depicted in the modern-day NOAA chart that stands in Hatteras today is not in its 
1861 original site.  In 1999, Hatteras Lighthouse and surrounding structures were successfully 
moved 2900 feet from their original locations.  To complicate things even further, this is not the 
original lighthouse.  The existing lighthouse was built in 1870, the original lighthouse had fallen 
into severe disrepair after the war.  The original lighthouse was located 600 feet north of the 
original location for the present-day lighthouse (Lighthouse Friends 2001; National Park Service 
2016).  The original lighthouse is shown on the 1861 map.  Further complications arose while 
trying to include this point in the GIS model.  This is, in part, because the 1861 image proved to 
be extremely difficult to geo-rectify to the modern-day NOAA chart. 
The last important point of interest included in the GIS model was Bald Beach.  As 
pointed out earlier, Bald Beach is the approximate location where the USS Monticello began 
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firing on the sound side Southern steamers and the retreating 3rd Georgia Regiment (Oxford 
2013:151, 156-159).  Neither the historic maps nor the modern-day NOAA charts included Bald 
Beach, therefore the author had to generate the coordinates.  The coordinates were input into the 
GIS model using the Go To XY tool in GIS.   
 
Figure 14. Historic Landscape of Hatteras Island (including Chicamacomico and Kinnakeet) circa 1861 digitized 
(By Jim Kinsella). 
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Creation of Bathymetry Models  
 After digitizing the Civil War landscape into the GIS model, the next step involved 
creating the bathymetric models depicting both modern and historic sounding data.  This was a 
necessary step because to successfully recreate the historic naval battlescape an understanding of 
the bathymetry was needed.  This allowed more accurate placement of Union and Confederate 
ships into the model.  Each vessel had certain limitations pertaining to their individual draft, so 
knowing the sound’s depths allowed for a more accurate battlefield creation.  As with Parker’s 
2015 study, modern bathymetry was compared to the 1861 bathymetry for any changes from 
natural occurrences or dredging operations.  As previously discussed, this area experiences rapid 
geological change (Riggs et al. 2011:2-3).  The likelihood of dredging operations occurring in 
the Kinnakeet survey area was unlikely; however, Rodanthe’s waters had extensive dredging due 
to the presence of the Rodanthe Emergency Ferry Channel (Richards and Parker 2017:37). 
 Creating the bathymetric models proved challenging and required multiple attempts.  The 
first involved trying to import electronic nautical charts (ENC) with sounding data from the 
NOAA website.  The goal was to use the vector metadata embedded within each chart to create 
the models.  This ultimately failed because the ENC charts only included ocean side sounding 
data.  A second attempt, following methodologies spelled out in Parker’s 2015 study, allowed the 
model to be completed.  First, the modern-day model was created (Figures 17 and 19).  To do 
this the present landscape was digitized.  This was done the same way as the historic landscape 
although contemporary charts only included land and marshland information.  The next step 
involved creating an attribute table, then the shoreline was manually assigned points with an 
attribute of zero indicating that there was no depth in this area.  Attribute data was then assigned 
to the modern-day charts.  Once attribute data was input, the Natural Neighbor tool was utilized 
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to interrelate all attribute data.  After the modern-day bathymetry model was completed, the 
same process was completed for the historic model (Figures 16 and 18).  As soon as both models 
were completed, the two maps could be analyzed side by side.  Once the comparative analysis 
was completed, ships were inserted into the model that combined bathymetry, historical 
narrative, and Oxford’s theory. 
Ship Placement into the GIS model 
 Placement of individual ships into this GIS model relied on primary source material as 
well as Oxford’s narrative of the 1 and 5 October 1861 events.  Historic bathymetry played a key 
role in ship placement.  The Outer Banks coastline is very shallow, and due to the various ships’ 
dimensions, some could not get close to shore.  This was evident during the gunboat Fanny 
capture as well as Empire’s attempt to land troops at Kinnakeet.  In both instances, the primary 
sources show the vessels could not get close to or on shore due to shallow depths (Mansfield 




Figure 16. Historic Bathymetry Points (By Jim Kinsella). 
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Figure 19. Image of Modern Bathymetry Map after using Natural Neighbor tool (by Jim Kinsella). 
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Ship positions during the Chicamacomico Races were based on primary resources 
referring to the location of Camp Live Oak and Midyett’s Windmill.  Per Oxford, Fanny was 
engaged and eventually captured by the CSS Junaluska, CSS Raleigh, and CSS Curlew roughly 
two to three miles west of Camp Live Oak (Harpers Weekly 1861c:668; Oxford 2013:106-110).  
Oxford’s version is derived from primary documentary materials.  Colonel Rush Hawkins’s 
reports from Commodore Lynch, Sergeant Major Peacock, and General Mansfield place Fanny’s 
location two to three miles due west of Camp Live Oak and adjacent to Midyett’s Windmill 
(Mansfield 1861:595; see also Oxford 2013:99).  Therefore, the GIS model was created by 
placing Fanny and its captors’ due west of the windmill.  Confederate ship positions off Camp 
Live Oak on 4 October 1861 were once again based on the interpreted location of Camp Live 
Oak and the windmill.  Cotton Plant was positioned within a mile directly west of Camp Live 
Oak; with Empire further south where they fired upon the 20th Indiana (New York Times 1861c; 
Yellowley 1861).   
The events of 5 October 1861 were concerned with the withdrawing 3rd Georgia and the 
subsequent bombardment at Bald Beach by the USS Monticello.  As with the 1 October 1861 
GIS model, ship positions were also based on Oxford’s theory and supported by documentary 
and bathymetric evidence.  Oxford’s interpretation and accounts from the 3rd Georgia place the 
USS Monticello three-quarters of a mile off Bald Beach when it began firing (Braine 1861:291-
292; Barrett 1963:55; Oxford 2013:157, 171).  As mentioned earlier, a degree of caution is 
warranted when examining witness accounts from primary source material of ship placement. 
Monticello’s location cannot be definitively pinpointed because the only clue from the historical 
record states that it was approximately ¾ of a mile from the shore (Braine 1861:291-292; Barrett 
1963:55; Oxford 2013:157, 171).  This was merely an observation made by the Monticello’s 
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captain in the heat of battle; it could have been closer or possibly further out.  As discussed, the 
GIS tool is merely an interpretation of evidence in the historical record, therefore, for this model 
segment, the position of three-quarters of a mile off Bald Beach was used.  Once the coordinates 
of Bald Beach were determined, the distance measurement tool was used to locate a point three 
quarters of a mile from Bald Beach the potential Monticello position sited.  Ship placement 
within the GIS model was accomplished using the measurement tool in the GIS model as well as 
the historic bathymetry data (Figure 20).   
  
Figure 20.  Image shows Cotton Plant’s placement in the GIS model.  Ship placement is based on primary sources, 
Lee Oxford’s proposed location of Camp Live Oak, and historic bathymetry data.  Note, Cotton Plant is not drawn 




An attempt was made to draw ships to scale.  Data on ship dimensions was drawn from 
Oxford (2013), United States Naval History Division’s, Dictionary of American Naval Fighting 
Ships (1959) and the NHHC (2015) online database.  This data was organized and compiled into 
Tables 1 and 2.  Adopting methodology from Parker’s 2015 study, the ships were drawn to scale 
by creating a line feature for the ship’s length, then creating a second line feature for the ship’s 
beam (width).  An ellipse was drawn around the two-line features and then converting it to a 
polygon (Parker 2015:75). 
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Table 2.Table showing Union ship dimensions and individual armaments for 1861-1862 (Braine 1861:291-292; 
Daily National Intelligencer 1861a:3; Moore 1861:155; US Navy History Division 1959:429; Barrett 1963:50; 
NHHC 2015a-i)  
Fields of Fire 
The final step with the GIS model was to model the fields of fire so areas to be 
archaeologically surveyed could be defined.  Range capabilities of each cannon type were 
determined.  Because there were multiple ships, gun positioning, as a ship’s location, was 
considered when creating the fields of fire.  If precise information was available, it was used to 
site the guns; if it was not, an assumption was made that the more accurate long-range gun was 
mounted on the bow (Parker 2015:76). 
76 
 
Research to create fields of fire for the events of 1-5 October 1861 focused on only ships 
involved in the firing.  These included Confederates: CSS Cotton Plant, CSS Curlew, CSS 
Empire, as well as the Union’s USS Monticello.  The collated data was organized and put into a 
table that included a gun’s capability for each ship.  Using data from Table 3, both the maximum 
and effective ranges were created in the GIS representations of each ship’s fields of fire.   
 
Table 3.Table showing ship armament and capabilities of both fleets.  Note only the ships that are in the fields of 
fire model are being studied further with range information (Braine 1861:291-292; Moore 1861:155; Barrett 1863; 
Holley 1865:477-482; Scharf 1887:378; US Navy History Division 1959:429; Barrett 1963:50; Canfield 1969:20; 
Silverstone 2006:58; NHHC 2015a-i; Parker 2015:138)  
There were a few discrepancies in the data collected for Monticello.  As evidenced by the 
table above, Monticello carried two 32-pounder (these had a bore of 6.4 inches) smoothbore guns 
(Braine 1861:291-292; US Navy History Division 1959:429; Silverstone 2006:58; NHHC 
2015h).  In addition to the 32-pounders, Monticello also carried a smaller gun, although there 
seem to be conflicting reports on whether it carried a 9-inch Dahlgren, 10-inch Dahlgren, or a 
30-pounder Parrott.  Lieutenant Braine refers to shooting a 30-pounder Parrott and striking CSS 
Fanny (Braine 1861:291-292).  Other sources show Monticello carried one Dahlgren type which 








CSS Cotton Plant 2X 12-pounder brass field howitzers 2000 1770
1X 12-pounder smoothbore 1600 1300
1X 32-pounder rifled 8460 3500
1X 12-pounder howitzer 2000 1770
1X 32-pounder smoothbore 2731 1300
2X 32-pounder smoothbore 2731 1300+
1X 9-inch Dahlgren 3450 1300+
Fields of Fire Ranges 






firing rounds at distances close to a mile, while the one 9-inch gun was capable of shooting to a 
distance close to two miles (Silverstone 2006:xx-xxi).  For this study, the 9-inch Dahlgren gun 
was used for the fields of fire model, since this was the common broadside gun used and a 
standard for the US Navy (Bell 1941:61; Schneller n.d.:5).   
This data was then entered into the GIS model to create fields of fire, adopting 
methodology from previous studies (Simonds 2014; Parker 2015).  Simonds (2014:47) stated 
that creating fields of fire for vessels is spatially ambiguous due to the episodic nature of naval 
engagements.  Therefore, special consideration must be made when creating the fields of fire for 
vessels.  Creating a field of fire relies on primary accounts, geography, and bathymetry.  Like 
Simonds’ study, the first step involved identifying approximate vessel locations.  Starting on 1 
October 1861, Fanny was reported to be anchored in six feet of water approximately three miles 
west south west of Camp Live Oak (Harpers Weekly 1861c:668; Mansfield 1861:595; Morrison 
1861:276; The New York Herald 1861; Ridgely 1861).  This position was plotted using the 
distance tool from the reported location of Camp Live Oak.  Its location was then used as the 
target for which the Confederates would have fired towards.  Primary sources state that the 
Southern flotilla approached Fanny from the northwest.  It is hard to say how far they were from 
Fanny when they started firing, so it was deemed appropriate to use both effective and maximum 
ranges for each gun while creating the fields of fire.  It should be noted here that although 
Junaluska was present during Fanny’s capture, it was unable to get into firing range, so the 
Junaluska fields of fire were not created.   
Creating the fields of fire for Fanny, Raleigh, and Curlew was done using a single line to 
show the direction of fire from each cannon.  From there, a line was offset by 22.5 degrees on 
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each side to create a 45-degree arc of fire (see Simonds 2014 and Parker 2015).  Creating fields 
of fire for CSS Cotton Plant and CSS Empire’s bombardment of Camp Live Oak on 4 October 
1861 as well as the USS Monticello firing on the 3rd Georgia on 5 October 1861 were done the 
same way, (Figure 21).  A 45-degree angle was implemented based off precedent set by previous 
maritime studies (see Simonds 2014 and Parker 2015).  Guns were not mounted on traditional 
naval carriages as they were before the war.  In an effort to reduce recoil generated from large 
guns, the US Navy shifted from traditional 4-truck carriages to either pivot carriages or the 2-
wheeled Marsilly carriage prior to the war.  This allowed the guns to be easily rotated from side 
to side while giving the guns a wider angle if directly facing their target (Veit and Kuchera 
2011:186).  The 45-degree angle was deemed appropriate since Monticello was likely parallel to 
the shore as it was stalking the Georgians, therefore the angle would be closer to 45 degrees.  
The same assumptions were made for the other ships involved in the affair.  Additionally, since 
steamers are not beholden to the whims of the wind, a 45-degree angle was deemed an 
appropriate interpretative tool.  The arc of the 9-inch was wider since the gun was on a pivot. 
      
  
 




Archaeological investigation for this project was concerned with two separate areas in the 
sound, the first area was off Camp Live Oak where Cotton Plant and Empire fired at the 20th 
Indiana (Figure 22).  The second area was where the 3rd Georgia was fired on by Monticello 
(Figure 23).  Archaeological data concerning the Camp Live Oak engagement was obtained 
during the Rodanthe Ferry survey project (Richards and Parker 2017), therefore planning of 
archaeological activities centered on the area Monticello harassed the 3rd Georgia.  Reports show 
the Monticello fired close to 400 shots in a span of about three hours (Braine 1861:291-292; 
Daily National Intelligencer 1861b:2).  Additionally, there was a distorted report of Monticello 
hitting CSS Fanny as well as two Confederate sloops (Braine 1861:291-292).  This comes from 
Lieutenant Daniel Braine’s official navy report where he incorrectly reported a couple of 
Confederate boats carrying Confederate soldiers were hit and destroyed by Monticello’s shot.  
He based this on Private Warren O’Harver’s (from the 20th Indiana’s Company H) account 
regarding the skirmish.  Additionally, Braine speculated in his report about striking CSS Fanny 
(Braine 1861:291-292).  Although it was reported that two unknown sloops on the sound island 
received fire from Monticello (New York Times 1861d).  There is no concrete evidence, however, 
that supports the New York Times that this happened.  From the GIS fields of fire representation, 
it is reasonable to assume that sloops in the sound could have received fire from Monticello, 
despite being three-quarters of a mile off the Atlantic coast.  Two areas were identified for the 
archaeological survey using the fields of fire model in conjunction with the historical narrative.  
The first location was the shoreline just off Little Kinnakeet Life Saving Station.  This shoreline 
zone would later be searched using visual shoreline techniques adopted from the Rodanthe Ferry 
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channel survey.  The second survey area was located west of the “Drain,” a site near the visual 
shoreline inspection area.  The next phase of the project involved pBlock modeling. 
    




   




Previous remote sensing studies suggested that pBlock modeling may be a useful tool for 
predicting magnetic signatures of subsurface ordnance (Richards 2011; Parker 2015).  pBlock 
modeling is a software utilized by Richards and Parker in their respective studies to deduce an 
object’s magnetic strength.  Parker and Richards acknowledge that this software is primarily 
used for geological studies rather than archaeological surveys, therefore particular attention had 
to be made, specifically, as to what traverse lengths to use.  Here, traverse length refers the 
distance of which an anomaly is passed.  Moreover, traverse length is the span of calculations 
used to represent the area of regularly spaced observation points (Smekalova and Bevan 
2011:13; Richard Almond 2018 pers. comm.).  Nonetheless, these studies set out a practice for 
utilizing pBlock modeling as a tool in remote sensing studies that incorporate a magnetometer.  
A series of pBlock models showing the potential magnetic signatures of Civil War ordnance that 
can be compared against any magnetic anomalies detected during a survey was designed.  By 
providing a basic estimate or approximation for determining a potential anomaly’s magnetic 
strength, comparisons could be made (Parker 2015:80).  Parker (2015:80-81) elaborated further 
on the same issues that Richards (2011:4) faced in his study, in addition to errors concerned with 
figuring out and using the correct traverse lengths, estimating the susceptibility of iron was also 
an issue. 
Concerning the ships involved in the affair (Monticello, Empire, and Cotton Plant), 
ordnance from a 32-pounder gun, 12-pound howitzer, and 9-inch Dahlgren gun were determined 
to be representative of battle, therefore, they were used for the pBlock modeling.  The diameter 
of a 32-pound cannonball is .1524m (6 inches) and a shell from a 9-inch Dahlgren gun is .226m 
(8.90 inches) (Bell 1941:61; Parker 2015:81).  These numbers were rounded to .2 meters since 
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the program requires the measurement be within one decimal point, the same was done in 
Parker’s (2015) study.  The dimensions of these were similar, therefore, they produced similar 
results in the pBlock model.  For both types of artillery, it was expected to see a gamma range of 
30nT to 2600nT that would represent potential ordnance.  A quick item of note, ordnance from a 
9-inch Dahlgren gun would have been hollowed out, as they were designed to break apart upon 
contact with a target (Eldridge 1996:19).  This was considered when creating the pBlock model 
for this type of ordnance.  For maximum effect, these shells were hollowed out in a way that the 
density or real weight was equal to 2/8 that of its solid diameter (Gibbon 1860:163).   
The diameter of the bore of a 12-pound howitzer is .1173m (4.62 inches).  The windage 
(the difference between the diameter of projectile and weapons bore) of a 12-pound howitzer is 
ten one-hundredths which means the diameter of the projectile is .1056m (4.158 inches) (Bell 
1941:360-68; Barrett 1863).  This was rounded to .1m for the pBlock model.  Based on the 
pBlock model, it was expected to see a gamma range of 8nT to 887nT that would represent 
potential ordnance.  An item of note, the Cotton Plant only utilized a 12-pound Howitzer along 
with Empire’s 32-pounder, therefore the minimum gamma reading of 8nT representing potential 
ordnance was only expected at Rodanthe, while 30nT was the minimum for the Kinnakeet 
survey.   
With the earlier precedents set in the Richards (2011) and Parker (2015) studies, many of 
the same pBlock parameters were utilized for this study.  The only variable difference for this 
study was water depth.  Based on this survey area, the water depth variables used were 0.5 
meters, 1 meter, and 1.5 meters.  An additional variable was created at 2 meters on the 
assumption that any ordnance might be buried and not resting at the bottom.  The latent 
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magnetism of the earth in North Carolina is around 45,000 gammas (Breiner 1973:6; Parker 
2015:81).  During the survey, however, latent earth magnetism seemed to fluctuate around 
48,000 gammas.  Entering both numbers into the pBlock model showed a variance of 4 gammas, 
therefore the decision was made to use the 45,000-gamma figure as the latent magnetism of 
North Carolina (Tables 4-7). 
 As seen from the tables below, there are some differences in the gamma range returns of 
an anomaly with the same dimensions as shot used during the Chicamacomico Races.  The 
stronger magnetic returns were at the shallower depths, while the weaker gamma returns were at 























Depth (m) 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 
Width (m) 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Height (m) 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Strike Length 
(m) 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Iron 
Susceptibility 
(SI = 12.5*cgs) 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 
Density (gm/c) 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.6 
Gammas (nT) 45000 45000 45000 45000 
Degree of 
Inclination -65 -65 -65 -65 
Degree of 
Declination 0 0 0 0 
Degree of 
Traverse 
Bearing 0 0 0 0 
Traverse Length 
(m) 50 100 200 50 
nT + 2421 2421 2421 405.9 
nT - 343.2 218.5 36.9 60.2 
Total Field nT 2764.2 2639.5 2457.9 466.1 
















Depth (m) 1 1 1.5 1.5 
Width (m) 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Height (m) 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Strike Length 
(m) 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Iron 
Susceptibility 
(SI = 12.5*cgs) 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 
Density (gm/c) 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.6 
Gammas (nT) 45000 45000 45000 45000 
Degree of 
Inclination -65 -65 -65 -65 
Degree of 
Declination 0 0 0 0 
Degree of 
Traverse 
Bearing 0 0 0 0 
Traverse Length 
(m) 100 200 50 100 
nT + 393.8 393.8 148 128 
nT - 60.2 29.7 19.8 17.7 
Total Field nT 454 423.5 167.8 145.7 
















Depth (m) 1.5 2 2 2 
Width (m) 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Height (m) 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Strike Length 
(m) 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Iron 
Susceptibility 
(SI = 12.5*cgs) 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 
Density (gm/c) 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.6 
Gammas (nT) 45000 45000 45000 45000 
Degree of 
Inclination -65 -65 -65 -65 
Degree of 
Declination 0 0 0 0 
Degree of 
Traverse 
Bearing 0 0 0 0 
Traverse 
Length (m) 200 50 100 200 
nT + 128 66.9 56.9 56.6 
nT - 17.7 8.8 8.8 8.8 
Total Field nT 145.7 75.7 65.7 65.4 














Depth (m) 2.5 2.5 2.5 
Width (m) 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Height (m) 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Strike Length 
(m) 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Iron 
Susceptibility 
(SI = 12.5*cgs) 12.5 12.5 12.5 
Density (gm/c) 7.6 7.6 7.6 
Gammas (nT) 45000 45000 45000 
Degree of 
Inclination -65 -65 -65 
Degree of 
Declination 0 0 0 
Degree of 
Traverse 
Bearing 0 0 0 
Traverse 
Length (m) 50 100 200 
nT + 35.1 32.9 29.8 
nT - 4.7 4.4 3.7 
Total Field nT 39.8 37.3 33.5 
Table 7. pBlock Models 13-15 
 
Archaeological Fieldwork 
Once potential battle areas were defined and identified by integrating historical research 
into the GIS model, a two-stage, four-method methodology was applied to the Pamlico Sound’s 
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waters off Little Kinnakeet, the beaten zone for ordnance Monticello fired at the 3rd Georgia on 
5 October 1861.  The first stage involved a visual shoreline inspection of inundated land via 
transects (visually inspected on snorkel) paired with an underwater metal detector.  The second 
stage consisted of a remote sensing survey (side-scan sonar and magnetometry) of the sound’s 
floor in slightly deeper water. 
Visual Shoreline Inspection and Handheld Metal Detection Survey 
The objective for the visual shoreline inspection was to record geological and biological 
features such as sediment changes and sub-aquatic vegetation (SAV).  Additionally, this survey 
sought to observe any cultural anomalies that may lie within the survey area.  During the three-
day visual shoreline inspection, the survey area was mapped onto mylar proforma templates 
(Figure 24).  
    
Figure 24. (Left) Scott Rose canvasing the survey area with the handheld CTX3030 unit.  (Right) Jim Kinsella 
sketching the sound floor during the visual shoreline survey. 
Originally it was proposed that the visual shoreline inspection would consist of two or 
three parallel 300-meter north to south transects.  Due to time constraints, funding, and lack of 
volunteer support, this plan was reduced to a smaller scale.  During the period of 26-28 July 
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2016, a three-person team conducted a 300-foot north to south baseline survey with 300 foot 
transects running west into the sound (Figure 25).  Reconnaissance activities took place the 
previous summer to locate suitable sampling points within the suspected Monticello activity area.  
The reconnaissance activities dictated potential areas to survey in and around an area known as 
“the Drain” in Little Kinnakeet.  In the end, however, only one area was selected.  The actual 
survey area was adjacent to the Little Kinnakeet Life Saving Station.  In addition to the 
restrictions mentioned above, this area was selected because it was the easiest point within the 
Monticello fields of fire to access.  There was an off-road trail from Route 12 that led directly to 
the shoreline inspection area.   
 
Figure 25. Illustrates where the visual shoreline inspection activities took place. (By Jim Kinsella). 
This methodology was chosen because of the shallow depths along the coastline, which 
are at times only one to two feet deep and would not allow a research vessel to effectively deploy 
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remote sensing equipment and obtain quality data.  Therefore, this portion of the survey relied on 
a pedestrian/snorkel survey.  The area surveyed was 300 feet by 300 feet with transects spaced 
20 feet apart.  A GPS point was taken at each transects end.  A compass was used to make the 
transect lines as straight as possible.  Once the survey area was set up, two team members 
meticulously combed the bottom looking for cultural anomalies and mapping the seafloor.  
During the transect survey, a third team member utilized a metal detector on loan from, the UNC 
Coastal Studies Institute (submersible Minelab CTX3030 with integrated GPS capabilities) for 
detecting metallic anomalies under the seafloor.  It was hoped that any ordnance fired from 
Monticello would be picked up with this unit.  Any potential anomaly detected by the CTX3030 
unit was tagged with the integrated GPS unit and reviewed during data processing.     
The mapping activities were recorded on sheets of mylar which were scaled at 20 feet by 
300 feet, which was essentially one survey lane (Figure 26).  In total, there were fifteen sheets of 
mylar with recorded data on them.  These sheets were then scanned onto the computer to create a 
final map in Adobe Illustrator.  This process involved pulling up each sheet of mylar and using 
the “snip it” tool in Microsoft Office to cut out each data element and place it in the Adobe 
Illustrator program (Figure 27).  Once each portion was input into the Adobe Illustrator program, 
they were lined up with each other to create a map template in which to trace.  The next steps in 
this process involved tracing in the seagrass and filling in the sandy areas (Figure 28).  Once the 
map was completed, it was imported into the GIS model.  The final step in this process involved 
overlaying the targets detected by the metal detector on atop the completed shoreline map so that 




Figure 26. Mylar worksheet used to sketch the shoreline during the visual shoreline inspection (By Jim Kinsella). 
 
 





Figure 28. Visual shoreline inspection area off Kinnakeet digitized through Adobe Illustrator (By Jim Kinsella). 
Off Shore Remote Sensing Survey 
Phase Two of the archaeological fieldwork was a three-day, self-funded remote sensing 
survey during the week of 24-28 October 2016, off Little Kinnakeet.  This methodology was 
selected for the following reasons: first, part of the goal was to look for cultural evidence 
representing the Chicamacomico Races by utilizing side-scan sonar and magnetometer to search 
for cultural material underneath the water. Secondly, the area was large and remote sensing was 
deemed the most appropriate and effective way to survey.  Furthermore, remote sensing has 
proven useful in maritime archaeological studies and in the discovery and documentation of 
vessels by NOAA’s Battle of the Atlantic Expedition Research (Bright et al. 2012).  
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Additionally, they have shown to be practical in studies like this one (Simonds 2013; Parker 
2015).   
The remote sensing conducted for this project required a permit (see Appendix A) be 
issued by the North Carolina Underwater Archaeology Branch (UAB).  There was a slight delay 
but, when the permit was granted, the UAB spelled out parameters required by the state for 
remote sensing.  The UAB stipulated that survey lane spacing was to be at 20 meters with a 
100% overlap between the lanes, aiming for 200% coverage. 
This survey was carried out aboard a shallow water vessel R/V Flounder, a (24’ Carolina 
skiff on loan from East Carolina University) and utilized a Tritech Starfish side-scan sonar (455 
kHz) which ran congruently with a Geometrics G882 Cesium Magnetometer for data acquisition 
(Tritech International 2016; Geometrics 2016).  Both units, along with the research vessel and 
support equipment were on loan from East Carolina University.  Navigation data was acquired 
via a Trimble AgGPS332 Differential GPS unit.  All survey and GPS data were acquired through 
Hypack 2016 software.   
Side-scan Sonar Operation 
 
The side-scan sonar device uses sound waves to give an image of the sound floor (Fish 
and Carr 1990:7).  Side-scan survey techniques have been utilized in the previous maritime 
battlefield studies and East Carolina graduate student thesis projects (Bright 2012; Bright et al. 
2012; Simonds 2013; Parker 2015).  In this case, the Tritech sonar device was pole-mounted to 
R/V Flounder (Figure 29).  The sonar device was mounted just off the helm with a starboard 
offset of 1.1 meters and 0.65 meters towards the bow.  These measurements were taken from the 
95 
 
boat’s center of gravity.  The layback figures were entered into the Hypack system before 
beginning the survey. 
 
Figure 29.  Pole mounted Tritech Sonar device with Trimble GPS unit (Photographed by Jim Kinsella). 
Magnetometer Operation 
 
A magnetometer survey occurred concurrently with the side-scan sonar survey to detect 
ferrous anomalies on the sound floor (Figures 30 and 31).  As the goal of this study was to reveal 
ferrous material related to the Chicamacomico Races, specifically ordnance, it was hoped the 
magnetometer would uncover any ordnance fired by Monticello.  Data referring to Monticello’s 
armament in the pBlock analysis tool helped determine the magnetic signature expected 
ordnance types and if they could be detected by the magnetometer.  The magnetometer survey 




Figure 30. Equipment set up during the first day of survey (Photographed by Jim Kinsella). 
 
 
Figure 31. Adam Parker and Emily Schwalbe getting ready to deploy the Geometrics Magnetometer (Photographed 
by Jim Kinsella). 
Survey Operation 
 
Initially the survey sought to run the transect lanes North-South; however, the contour of 
the coastline dictated that the lanes be slightly offset southwest to northeast by 10.3865°.  
Originally, the total planned survey area was approximately 2.90 sq. km (1.119 sq. miles).  This 
worked out to each lane being 3021 meters (9911.4 feet) long and 20 meters (65.6 feet) across.  
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After concessions were made to fit within the scope of budget and time, the survey area was 
amended to approximately 1.29 sq. km (.498 sq. miles).  With new goals set, the objective was to 
survey 10 lanes per day.  It was hoped to cover as many survey lanes as possible without rushing 
through the survey.  A maximum speed that fell within the range of 2.5 and 3 knots was deemed 
adequate.  Survey lanes were numbered 1 to 51, with 1 being inshore and 51 furthest out in the 
sound.  Once on site, it was determined that lanes 1 through 11 were far too shallow to 
adequately survey.  The decision was made to begin the survey with lane 12 and work westward. 
Originally a longer survey period was desired, however, due to similar obstacles met 
during the shoreline survey (time constraints, funding, volunteer commitment and availability, 
and a booked-up research vessel) the survey was truncated into three days.  Within those three 
days, the crew tried to cover as much ground as possible without acquiring poor data in the 
process.  In the end, 20 lanes were covered without issue.  The lanes that were completed were 
done successfully and provided good data.   
Data Processing and analysis 
During the sonar processing phase, each lane was carefully examined for visual 
anomalies.  In this study, the sole purpose of the side-scan sonar was to capture glimpses of the 
sound floor to eliminate magnetometer targets from further consideration.  Going into the survey, 
it was understood that the likelihood of observing any ordnance in the sonar images was highly 
unlikely.  After over 150 years they would most certainly have sunk below the surface of the 
sound floor or buried by changing shoals.  Even if they had not, they were far too small to 
capture with the sonar device (Parker 2015:109-110).  Instead, as discussed, using the side-scan 




Data processing occurred every evening after fieldwork. The magnetometer data was 
edited in Hypack 2016 software, which helped eliminate any data acquisition errors from a 
variety of factors occurring during a survey.  Magnetometers do not have swaths as do side-scan 
sonar devices, therefore, they record data for a specific point on earth at that specific point in 
time, but not outward.  With that said, much time was spent interpreting and contouring the 
magnetometer data.  Once the magnetometer data was edited for errors, the next step was to 
analyze each individual anomaly picked up by the towfish and compare it against the pBlock 
models discussed earlier.  Further discussion of this data is in the following chapter.  Once data 
were sorted and analyzed, the next step was to create a final data set to import into the GIS map 
using Hypack 2016 software. 
The sonar files were originally intended to be processed using Chesapeake Technology’s 
SonarWiz 5 software as was the case with previous ECU studies (Simonds 2013; Richards et al. 
2015; Parker 2015).  There were technical issues importing the sonar data into the SonarWiz 
software, therefore the decision was made to process the sonar data with the Hypack 2016 
software.  This process involved manually bottom tracking each individual survey lane and then 
analyzing each one for visual anomalies.  The sonar images provided a check and balance for the 
magnetometer data.  Like the 2015 Parker study, the sonar images assisted in eliminating 
magnetic anomalies such as crab pots, duck blinds, and pilings.  Once this step was completed, a 
final mosaic of the sonar images was created and imported into the GIS map.   
The magnetometer data set was then combined with the sonar images.  To accomplish 
this task, both data sets were imported into the GIS model, by overlaying one on top of the other.  
Any target represented in the magnetometer data that matched up with a sonar target (not in the 
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shape of Civil War ordnance; a shell or cannonball) was eliminated from further consideration as 
being ordnance.  Additionally, any ordnance representative of battle would likely have sunk into 
the sediments and not produced a sonogram signature. 
Additional Survey Areas and Further Data Acquisition  
This project also analyzed and re-assessed data acquired off Rodanthe in late summer of 
2015 for integration into this study.  These data were acquired during a remote sensing operation 
conducted near the Rodanthe ferry channel during the UNC-Coastal Studies Institute’s (CSI) 
interdisciplinary NC Department of Transportation (NCDOT) survey in off Rodanthe.  While the 
interdisciplinary grant was geared more toward the geological and ecological consequences of 
dredging and subsequent deposition, it also included a marine debris survey led by Dr. Nathan 
Richards utilizing side-scan sonar and magnetometer, and visual and metal detection techniques 
off present-day Black Mar Gut (see Richards and Parker 2017), which is near Lee Oxford’s 
location for Camp Live Oak.  This same area is in proximity to the capture of Fanny by 
Confederate forces (Oxford 2013:195-196).  Figure 32 below illustrates the area that was 
examined during the CSI DoT study over August of 2015 – and which essentially represents a 
“sampling” of the Chicamacomico Civil War battlescape. 
Data for this survey were collected in the same manner and with the same equipment as 
the Little Kinnakeet survey.  The data from the NCDOT survey were also incorporated into the 
GIS model.  The results will be presented in the next chapter; analysis of the results will be 











Is there in situ Maritime Archaeological Evidence of the Chicamacomico Races? 
 
Introduction 
This chapter will examine both the historical and archaeological data gathered throughout 
this study.  The discussion will begin with a historical narrative focusing only on the events from 
4 and 5 October 1861, since the archaeological fieldwork was only concerned with activity on 
those dates.  This focus will center upon the information that guided the GIS models’ creation.  
From there, the focus will shift towards communicating the results from the archaeological 
surveys conducted along the shoreline and waters off shore of Little Kinnakeet.  Additional data 
sets from the Richards and Parker (2017) survey are also presented in this chapter. The Little 
Kinnakeet survey results will precede the Rodanthe survey results. 
Battle Narrative 
The Chicamacomico Races was a confusing event that was the result of two opposing 
strategies to secure the Outer Banks.  This event can be broken down into two parts: Confederate 
bombardment of Union forces at Camp Live Oak and Union bombardment of Confederate forces 
at Kinnakeet.  The two events will be discussed in chronological order and will be viewed from 
both Union and Confederate perspectives.  
4 October 1861 
On the morning of 4 October 1861, the Union’s 20th Indiana Regiment was encamped at 
Camp Live Oak near the Midyett Windmill about 40 miles north of Hatteras Inlet (Harpers 
Weekly 1861d:673; Scharf 1887:380). At least two companies were, or very shortly would be, 
posted further south to guard possible landing sites.  That same morning, Colonel Wright and the 
3rd Georgia arrived off Chicamacomico accompanied by the 8th North Carolina.  They left 
Roanoke Island the previous evening and were aboard a small fleet of Confederate gunboats 
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consisting of CSS Curlew, CSS Raleigh, CSS Junaluska, CSS Empire, CSS Cotton Plant, and 
the recently captured CSS Fanny (New York Times 1861c; The Richmond Daily Dispatch 1861e, 
1861f).   
At Camp Live Oak, Colonel Brown along with the 20th Indiana saw the fleet which 
appeared to be moving toward their position from Croatan Sound from the northwest.  Initially, 
Brown suspected these were rebel steamers due to their movements, but he was unsure.  A short 
time later, it was confirmed that these were rebel steamers as they changed course directly 
towards the camp (Harpers Weekly 1861d:673; Logansport Journal 1861; Whitney 1866:60). 
Once Brown realized the approaching vessels were indeed the enemy, he knew it was 
time to act, so he immediately sent a message to Hawkins to inform him of the situation 
(Harpers Weekly 1861d:673).  He then readied the 20th Indiana to prepare for an attempted 
landing as the Southern flotilla approached their position.  In a strange turn of events, the 
Confederate fleet changed direction.  Instead of approaching straight toward Brown and his men 
as he expected, they moved south, to a point roughly 5 miles below their position.  The bulk of 
the flotilla moved towards the shore where they anchored about two miles offshore while another 
Confederate steamer moved north towards the camp.  Several ships were towing large barges 
packed with men from the 3rd Georgia and 8th North Carolina Regiments.  This was particularly 
alarming to Colonel Brown because the number of Confederate troops he witnessed that morning 
was much higher than he initially anticipated (Brown 1861a; Logansport Journal 1861: Whitney 
1866:60-61). 
At approximately 9:00 a.m. Confederate forces launched an attack against the Union 
encampment at Camp Live Oak (New York Times 1861c).  The attack consisted of an artillery 
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bombardment from gunboats positioned a short distance off shore.  The steamer, CSS Cotton 
Plant was now directly west of Camp Live Oak and the windmill (Yellowley 1861).  Cotton 
Plant had a shallow draft, so it could get closer in shore than other vessels like Curlew and 
Empire (NHHC 2015c; NHHC 2015d).  Several men and officers from Curlew, boarded Cotton 
Plant so that they could disembark with the infantry once they were in position to land.  Cotton 
Plant, now anchored (1 mile directly west of the camp), continuously bombarded the camp from 
the sound side to drive Union forces out, while Empire shelled them as they retreated towards the 
south (Figure 33).  This assault lasted for close to an hour, and several tents at Camp Live Oak as 
well as a house being used as a hospital caught fire.  The windmill adjacent to the camp was also 
destroyed (Harpers Weekly 1861d:673; Logansport Journal 1861; New York Times 1861b; 
Yellowley 1861; Merrill 1869:488; NHHC 2015b).   
Due to many sick men, lack of supplies, and inferior armament, the 20th Indiana were 
unable to adequately defend the camp; however, they were still willing to put up a fight to hold 
the camp (Oxford 2013:127).  Once Colonel Brown realized holding the camp was not feasible, 
he gave the order to retreat toward Hatteras.  The men obeyed these orders leaving everything 
behind except for their muskets.  Once the Georgians noticed the 20th’s retreat they attempted a 
landing from Cotton Plant to intercept them (Harpers Weekly 1861d:673; Logansport Journal 
1861; New York Times 1861c; New York Tribune 1861b; Yellowley 1861:55-60; Merrill 




Figure 33. Cotton Plant and Empire’s positions during the assault on Camp Live Oak on 4 October 1861. Cotton 
Plant’s position is based off primary sources as well as historic bathymetry.  This researcher derived Empire’s 
location from information in the historical record.  Note, ships are not drawn to scale so that they could be seen in 
the image.  (By Jim Kinsella). 
 
After the retreat was ordered, Captain Edward Jardine raced via horseback to deliver 
news of the enemy attack at Chicamacomico to Hawkins at Hatteras.  In response, as a 
countermeasure, Hawkins ordered Jardine to return to Camp Live Oak with reinforcements to aid 
the 20th Indiana (Johnson 1861:56; Graham 1900:94).  By now, a couple of hours had passed 
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since the assault began at Chicamacomico.  While continuing with their retreat towards Hatteras, 
the Indianans noticed the Confederate fleet was moving parallel to them along the sound.  This 
prompted them to move their retreat at a quicker pace, as they feared another landing attempt 
further south was possible (Harpers Weekly 1861d:673; Logansport Journal 1861; see also 
Trotter 1989:46; Oxford 2013:135). 
With the menacing presence of CSS Empire in the sound, the 20th Indiana’s fears were 
justified, as the enemy planned to cut them off further south by landing the 8th North Carolina 
from the barges towed behind Empire at Big Kinnakeet (Scharf 1887:381).  The 8th North 
Carolina arrived at Kinnakeet ahead of the 20th Indiana and anchored two miles offshore.  
Unfortunately, they were unable to land in time because Empire ran aground on an uncharted 
sandbar.  Furthermore, the shoals prevented the smaller boats from reaching shore (New York 
Times 1861c; see also Oxford 2013:141-143).  Undeterred, the 8th North Carolina wanted to 
attempt the landing, however, Colonel Wright was reluctant to issue the order and thus, they 
missed their opportunity (The Richmond Daily Dispatch 1861f; see also Trotter 1989:46). 
The 8th North Carolina’s failed landing attempt allowed Colonel Brown and his troops to 
continue their retreat towards the Hatteras Lighthouse (Harpers Weekly 1861d:673).  During the 
retreat, Brown kept an eye on the Confederate fleet in the sound, stopping only a handful of 
times to rest.  Several hours later, Colonel Brown and his men finally made it to the lighthouse.  
As soon as they arrived, they decided to make a stand, turning the lighthouse into a temporary 
fort.  While Colonel Brown was busy with the retreat and evacuation of Camp Live Oak, Colonel 
Hawkins was at Fort Clark staying apprised of the situation.  Hawkins prepared to send the 9th 
New York Zouaves to support the retreating 20th Indiana.  Along with the Zouaves, he also 
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issued orders for the USS Monticello and USS Susquehanna to render aid and provide support 
(Brown 1861a; Harpers Weekly 1861d:673; Lardner 1861:291; Logansport Journal 1861; see 
also Trotter 1989:46; Oxford 2013:140-42). 
Several hours later Monticello was steaming parallel to the Zouaves on the Atlantic, with 
Susquehanna not far behind.  Together, both ships hugged the shore as they made their way 
north towards the lighthouse where they anchored upon arrival.  While at anchor, the two 
steamers sent provisions to the 20th Indiana who were camped at the lighthouse (Harpers Weekly 
1861d:673; Johnson 1861:56; Logansport Journal 1861; New York Times 1861d; see also 
Oxford 2013:144). 
5 October 1861  
On the morning of 5 October 1861, Hawkins ordered Commander Lardner to remain off 
the lighthouse with Susquehanna to reinforce those on shore.  At the same time, he ordered 
Monticello to patrol north and look for Confederate forces (Harpers Weekly 1861d:673).  
Meanwhile, Union forces camped at the lighthouse realized they were followed by the 3rd 
Georgia, who were advancing on their position after making a successful landing a few miles 
north from where they were now camped.  That same morning, Colonel Brown marched the 20th 
Indiana further south to Fort Clark where they would remain while the Zouaves were posted near 
the lighthouse ready to engage the 3rd Georgia should the need arise (Oxford 2013:152-154). 
The 3rd Georgia soon became aware that the 20th Indiana were now reinforced by the 9th 
New York Zouaves.  This was reported by 3rd Georgia soldier, Asa Winn.  Winn’s statement 
indicates they came in sight of the lighthouse and noticed the Union numbers were too large to 
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attack, so the 3rd Georgia moved back towards Chicamacomico (Winn 1861).  The Zouaves they 
were relieved when the 3rd Georgia did not attack (Oxford 2013:152-154).   
After falling back towards Chicamacomico, the 3rd Georgia camped and waited for the 
8th North Carolina to join them after landing at Kinnakeet.  Unfortunately, the 8th’s landing was 
unsuccessful due to the shoals and shallow waters.  These circumstances, coupled with the 
appearance of the Zouaves, an attack on the lighthouse by the 3rd Georgia, was not likely to be 
successful, prompting Colonel Wright to pull them back towards Chicamacomico (Trotter 
1989:47; Oxford 2013:153-154).  Around noon, as the 3rd Georgia was falling back along Bald 
Beach, they noticed a large vessel situated close to the shore.  As they stared curiously at the 
ship, the situation grew tense.  The unidentified vessel, (determined to be USS Monticello), 
opened fire, starting a relentless assault against the withdrawing Georgians (Frank Leslie’s 
Illustrated Newspaper 1861; Harpers Weekly 1861d:673-677; see also Barrett 1963:55; Oxford 
2013:154-155).   
Monticello was steaming northward close to shore on the Atlantic side of the island when 
the lookout spotted the 3rd Georgia moving north along Bald Beach (Figure 34).  Monticello’s 
lookout also noticed several vessels flying enemy colors in the sound across the island.  This 
prompted them to anchor and begin firing on the combined Confederate forces (Braine 
1861:291-92; Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper 1861; Harpers Weekly 1861d:673-677; 
Johnson 1861:58; New York Times 1861d; see also Trotter 1989:47; Oxford 2013:156-157).  A 
report from one of Hawkins’s Zouaves stated the following about the Monticello ‘s 




Steaming up the Atlantic to a position opposite the Rebel fleet, she shelled the camp 
and vicinity in a right lively manner.  One of her shells, as I watched, either struck 
one of the gunboats or so near it as to perceptibly swing the vessel to and fro for a 
moment (Johnson 1861:58). 
During the chaos of Monticello’s gunfire, some Georgians took refuge in the woods while 
others ran towards the sound side as the Confederate fleet began sending small boats to recover 
soldiers who were trying to escape.  Around this time, some Confederate steamers moved into 
position and returned fire over the island towards Monticello, however they were unable to get 
within appropriate firing range as they were miles from the shore.  This prompted Monticello to 
respond, firing its thirty-pounder Parrott rifle over the island towards the Confederate fleet and 
the smaller boats, resulting in shells cascading over the island.  Colonel Wright reported that 
Monticello hurled over 400 shells before they were able to get out of range (Figure 35 and 36) 
(Braine 1861:291-92; Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper 1861; Harpers Weekly 1861d:673-
677; Johnson 1861:58; New York Times 1861d; see also Barrett 1963:55; Trotter 1989:47; 
Oxford 2013:158-59).     
During the firefight between both fleets, the Zouaves gave chase to the Georgians while 
the 8th North Carolina watched helplessly aboard CSS Empire.  The long-range fighting lasted 
several hours before it finally ended later that evening.  Once it was over, Monticello rejoined 
Susquehanna and the two made their way back towards Hatteras Inlet while the 3rd Georgia 
withdrew to Chicamacomico (Braine 1861:291-92; New York Times 1861d; see also Barrett 





Figure 34. Monticello’s position as it shelled the 3rd Georgia as well as the Confederate fleet in the sound on 5 
October 1861. Monticello’s position is based on primary sources as well as historic bathymetry.  This researcher 
placed Lynch’s squadron based on historic bathymetry.  Note, ships are not drawn to scale so that they could be 




Figure 35. “The ‘Monticello’ Shelling the Rebels near Hatteras, October 5, 1861.” (Harpers Weekly 1861d:677). 
 
 
Figure 36. “Engraving of the Chicamacomico Races.” (Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper 1861).  
Battle Conclusion 
By the morning of 6 October 1861, the affair was over, and the entire Confederate 
expedition was back at Roanoke Island (New York Times 1861d).  Union forces abandoned the 
outpost at Chicamacomico and decided to focus efforts on holding Hatteras Inlet.  After four 
confusing days, little was accomplished by either side, except for the capture of Fanny.  There 
111 
 
were claims from Union forces that the bombardment from Monticello was lethal towards the 3rd 
Georgia as well as the Confederate steamers in the sound (Braine 1861:291-92; Daily National 
Intelligencer 1861b:2; Harpers Weekly 1861d:673; Logansport Journal 1861).  This was 
inaccurate, there were no major casualties and no reports of successful hits on the Confederate 
fleet (The Richmond Daily Dispatch 1861f).  Additionally, there was no shift in military power, 
neither side gained any significant edge.  Furthermore, control over Pamlico Sound and the Outer 
Banks was not decided during this event.  Both Union and Confederate forces convinced 
themselves that they successfully fought off enemy advances (Barrett 1963:55; Trotter 1989:47-
48; Oxford 2013:166).    
Archaeological Data 
This section presents data collated during the archaeological fieldwork conducted on 26-
30 July 2016 and 24-28 October 2016.  As discussed, only the Chicamacomico Race events from 
4-5 October 1861 were examined archaeologically.  Fieldwork at Little Kinnakeet focused on the 
5 October 1861 battle events, while data extracted from the Rodanthe survey focused on 4 
October 1861, including the initial assault on Camp Live Oak.  As discussed, fieldwork activities 
for this project occurred in two stages; the first consisted of a visual shoreline inspection coupled 
with handheld metal detection along the shoreline adjacent to the Little Kinnakeet Life Saving 
Station, the second was a remote sensing survey (side-scan sonar and magnetometer) in the 
waters off Little Kinnakeet.  The visual shoreline inspection and metal detection data will be 
discussed first, followed by the off shore remote sensing data.  During the latter discussion, the 
magnetometer data will be presented first, followed by the side-scan sonar data.  The two data 
sets will then be combined to discuss any relationships that may exist between the two.  For each 
methodology, the Little Kinnakeet data will precede the Rodanthe survey data results. 
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Little Kinnakeet Visual Shoreline Inspection and Metal Detection Data 
There were no expectations of seeing any ordnance on the sound floor; any potential 
ordnance would most likely be buried under sediment.  There was not much to note visually 
during this survey aside from seagrass and various debris, such as small pieces of timber and 
discarded rope.  Future archaeologists who survey this area may discover some of this project’s 
lost tent stakes which were used to set up the lanes.  These were lost in a deep portion of the 
survey area, possibly the result of an old dredging project.  This area was observed as primarily 
consisting of a sandy bottom with sparse sub aquatic vegetation (SAV) (Figure 37). 
Several anomalies were detected by the CTX 3030 unit during the handheld metal 
detector investigation.  The detector logged spatial information for each anomaly as well as 
burial depth information, which was recorded in centimeters and converted to meters during 
post-processing.  The device also captured the ferrous and conductivity levels of each anomaly.  
Ferrous levels were measured on a scale of 1 to 35, the higher the number, the higher the ferrous 
content.  Conductivity levels were measured on a scale of 1 to 50, with 50 representing the 
highest conductivity.   
Once the entire survey area was recorded on mylar proformas, and each lane had been 
canvassed with the metal detector, the decision was made to do some additional reconnaissance 
further out in the sound to see how far out anomalies were found.  Additionally, this assisted 
with filling a small gap between the visual shoreline inspection area and the proposed remote 
sensing survey area.  This was possible because the area beyond the potential dredge channel 
was shallower and accessible as the water was only waist deep.  If more time and funding were 
available, the entire shoreline and metal detector survey would have been much larger to 
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encompass the entire gap between the shoreline inspection area and the side-scan and 
magnetometer survey area.   
As evidenced by Figure 38, most anomalies are situated closer to the shoreline, then get 
rarer further offshore.  The depths of anomalies detected, ranged from .04m to .3m beneath the 
sound floor (see raw data in Appendix B).  An assumption can be made about these targets; there 
is frequent foot traffic as well as off-road vehicles onshore in the area closest to the survey zone, 
therefore, several targets could be trash, fishing lures, or other debris. 
Since this study was concerned with detecting archaeological signatures of a Civil War 
battlescape, the raw data was analyzed to see if they fit within the parameters of being ordnance.  
While analyzing the data, the following was kept in mind: high ferrous targets could be ordnance 
or iron nails whereas nonferrous targets could be certain coins, aluminum cans, or trash.  Metals 
such as copper and silver would most likely have higher conductivity values (Minelab 2017:64; 
see also Richards and Parker 2017:83).  Additionally, Civil War cannonballs and shells are 
known to be cast iron, as opposed to other types of metal (Gibbon 1880:163; Bell 1941:37).  Iron 
has high ferrous levels as well as high levels of conductivity, therefore, certain criteria 
determined if these anomalies could be ordnance representative of battle: the anomaly’s ferrous 
level, conductivity content, and spatial location along the shoreline.  Figures 39 through 42 show 
the spatial location, ferrous content, and conductivity levels of each anomaly.  During data 
processing the data were filtered using an SQL statement (i.e. Ferrous > 20 AND Conductivity > 
40 = Potential Ordnance) in the GIS model.  Any anomaly detected that fit within these 
parameters was considered as being potential ordnance (Figure 43).  As evidenced by Figure 43 
and Table 8, 28 of the 137 targets detected have the potential to be ordnance.  These findings will 
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be used to create a final battle map that will be compared against the operational frameworks 
outlined earlier and will be discussed in the following chapter. 
 
Figure 37. Visual shoreline inspection area off Kinnakeet digitized through Adobe Illustrator and imported to GIS 




Figure 38. Map depicting visual shoreline survey area.  Green points are individual metal detector targets.  












Figure 41. Chart depicting the ferrous content of each magnetic anomaly detected during the metal detection survey 




Figure 42. Chart depicting the conductivity level of each magnetic anomaly detected during the metal detection 










































































































































































































































































































































Figure 43. Map of Little Kinnakeet depicting potential ordnance based on high ferrous and conductivity levels. Data 




Findpoint Ferrous Conductivity Depth (cm) Latitude Longitude 
FP004 35 50 9 35.40679 -75.494 
FP018 33 46 7 35.40663 -75.49398 
FP020 35 45 14 35.40656 -75.49403 
FP021 33 41 10 35.40656 -75.494 
FP023 31 43 5 35.40654 -75.49403 
FP031 24 45 5 35.40644 -75.49404 
FP035 28 48 8 35.40635 -75.49401 
FP048 35 47 15 35.4065 -75.49406 
FP050 35 42 5 35.40658 -75.49408 
FP051 35 50 8 35.40661 -75.49408 
FP055 35 46 24 35.40664 -75.49407 
FP059 35 50 12 35.40673 -75.49407 
FP067 21 43 7 35.40692 -75.49412 
FP076 35 49 7 35.40699 -75.49416 
FP079 35 50 7 35.40696 -75.49412 
FP080 35 44 9 35.40695 -75.49417 
FP089 33 49 6 35.40695 -75.494 
FP093 35 48 24 35.4069 -75.49401 
FP094 26 45 14 35.4069 -75.49401 
FP106 29 41 19 35.40634 -75.49415 
FP110 24 42 11 35.40649 -75.49422 
FP112 35 49 9 35.40674 -75.49422 
FP114 35 44 10 35.40701 -75.49425 
FP115 28 48 21 35.4065 -75.49442 
FP121 34 43 8 35.40706 -75.49438 
FP126 28 48 5 35.40635 -75.4948 
FP129 32 44 14 35.40686 -75.49464 
FP134 32 47 5 35.40699 -75.4954 
Table 8. Targets from Kinnakeet shoreline survey area that possess the potential to be ordnance. 
 
Rodanthe Visual Shoreline Inspection and Metal Detection Data 
 Additional data sets from the Richards and Parker 2017 survey were incorporated into 
this study as well.  The Richards and Parker survey focused on an area located adjacent and 
slightly north of Black Mar Gut off Rodanthe.  Based on evidence contained within the historical 
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record and Oxford’s secondary account of events (Oxford 2013), there is a strong likelihood that 
the initial assault on Camp Live Oak lies within proximity to the survey area. 
 The methodologies employed during the Rodanthe survey by Richards and Parker (2017) 
were like the Little Kinnakeet survey; however, the Rodanthe survey area was much larger.  
Richards and Parker (2017) surveyed a 600 by 600-foot area off Rodanthe’s shoreline.  They also 
had different research objectives where the goals were to search for anomalies with any cultural 
significance.  Although the size of their survey area and research objectives differed, their study 
provided a similar data set to that gathered during the Little Kinnakeet survey.  Richards and 
Parker recorded the sound floor in a similar fashion.  The primary difference from this project, 
however, was the degree of metal detector coverage.  The Little Kinnakeet survey had many 
more targets than the Richards and Parker study because the metal detector was utilized to 
canvas the entire area.  During the Richards and Parker survey, half of the area was 
systematically covered with the metal detector to detect targets at random points between the 
search area and the point of access.  This methodology proved sufficient as it provided a decent 
data set for further analysis.   
The Rodanthe survey area was comparable to Little Kinnakeet as there was not much to 
note visually other than a large amount of seagrass and a sandy bottom (Figure 44).  There were, 
however, various articles of marine debris such as a paddle, rope, timber, and a concrete block 
(Richards and Parker 2017:84-85).  Although the methodologies were slightly different, there 
were still several anomalies detected with the metal detector (see raw data Appendix C).  Figures 
45 through 49 show the spatial location, ferrous content, and conductivity levels of each 
anomaly.  Keeping the same considerations in mind, these data were reassessed and filtered in 
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the same manner as the Little Kinnakeet shoreline data sets to produce a final data set of 
anomalies thought to be representative of battle (Figure 50).  As evidenced by Figure 50 and 
Table 9, 15 of the 30 targets detected have the potential to be ordnance.  These findings will be 
used to create a final battle map for the Rodanthe area, which will be compared against the 
operational frameworks outlined earlier which will be discussed in the following chapter. 
 
Figure 44. Visual shoreline inspection area off Rodanthe, from Richards and Parker 2017 Survey, digitized through 









Figure 46. Map of Rodanthe, depicting ferrous content of each anomaly detected with the metal detector.  




Figure 47. Map of Rodanthe depicting conductivity levels of each anomaly detected with the metal detector.         




Figure 48. Chart depicting the ferrous content of each magnetic anomaly detected during the Richards and Parker 





Figure 49. Chart depicting the conductivity level of each magnetic anomaly detected during the Richards and 


































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 50. Map of Rodanthe depicting potential ordnance based off high ferrous and conductivity levels. Data was 
filtered according to a SQL statement. (By: Jim Kinsella).  
128 
 
Findpoint Ferrous Conductivity Depth (cm) Latitude Longitude 
FP004 35 43 0.12 35.59939 -75.47062 
FP005 29 41 0.07 35.59934 -75.47146 
FP009 35 44 0.1 35.59941 -75.47144 
FP011 29 45 0.12 35.59941 -75.470975 
FP015 32 45 0.11 35.5995 -75.470298 
FP016 35 42 0.16 35.59949 -75.470244 
FP018 30 41 0.09 35.59953 -75.471276 
FP019 23 47 0.17 35.59954 -75.471209 
FP020 30 42 0.07 35.59966 -75.470694 
FP021 33 46 0.05 35.59964 -75.47118 
FP024 21 42 0.11 35.60015 -75.471254 
FP026 35 45 0.11 35.60027 -75.470912 
FP027 34 42 0.17 35.60026 -75.471296 
FP028 35 42 0.17 35.60027 -75.471501 
FP029 24 41 0.17 35.60032 -75.47154 
Table 9. Targets from Rodanthe shoreline survey area that possess the potential to be ordnance. 
Little Kinnakeet Magnetometer Data 
 The magnetometer and side-scan sonar surveys were run concurrently.  This proved the 
most optimal use of time and worked well in covering a lot of ground with the allotted time.  The 
baseline magnetic range in North Carolina is around 45,000nT (Breiner 1973:6).  During this 
survey, the baseline gamma range was 48,960 gammas/nanoteslas (nT) which changed over time 
due to diurnal variation.   
Like Parker’s (2015) study, certain criteria were set to determine whether an anomaly had 
the potential to be ordnance representative of the Chicamacomico Races: strength and duration 
of each magnetic anomaly.  An additional criterion was established, that involved each 
anomaly’s location that will be compared against the fields of fire models.  It should be noted 
here, that a portion of this survey extended slightly past the fields of fire range of Monticello’s 
32-pounder; however, it was within the 9-Dahlgren range.  While shelling the 3rd Georgia, firing 
would have been level coming from a 32-pounder smoothbore as they were direct fire weapons 
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with low trajectories (Eldridge 1996:15).  Firing upon the flotilla in the sound would require the 
gun to be elevated so that the effective range could reach the targets.  Even if fired at a level 
range, the smoothbore guns were capable of clearing obstacles (Eldridge 1996:15).  Furthermore, 
the decision was made to survey the area because it seems fully plausible that round shot 
ordnance from a 32-pounder smoothbore could still be found in this area through a “ricochet” 
effect.  Water is considered a stable surface so there is the potential for artillery fire to have 
ricocheted enough off the water if the projectile’s velocity slowed down enough.  Certain types 
of ordnance have the tendency to lose velocity once it enters the water.  Furthermore, 
smoothbore guns were utilized as direct fire artillery with low trajectories.  They could be angled 
in such a way that the projectile would ricochet off the water in instances where water was calm 
(Holley 1865:216; Bell 1941:4-5; Eldridge 1996:15).   
 As discussed in the previous chapter, shot from the following guns were deemed 
representative of the types of ordnance this survey expected to come across; 9-inch Dahlgren gun 
and 32-pound smoothbore.  Based off the parameters entered into the pBlock analysis it was 
expected that potential ordnance would have a gamma reading of 30nT or more.  It was expected 
that the duration of each anomaly would vary, presumably even at shallow depths, if the target is 
likely buried, therefore objects closer to the surface would have a longer duration than deeper 
objects.  Objects at 1-2 meters would likely have a duration of one to two seconds, while those 
closer to the surface would have a longer duration. 
Several false targets were deleted from the data set record during the data post-processing 
phase.  The criteria for a false target were any large spike in a magnetic reading with a short 
duration (usually under one second).  There were several instances of false or “glitchy” data, 
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caused by sharp turns during lane changes, over-corrections in steering, tow cable snag, or the 
magnetometer bottoming out on the sound floor.  A final table of targets to be analyzed further 
was produced once the false targets were removed (see Appendix D).  This final table includes 
target number, target coordinates, target intensity, and target duration. 
Interpreting the magnetometer data required reviewing several factors to determine 
whether the target was an object lying on the sound floor.  Each magnetic anomaly exists as a 
dipole (a pair of equally charged magnetic poles).  The magnetic strength of an anomaly, as well 
as depth, plays a role in how dipoles are expressed in the data (Breiner 1999:17-18).  Having set 
the lane spacing to 20 meters, it was expected to see dipoles (distinct positive and negative 
values) associated with each anomaly (Figure 51).  There were certain cases where only a 
monopole, half the dipole, was visible; possible explanations for this occurrence offered by 
Parker (2015:104), were that the towfish passed over only one side of the magnetic field 
(positive or negative) of a given target, that may have had a strong gamma reading but was 
farther from the towfish.  Figure 52 shows anomalies and their magnetic intensities.  As shown in 
this figure, intensity ranged from 5.83nT to 1450.79nT.  Table 14 in Appendix D shows the 
duration of each magnetic anomaly detected during the survey.     
 
Figure 51. Example of a dipole from this study’s magnetometer data set.  This dipole has a reading of 





Figure 52.  Chart depicting magnetic intensities of each magnetic anomaly.  Magnetic intensity was 
measured by finding the deviation between the high peak vs. the low peak (By: Jim Kinsella). 
 
While compiling the magnetometer data in the GIS model, there were some noticeable 
gaps and shelving in the data.  To overcome this issue, lane spacing was set to 5m and 10m in 
Hypack for data processing to eliminate the gaps.  There was not a significant difference in the 
5m vs. 10m; therefore, the decision was made to use the 10m lane spacing to analyze the data.  
During this analysis in the GIS model, the gamma intervals were set to 1, 5, and 10 nanoteslas. It 
was determined that setting the parameters to 10nT in the GIS model offered the clearest 
representation of the data.  Figures 53 and 54 below show the difference between the 10m and 
20m lane spacing with the gamma range set at an interval of 10nT.  In these images, the black 
line represents the baseline of 48,960nT while the blue line represents values above the baseline 
and the red represents values under the baseline value.   
The next set of figures shows the epicenter and intensity for each magnetic anomaly.  The 
intensity of each anomaly was determined by finding the deviation between each magnetic 
dipole’s positive peak and negative peak.  Figure 55 below shows the GIS representation of each 
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yellow asterisk.  Additionally, each anomaly is identified with a label in this figure.  These labels 
were not generated in any strategic fashion by the author, they were simply generated by 
ArcMap as an Object ID Number assigned by the program.  Figure 56 shows the GIS 
representation of each anomaly’s magnetic intensity.   
 
Figure 53. Magnetometer data from Hypack depicted in the GIS model for analysis.  Image above shows results 
with 20m lane spacing with 10nT intervals.  The baseline 48960nT is represented by the black line.  




Figure 54. Magnetometer data from Hypack depicted in the GIS model for analysis.  Image above shows results 
with 10m lane spacing with 10nT intervals.  The baseline 48960nT is represented by the black line.  





Figure 55. Magnetometer data from Hypack represented in the GIS model.  Image includes 10m lane spacing with 
contour lines spaced at 10nT, as well as the epicenter for each magnetic anomaly.  The epicenter of each anomaly is 





Figure 56. Magnetometer data from Hypack represented in the GIS model.  Image includes 10m lane spacing with 
contour lines spaced at 10nT, as well as the magnetic intensity of each magnetic anomaly.  The value is represented 
in nT. (By: Jim Kinsella). 
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Little Kinnakeet Side-scan Sonar Data 
 Like Parker’s (2015) study, the purpose the side-scan sonar survey’s purpose was not 
specifically to find targets representative of ordnance as the likelihood of doing so was extremely 
low.  Instead, the purpose was to eliminate the causes of magnetic anomalies such as buoys, crab 
pots, and pilings.  During the Little Kinnakeet remote sensing survey, a total of 175 targets were 
recorded and cataloged into an Excel spreadsheet. Information captured on each target included 
the date target was acquired, fish altitude, range to target, target dimensions, target coordinates, 
and target description.  Each target was captured as an image (jpg format) and cataloged.  Each 
target was also categorized into the following categories; SAV, marine debris, limbs, pilings, 
crab-pots, duck-blind, and unknown.  Like the 2015 Parker study, the final phase of data 
processing involved capturing all lanes as GeoTIFF images to be incorporated into ArcGIS (see 
raw data in Appendix E). 
 
Figure 57. Chart illustrating the percentage of sonar categories (By: Jim Kinsella). 
Due to the nature and economy within the Outer Banks, it was expected to see several abandoned 
crab pots in the sonar images during data processing, this was not the case, however, as 











Crab Pot Duck Blind False Target Impression Limb
Marine Debris Piling SAV Scour Unknown Object
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that may be crab pots.  The remaining targets were an assortment of various kinds of SAV, tree 
limbs, marine debris, downed pilings, and pilings from a duck blind in the survey area.  One 
thing to note, while processing the side-scan sonar data, an undetermined flaw in the data was 
detected.  This may have occurred during data acquisition.  As a result, data could not be 
processed in SonarWiz as originally planned.  Nevertheless, once it was accepted that there were 
flaws in the data, analysis proceeded through the Hypack and GIS software (Figures 58 and 59). 
 




Figure 59. Sonar survey area with sonar targets imported into the GIS model.  Note mosaic layer is turned off so 
that the target symbols could be seen.  (By Jim Kinsella). 
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 During the side-scan sonar investigation and processing activities, acoustic targets were 
used to eliminate magnetometer targets from consideration of potentially being ordnance.  This 
included targets such as crab-pots, pilings, scour marks, and a duck blind.  They are presented 
here as examples of the types of sonar anomalies discovered during the survey.  By the 
conclusion of fieldwork, no sonar targets could be definitively connected to Civil War-era 
conflict. 
TARGETS 107 and 151 
Figure 60 includes images of sonar targets noticed during data processing.  These were 
detected near the middle of the survey area.  They appear to be abandoned crab-pots, based on 
the absence of a marker buoy.  There is a small possibility that they could be cinder blocks due to 
the lack of magnetic signature noticed during data processing.  Both objects are similar in size 
and shape.  They are approximately 0.8 meters long and 0.8 meters wide.   
      
Figure 60. Images of TARGETS 107 and 151 (left to right) which appear to be discarded crab-pots lying on the 




 TARGET 135 appears to be a cluster of pilings associated with a duck blind (Figure 61).  
The duck blind was observed prior to the survey, so it was expected to show up during post-
processing.  This was the only duck blind in the survey area and it was located right in the 
middle of the survey area.   
 
Figure 61. Image of TARGET 135, revealed to be a duck blind in the middle of the survey area. 
 
TARGET 134 
 TARGET 134 shows scour marks on the sound floor (Figure 51).  There were several 
instances of this observed during the survey and post-processing.  The cause for such marks on 
the sound floor could be the result of an anchor being dragged through sediment.  A more likely 
answer is that this scour mark was left behind by a boat motor.  Due to the shallow depths, it is 




Figure 62.  Image of TARGET 134, example of scour markings on the sound floor. 
 
Combined Magnetometer and Side-scan Sonar Data 
The final steps in processing the remote sensing data involved combining the two data 
sets and integrating them into the GIS model (Figure 63).  The purpose was to see if there was 
any correlation or relationship between sonar targets and magnetic anomalies.  From the onset, it 
was discussed that it was unlikely to see any ordnance in the sonar images but combining both 
sets of data was important as it gave a clearer picture of what is on or underneath the sound floor.  
Like previous studies conducted at ECU, combining both data sets in the GIS model helped 




Figure 63. All Sonar Targets overlaid on top of the magnetometer data in the GIS model. Note: due to potential 
layback issues as well as the sonar device being pole mounted while magnetometer was towed, targets may not line 
up.  This is further exacerbated by wind, current, and sharp turns. (By: Jim Kinsella). 
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Combining both data sets assisted in eliminating several targets from consideration; any 
magnetometer image with an associated sonar target was not considered ordnance.  Such was the 
case with crab pots identified earlier in the side-scan sonar images, as well as the duck blind.  A 
total of 30 magnetic anomalies were further examined (see Figure 63 above).  Among these 30 
magnetic anomalies, 16 were eliminated from further consideration of being ordnance as they 
appeared to share a relationship with a side-scan sonar image (see Table 10 below).   
Target Related Sonar Image 
MA#1 Piling Unknown Object 
MA#2 Marine Debris 
MA#3 Unknown Object 
MA#4 Unknown Object 
MA#9 Unknown Object 
MA#10 Unknown Object 
MA#12 Unknown Object 
MA#13 Unknown Object 
MA#14 Unknown Object 
MA#15 Unknown Object 
MA#16 Unknown Object 
MA#21 Piling 
MA#22 Unknown Object 
MA#24 Crab Pot 
MA#23 Unknown Object 
MA#27 Unknown Object 
Table 10.  This table depicts the magnetic targets that were eliminated from consideration based off a correlation 
with a side-scan sonar image. 
These remaining targets fell within the range of 12.44nT to 1450.79nT.  Based on the 
pBlock parameters mentioned earlier, for a target to be considered ordnance, it needed to have a 
gamma reading of 30nT or higher.  With that said, 3 targets from the remaining 14 were 
eliminated.  This left only 11 targets that fit within the pBlock parameters of being ordnance and 
that do not have a correlation with a sonar image.  Additionally, there were two sets of targets 
that appeared to have been duplicates of one another.  This brought the list of targets to 9 
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considered as being potential ordnance (see Table 11 below).  Figure 64 below shows the 
magnetic intensities of the remaining targets under consideration.   
Target Magnetic Intensity 
Within 
pBlock Comments 
MA#5 136.3 Yes n/a 
MA#6 129.39 Yes n/a 
MA#7 12.44 No Eliminate 
MA#8 21.07 No Eliminate 
MA#11 864.96 Yes n/a 
MA#17 563.8 Yes 
Likely same target as 
MA#29 
MA#18 1450.79 Yes 
Likely same target as 
MA#28 
MA#19 173.81 Yes n/a 
MA#20 52.04 Yes n/a 
MA#25 98.48 Yes n/a 
MA#26 20.51 No Eliminate 
MA#28 1450.79 Yes 
Likely same target as 
MA#18 
MA#29 563.8 Yes 
Likely same target as 
MA#17 
MA#30 58.69 Yes n/a 
Table 11.  The table above depicts the 14-remaining magnetic targets that does not have a correlation with a sonar 
image.  The table also shows if they fall within the pBlock parameters. 
 
Being unable to physically investigate the remaining magnetic anomalies, coupled with 
the assumption that potential ordnance was buried within the sediment; magnetic anomalies 
detected by the magnetometer fitting within pBlock parameters were said to be potential  
ordnance.  Parker (2015) made a similar assumption in his study.  As a result, the nine magnetic 
anomalies fitting pBlock parameters and not correlated with a sonar image were revealed in a 
final map, along with the shoreline targets, for further analysis (Figure 65). 
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Figure 64.  This figure represents the magnetic intensity of the remaining targets under consideration for 




Figure 65.  This figure represents the location of targets in off Little Kinnakeet that are potentially 




Figure 66.  This figure represents a close-up of targets along the Little Kinnakeet shoreline that are 
potentially associated with the Chicamacomico Races. (By: Jim Kinsella). 
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Rodanthe Remote Sensing Data Set 
 Richards and Parker’s project also involved a remote sensing survey in the waters off 
Rodanthe in addition to the shoreline survey (Figure 67).  Their survey covered approximately 
4.195717 square kilometers (1.61997539 square miles) to assess any cultural resources and/or 
marine debris in the area (Richards and Parker 2017:1,76).  The methodologies to carry out the 
survey were like this study; however, their research was not focused on searching for ordnance, 
therefore the data sets were reanalyzed when integrated into this study.   
Richards and Parker identified 75 sonar targets at Rodanthe, many of which fell into the 
following categories; pilings, crab pots, and channel marker buoys.  Seventeen of the 75 targets 
had correlating magnetic signatures; therefore, they were removed from being considered 
ordnance.  The Richards and Parker survey area was littered with both active and abandoned crab 
pots, which was much different than the Little Kinnakeet project, however, the water is much 
deeper than at Little Kinnakeet, so that factor alone could account for the abundance of crab pots.  
Additionally, the Black Mar Gut area is much more active in terms of recreation due to its 
proximity to public roads and residential areas, and therefore easier to access for noncommercial 





Figure 67. GIS Image of sonar targets collected during the Richards and Parker 2017 survey.  Red line indicates the 
Rodanthe Ferry channel, while the gray box indicates the shoreline inspection area (Image provided courtesy of N. 
Richards). 
 
Richards and Parker also utilized a magnetometer concurrently with the sonar device.  
The baseline gamma range fluctuated between 48,125.6 nT – 49,320.2 nT during their survey 
(Richards and Parker 2017:80).  Figure 68 below shows results of their magnetometer survey.  
Note the target cluster along the dredged ferry channel.  This is possibly indicative of discarded 
debris from boat or ferry traffic.  Several magnetic anomalies correlated with crab pots and 
buoys identified during the survey as well as during post-processing.  There were several 
unidentified targets from the magnetometer data set, for which they offer the following 
explanation: the unidentified targets could possibly be discarded submerged crab pots or ferrous 
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line weights (Richards and Parker 2017:76-80).  The same explanation could be made for the 
Little Kinnakeet survey.  However, with the research goals in mind, this study looked at the 
Richards and Parker data differently.  Since this area falls within the proximity of the initial 
assault on Camp Live Oak, one would expect that these small unidentified magnetic targets 
could potentially be ordnance from Confederate forces in the sound but as will be discussed later, 
this is not the case.  Figures 69 and 70 below show sonar data overlaid atop the magnetometer 
data.   
  
Figure 68. GIS Image of magnetometer targets with gamma readings for each target collected during the Richards 
and Parker 2017 survey.  Red line indicates the Rodanthe Ferry channel, while the gray box indicates the shoreline 




Figure 69. GIS Image of magnetometer data overlaid with side-scan sonar targets collected during the Richards and 
Parker 2017 survey.  Gray box indicates shoreline inspection area (Image provided courtesy of N. Richards). 
 
Figure 70. GIS Image of magnetometer overlaid with side-scan sonar targets collected during the Richards and 
Parker 2017 survey.  Special note, this image contains surface events. (Image provided courtesy of N. Richards). 
152 
 
During data processing and analysis, it was discovered that targets detected during 
remote sensing in the off-shore survey area at Rodanthe were likely not representative of battle.  
These conclusions were drawn after further review of primary source material, historic 
bathymetry, and fields of fire models.  There were a few targets that fell within 1000 yards of 
Cotton Plant; however, they appeared to have sonar targets associated with them.  Therefore, 
only targets from the Rodanthe shoreline survey were considered for final battle analysis.  These 
have been put into a final GIS map for further analysis (Figure 71).  It could be argued that the 
approximated position of Cotton Plant could be incorrect.  However, in this case, the ship’s 
position was estimated based on its proximity from one of the best-known landmarks in the area 
at the time – the windmill, and historical testimony that Cotton Plant was anchored 1 mile 
directly west of Camp Live Oak (Harpers Weekly 1861d:673; Logansport Journal 1861; New 
York Times 1861b; Yellowley 1861; Turner 1864; Merrill 1869:488; Oxford 2013:130).  As 
discussed, the GIS tool is an interpretation of the historical data from the author, therefore a 
degree of inaccuracy in the actual location could exist.   
Conclusion 
 This chapter focused on data sets produced from historical research as well as 
archaeological fieldwork (shoreline and remote sensing surveys) outlined in the previous chapter.  
The battle narrative informed the GIS model creation which outlined the proposed battle areas 
that assisted in planning archaeological fieldwork.  Which in turn assisted in setting up the 
desired survey areas for the visual shoreline inspection and remote sensing operations.  Although 
there are several other areas that would be ideal candidates for survey as they fall within the 
fields of fire models, the decision was made to focus on the areas identified above.  This decision 
allowed the project to stay within budget and time constraints.  Each archaeological data set was 
153 
 
examined individually before they were combined and examined together.  The end results of 
this combined analysis were put into a final GIS map that showcased all targets from each survey 
that are considered potential ordnance representative of battle.  This final map will be utilized in 
the next chapter to examine the Chicamacomico Races within the KOCOA framework. 
 
Figure 71.  This figure represents a close-up of targets along the Rodanthe shoreline that are potentially associated 




Ordnance or Crab Pot?  An Analysis of the Sound Floor in Pamlico Sound 
 
Introduction 
This chapter will focus on bringing together all the collated data sets to analyze them 
according to the theoretical framework presented in Chapter 2.  This includes data gathered 
through historical research as well as the archaeological surveys.  Data sets from the 
archaeological surveys were filtered according to the ordnance characteristics and cross-
referential data sets to identify characteristics with the potential to be in situ ordnance.  The final 
data set produced was imported into the GIS model to create a composite battle map where the 
targets (potential ordnance) were compared against the fields of fire models.  The objective was 
to determine if the targets met the criteria of potential ordnance from the Chicamacomico Races.  
The chapter will follow precedent set in Parker’s (2015) study, where he outlined a naval 
battlefield’s boundaries by utilizing archaeological data.  Determining battlefield boundaries was 
done before commencing the theoretical analysis of the battle.  For the theoretical analysis, the 
battlefield pattern framework is influenced by the historical and archaeological records while the 
KOCOA analysis is influenced by the historical record as well as the GIS model. 
Chicamacomico Races Battle Boundaries 
The battle areas were determined using the two final survey data maps from the Little 
Kinnakeet and Rodanthe surveys (Figures 65 and 71).  Most targets (potentially representative of 
battle) at Little Kinnakeet were situated closer to the shore adjacent to the access area near the 
Little Kinnakeet lifesaving station.  These anomalies fit the ferrous and conductivity 
characteristics (detected by the metal detector) that could represent potential ordnance.  
Furthermore, it was reported that the 3rd Georgia withdrew into the sound in this area as they 
were harassed by shells from Monticello (Braine 1861:291-292).   
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An additional small group of magnetic anomalies is located further (.38 miles) out into 
the sound.  Collectively, these targets are consistent with the historical record reporting Civil 
War activity in this area.  If these magnetic anomalies are ordnance, then they are indicative of 
Union artillery fire from Monticello as these anomalies lie within the fields of fire represented in 
the GIS model (Figures 72 & 73).  This would have been the point Monticello fired upon their 
enemy from ¾ of a mile off Bald Beach in the Atlantic.  The Georgians were attempting to 
withdraw back towards Chicamacomico when they came under fire after being spotted.  As a 
result, the Georgians scurried northward on the beach as well as towards the Confederate flotilla 
in the sound while seeking cover from Union artillery fire (Braine 1861:291-292; Johnson 
1861:58; New York Times 1861d).   
For the Rodanthe area, there was a small cluster of anomalies (potentially representing 
the battle) situated along the shoreline adjacent to Black Mar Gut.  This zone is adjacent to 
Oxford’s purported location of Camp Live Oak (Oxford 2013:195-196).  The historical record 
indicates this area was heavily bombarded by both Cotton Plant and Empire (2, 12-pdr howitzer, 
1,32-pdr smoothbore) during the initial assault on Camp Live Oak.  Furthermore, there are 
reports the windmill, tents, and hospital caught fire (New York Times 1861c; Yellowley 1861).  
The hospital appeared to be a major target of the Confederate attack (Logansport Journal 1861).  




Figure 72.  This figure represents the fields of fire range for Monticello’s 32-pound smoothbore as well as 




Figure 73.  This figure represents the fields of fire range for Monticello’s 9-inch Dahlgren gun as well as anomalies 




Figure 74.  This figure represents the fields of fire range for Cotton Plant’s 12-pound Howitzers and Empire’s 32-
pounder smoothbore as well as anomalies that fit the criteria of potential ordnance.  (By: Jim Kinsella) 
Like the Little Kinnakeet area, several anomalies were detected further out into the sound 
in the Rodanthe area.  Eighteen of the 75 targets detected by the Richards and Parker (2017) 
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magnetometer survey did not have a corresponding sonar image.  They were thought to be 
abandoned crab pots but for purposes of this study, the data was reassessed to see if they fit 
within the ordnance range (Figures 54 & 68).  While the magnetic signatures shared similar 
characteristics (relative strength and duration) to those found at Kinnakeet, the likelihood of 
these being representative of battle is low.  This is because the area surveyed by Richards and 
Parker did not fit within the fields of fire model (discussed further below).  There are also no 
reports of Union forces, in this case 20th Indiana, firing any artillery toward Cotton Plant or 
Empire.  Therefore, it is unlikely that these anomalies represent Union artillery fire.   
Like Parker’s (2015) study, defining the battle boundary areas produced two areas to 
focus the analysis on; the core area and the study area.  As stated by Parker (2015:122), the study 
area concerns those places that related to or contributed to the battle, while the core area is where 
actual battle activity occurred (see also Lowe 2000:23-24).  While both events examined here 
were somewhat one-sided day to day, (conditions of 4 October favored Confederate forces, while 
conditions of 5 October favored Union forces), the battle areas can still be analyzed using 
KOCOA.  The study area includes both the sound and ocean off Hatteras Island where Union 
forces established Camp Live Oak adjacent to Midyett’s Windmill near Black Mar Gut 
(Yellowley 1861; Oxford 2013:195-196).  This also includes the point where Fanny was 
captured on 1 October 1861.  Unfortunately, the Fanny capture zone was not surveyed 
archaeologically by this survey or Richards and Parker (2017). Therefore, there is no 
archaeological evidence to verify this event, so the Rodanthe analysis will focus solely on 
activity within areas surveyed archaeologically.  The study area also includes the area where 
Confederate forces attempted a landing during the initial stages of the Races and where the 3rd 
Georgia observed Monticello stalking their position from the Atlantic.  The core areas include 
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the area where Cotton Plant and Empire engaged the 20th Indiana at Camp Live Oak on 4 
October 1861, then from the northern end of the island moving southward to Kinnakeet (more 
specifically Bald Beach) where Monticello opened fire on the 3rd Georgia (Figure 75).  
Following the definition of the core areas involved with the Chicamacomico Races, the 
Battlefield Pattern analysis and KOCOA analysis were completed.   
 
Figure 75.  This figure represents both the core and study areas of the Chicamacomico Races. 




Battlefield Pattern Analysis 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the battlefield pattern analysis is focused on addressing the 
spatial and temporal aspects of a battlescape (Fox and Scott 1991:92).  While the 
Chicamacomico Races were far from a traditional military encounter, prescribed tactics used in 
military encounters such as this are evidenced in the archaeological record.  Therefore, material 
evidence left behind in the wake of battle offers insight into the progression of a battle (Fox and 
Scott 1991:92-93).  In the case of the Chicamacomico Races, material evidence detected during 
archaeological investigation and thought to be representative of a battle offered several clues 
about the military action that occurred.  Much of this has already been discussed above while 
outlining the Chicamacomico battle boundaries.  
The battlefield pattern analysis looked at each vessel (Monticello, Cotton Plant, and 
Empire) as a single unit and did not focus on individual sailors within the ships.  For instance, 
the distribution of material evidence (with a potential to be ordnance) detected off shore as well 
as along the shoreline at Kinnakeet reveals much about the behavior of those aboard Monticello.  
These findings suggest that, as the Union ship stalked the 3rd Georgia as well as the small 
Confederate fleet in the sound, they were in a tactical position to do so.  As a result, they made 
the decision to engage them by opening fire.  Evidence of artillery fire was potentially recorded 
throughout the sound and along the shoreline in the survey areas.  The evidence, magnetic 
anomalies, were found in clusters along the shoreline as well as offshore in the sound.  The 
distribution could reveal that Monticello was stationary (anchored) along the inner shoals off 
Hatteras Island as it harassed the enemy.  Similar conclusions can be made upon the material 
evidence detected at the Rodanthe sites.  Cotton Plant and Empire situated themselves in 
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stationary positions off Rodanthe (see Figure 33) where they shelled the 20th Indiana at Camp 
Live Oak (Yellowley 1861; Turner 1864; Oxford 2013:130). 
Remote sensing methodologies allowed this study to observe the systemic location (gross 
patterning) of material evidence because the pBlock modeling tool examined signatures of 
anomalies (dynamic patterning) that were thought to be representative of battle.  The pBlock 
analysis tool was useful for addressing this study’s research goals, as it revealed characteristics 
representative of a 9-inch Dahlgren gun (one at Bald Beach), 12-pound Howitzer (3 at 
Rodanthe), and a 32-pounder (only one at Rodanthe, and only two at Bald Beach).  As discussed 
earlier, shot from these guns were deemed representative of battle since they were aboard the 
vessels involved.   
KOCOA Analysis 
KOCOA is an analytical tool utilized by the ABPP for surveying and documenting 
battlefields (Lowe 2000:7).  They use it to determine if and what areas of historic battlefields 
need to be protected (Parker 2015:133).  Each element within the KOCOA analysis tool were 
discussed in detail in Chapter 2 as well as how each element has been amended to fit within a 
naval battlefield (see Babits 2010:3-4).  For each element, the Kinnakeet area will be discussed 
first, followed by the Rodanthe area.   
Key Terrain 
The first element within the KOCOA analysis, Key Terrain, is described as the vantage 
point or “high ground.”  Whoever had this point during a battle had an advantage over the enemy 
(Fonzo 2008:2; Parker 2015:133).  At Chicamacomico, this element is represented by both the 
sound and ocean.  During the Chicamacomico Races at Kinnakeet, the Atlantic Ocean was the 
key terrain which was controlled by the USS Monticello.  It was important to examine this area’s 
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bathymetry in much the same way as Parker did (2015).  Parker (2015:133) pointed out that 
without enough water under a ship, it would not be able to effectively maneuver to engage the 
enemy.  The Atlantic Ocean is much deeper than Pamlico Sound side as evidenced by the 
historic bathymetry (Figure 76).  Therefore, Monticello could maneuver into position much 
easier than the Confederate fleet who were on the sound side of the island.  Furthermore, this 
gave Union forces the vantage point to fire on the 3rd Georgia as they withdraw towards 
Chicamacomico.  Monticello held this the vantage point for several hours constantly shelling the 
Confederate forces on the beach and in the sound.  During this time, the Confederate tried to 
bring their fleet into a position to aid their infantry and return fire against Monticello (New York 
Times 1861d; Braine 1861:291-2; Oxford 2013:159).  The archaeological evidence appears to 
verify this account as all targets potentially representing battle were found clustered together 
offshore at Little Kinnakeet (Figures 75 and 76).   
 
Figure 76.  Historic bathymetry map including Monticello’s location. (By: Jim Kinsella). 
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At Rodanthe, key terrain consisted mainly of Pamlico Sound which was occupied by 
Confederate forces during the initial assault on Camp Live Oak.  Like the analysis at Kinnakeet 
and following precedents set by previous studies (Simonds 2013; Parker 2015), it was important 
to examine the bathymetry (Figure 77).  Pamlico Sound is shallow as evidenced by the 
bathymetry model and as discussed, a certain amount of water must be under a ship for it to 
effectively engage the enemy.  In this case, only Cotton Plant and Empire could effectively 
exploit the sound to fire on Camp Live Oak and the retreating 20th Indiana as well as assist in 
landing forces to take the camp.  Cotton Plant’s draft was only 4 feet 6 inches, allowing it to get 
within a mile of shore and engage the camp (NHHC 2015b). Other Confederate ships such as the 
expedition’s flagship, Curlew, could not get as close to shore to fire effectively due to their deep 
drafts (Oxford 2013:127-128).  While Empire had a draft of 7.5 feet, reports suggest it was still 
able to get within effective range and fire on the camp (Yellowley 1861; NHHC 2015d).  A 
quick note, referring to Empire, the KOCOA analysis does not agree with the historical record.  
Due to bathymetry and fields of fire, Empire was not likely within effective range to fire on the 
camp or those amongst the 20th Indiana as they escaped towards the south (Figure 77 and 74).  
While Empire likely was not in the appropriate position, the position of Cotton Plant gave them 
the vantage point to fire on the 20th Indiana unhindered because the Federals did not have 
cannons.  Additionally, reports reveal the 20th Indiana were unable to defend their position due 
to several sick soldiers and their reinforcements being captured a few days prior (Brown 
1861b:68, see also Oxford 2013:127).  In this instance, only Confederate forces could effectively 
utilize Pamlico Sound’s key terrain.  This is verified by Brown’s report to Hawkins, where he 
stated, “the enemy was evidently at this time master of the upper end of the sound” (Brown 
1861b:68, see also Oxford 2013:127).  Referring to the data from the visual shoreline inspection 
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and hand-held metal detection survey, the archaeological evidence was sparse along the 
shoreline suggesting that most ordnance fired from Cotton Plant likely landed on the island, in 
and around the location of Camp Live Oak. 
 




Observation and Fields of Fire 
The second element within the KOCOA analysis, Observation and Fields of Fire, can be 
broken into two subsets.  Observation is considered any point on the landscape that allows 
observation of enemy movements.  Furthermore, it is also considered as being seen by the enemy 
as well as allied in placements (an artillery component) that is not necessarily key terrain.  
Stephen Fonzo (2008:2) stated that observation offers the opportunity to see over an area and 
acquire targets and noted that high ground is one example.  Babits (2011:3) stated that 
observation is not as important in a naval context as it would be for a terrestrial battle.  In a naval 
battle, ships are highly visible to the enemy unless weather (fog, night) interferes, therefore, this 
analysis will focus mainly on fields of fire. 
In Chapter 2 it was discussed that fields of fire refers to a weapon’s capability, more 
specifically, the maximum and effective ranges of weapons or a ship’s armament (see Parker 
2015:137).  These capabilities have been visually presented in the GIS model representing the 
fields of fire for each ship involved in the Chicamacomico Races.  It is important to note that 
within a nautical scope, this element can fluctuate during battle because fields of fire are 
temporary circumstances where it depends upon the ship’s ability to move into the appropriate 
position to engage and fire at the enemy.  This is heavily influenced by certain factors such as 
ships roll, currents, obstructions in the water, tidal behaviors, and winds (Babits 2010:3; Parker 
2015:137).   
Following precedent set by Parker (2015), data from Tables 1 and 2 representing ship 
weapon capabilities were used to examine both the maximum and effective ranges for each ship.  
Figure 78 shows the fields of fire representation of Cotton Plant as it fired upon the 20th Indiana 
as well as Empire’s nonfiring position during the initial assault on Camp Live Oak on 4 October 
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1861.  As discussed, the historical record shows Empire was within range to shell the 20th 
Indiana; however, as evidenced by the fields of fire model and historic bathymetry, reports of 
Empire being within range are likely untrue.  Figure 79 shows the fields of fire for Monticello as 
it shelled the 3rd Georgia on 5 October 1861.  Special consideration must be made when 
examining the fields of fire for vessels.  These models are interpretive tools based on historical 
research, historic geography, as well as historic bathymetry.  Therefore, ship locations in the 
models are only approximations due to the episodic nature of naval encounters (Simonds 
2014:47; Parker 2015:138).   
Research shows both ships were anchored while firing, however, the exact point cannot 
be pinpointed with exact precision.  As per the historical record, Cotton Plant was allegedly 
anchored 1 mile west of the windmill (Harpers Weekly 1861d:673; Logansport Journal 1861; 
New York Times 1861b; Yellowley 1861; Merrill 1869:488; Oxford 2013:130).  This project did 
not investigate the location of the windmill archaeologically, therefore, the location is based 
upon Oxford’s (2013:195-196) theory.  The same considerations must be made for Monticello as 
well.  Historical evidence, suggests Monticello was ¾ of a mile off Bald Beach (Braine 
1861:291-292; Barrett 1963:55; Oxford 2013:157, 171).  Since Bald Beach is a broad area, the 
location was based off where it was pinpointed on maps available.  The possibility exists that 
Monticello could have been located anywhere off Bald Beach, perhaps 100 yards north or south 
from the location used in the GIS representation.  Therefore, ship locations in the GIS model are 




Figure 78.  Fields of Fire model for Cotton Plant and Empire during the events of 4 October 1861.  This 
shows the 20th retreating south as they were fired upon. 





Figure 79.  Fields of Fire model for Monticello during the events of 5 October 1861, as it shelled the 3rd 




A few conclusions can be reached by examining the fields of fire models in conjunction 
with the historical record.  Looking at the events of 4 October 1861, Union forces at 
Chicamacomico took the brunt of the enemy’s attack for several hours, resulting in the 
destruction of nearby tents and the windmill, as well as the loss of the camp (Logansport Journal 
1861; New York Times 1861c; Yellowley 1861; Merrill 1869:488).  This ultimately led to the 
20th Indiana’s retreat towards Hatteras Inlet.  The destruction caused by the attack and the 20th’s 
retreat, reveals that Confederate forces were attempting to utilize the full range of artillery 
aboard Cotton Plant, as the goal was to drive Union forces out.  While the Southerners attempted 
to effectively use the full range of Cotton Plant’s artillery, the same cannot be conclusively said 
about Empire’s effectiveness during this battle.  While historical resources indicate Empire was 
within range to shell the 20th Indiana at Camp Live Oak, the ship’s draft (7.5 feet), historic 
bathymetry maps, and the fields of fire models suggest Empire was likely unable to get within 
firing range of Camp Live Oak. 
Examining the events of 5 October 1861, Monticello shelled the 3rd Georgia as well as 
the Confederate fleet in the sound for several hours.  Material (with the potential to be ordnance) 
along the shoreline suggests that Monticello was within effective range of the temporary 3rd 
Georgia march route, as there are reports that shells landed among and passed over the Third 
(Braine 1861:291-92; Daily National Intelligencer 1861b:2; Harpers Weekly 1861d:673).  
During this event, there was no loss of life, suggesting Monticello’s shots were not accurate, 
possibly resulting in wasted ordnance.  The only effect it seemed to have was the 3rd Georgia 
withdrew from the area.  None of the Confederate fleet on the sound were struck by Monticello’s 
shells even though such was falsely reported in Braine’s official report (Braine 1861:291-92; 
Daily National Intelligencer 1861b:2; Harpers Weekly 1861d:673; Logansport Journal 1861; 
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Mansfield 1861:626-27, see also Oxford 2013:168).  While they may have been within effective 
range to engage the 3rd Georgia on the beach, this suggests they were not within effective range 
to strike the enemy fleet.  The points in the sound where possible ordnance anomalies were 
found were likely unreachable by the Confederate flotilla due to the water depths.  There is the 
possibility, however, that this area was reachable by smaller boats recovering 3rd Georgia troops 
seeking escape from Union fire.  There were anomalies discovered in this area which supports 
the ricochet effect of ordnance from a 32-pounder smoothbore gun.  As discussed earlier, water 
is stable surface, so the possibility of ordnance skipping along the surface is viable as the 
smoothbore guns could be angled to make the ricochet effect possible (Holley 1865:216; Bell 
1941:4-5).   
Cover and Concealment 
The third element within the KOCOA analysis is cover and concealment.  This element 
can also be broken down into two subsets: cover and concealment.  Cover is considered 
protection from enemy fire whereas concealment is protection from enemy sight, which is a 
counter to observation.  Parker (2015:136) further elaborates that while concealment offers 
protection from enemy sight, it does not always offer cover against enemy fire.  Different types 
of landforms or landscapes can act as both cover and concealment, but at times may only work as 
one.  Riverbanks, forests, and trenches are terrestrial examples of this element (Fonzo 2008:2).  
Within a nautical scope, dunes, ridges, and forts are considered cover and concealment.  Babits 
(2011:3) states that in some instances, the vessel itself may act as cover and concealment, 
however, in most cases, they are poor sources of concealment due to their highly visible nature.  
This was until the advent of submarine warfare.  Regarding cover, the vessel’s armor may offer 
some protection for the sailors aboard.   
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Babits’ thoughts on concealment being unlikely were validated while analyzing the 
events at Chicamacomico.  During each engagement on 4-5 October 1861, there were no forts or 
ridges that offered concealment.  At Bald Beach, the 3rd Georgia looked towards the sparse 
woodlands in the area for concealment.  With limited options for cover, the 3rd Georgia sought 
cover on the small boats coming to shore to retrieve them and bring them to the Confederate fleet 
away from Monticello’s assault (New York Times 1861d).  In addition to the sparse woodlands in 
both areas, there are several sand dunes in the area (see Riggs and Ames 2011:2-3) that offered 
some cover and concealment during the Chicamacomico Races.  While escaping the assault at 
Live Oak, the 20th Indiana used the dunes and woods to avoid being seen by the Confederate 
flotilla.  At the northern end, just south of their camp, the 20th Indiana used the big dune there as 
concealment and partial cover (Braine 1861:291-92; Harpers Weekly 1861d:674-675; Oxford 
2013:147-152).   
Obstacles 
The fourth element, Obstacles, is any feature on the landscape that affects the battle by 
hindering or restricting movement.  In a terrestrial scenario, obstacles can be rivers, forts, 
mountains, and walls (Fonzo 2008:2; Parker 2015:135).  Babits (2011:3) states that within a 
naval scenario, obstacles can range from sandbars, wind, and even the water itself.  Tidal 
behavior can act as an obstacle for any ship (or men seeking to leave or get to the ship) in a naval 
situation if there is a significant change in draft underneath.  Parker (2015:135) further adds that 
ships sunk within a harbor act as obstacles during naval warfare.   
At Chicamacomico and the areas surrounding Hatteras Island, water, wind, sandbars, and 
even sandy ground are factors that both Union and Confederate forces would have contended 
with.  The area is known for its shallow waters, sandbars, sand dunes, and shifting landscape.  
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Additionally, during the year at certain points, wind can also be a factor in the Outer Banks 
(Pilkey, et al. 1998:39; Carbone 2001:xv; Riggs and Ames 2003:23; Babits, et al. 2014:3).   
At Chicamacomico, water depth was the main obstacle, such was the case, during the 
initial assault, as Curlew was unable to make it closer to shore to land troops at Camp Live Oak 
because the sound was too shallow in this area (Figure 80).  As a result, Curlew had to unload 
men onto Cotton Plant which was a lighter draft vessel (NHHC 2015b; NHHC 2015c; Oxford 
2013:128).  Water depth was also an obstacle later during the affair; when Empire tried to unload 
men further south at Kinnakeet (Figure 81) to intercept the 20th Indiana who were retreating 
from Camp Live Oak (New York Times 1861c; The Richmond Daily Dispatch 1861f; Trotter 
1989:46; Oxford 2013:143).  Another obstacle was the sandy ground on Hatteras Island, which 
was a hindrance of troop movement.  This would likely have been an issue during the Indianan’s 
retreat towards the forts at Hatteras on 4 October as well as for the Georgians while they 





Figure 80. CSS Cotton Plant’s position on 1 October 1861.  CSS Cotton Plant managed to get closer to the 
shoreline to engage Camp Live Oak because of its shallow draft.  CSS Curlew was unable to get within range. 
Please note, neither ship is drawn to scale in this figure, they have been enlarged so that they could be seen on map. 




Figure 81.Bathymetry model with CSS Empire.  Possible location where CSS Empire ran aground trying to offload 
the Eighth North Carolina to cut off the Twentieth Indiana. (By: Jim Kinsella). 
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Avenues of Approach 
The fifth and final element within the KOCOA analysis model is Avenues of Approach.  
This element is described as any zone used for troop movement and/or transport.  In terrestrial 
battlescape settings, this refers to any road, railroad, canal or river, dry open fields, that are used 
to allows troop movement (Fonzo 2008:2).  Babits (2011:4) stated that in a naval scenario, this 
element is considered the channel or anywhere the tides and wind facilitate vessel movement.  
Parker (2015:143-144) elaborated, “this element refers to a route that offensively, will bring a 
unit safely to the enemy's most vulnerable position and will, defensively, offer the most 
protection from enemy fire during a withdrawal from action.”  He further added that in a naval 
battlescape, this element refers to any portion of the water that has sufficient depth to 
accommodate a ship’s draft (see also Lowe 2000:7; Babits 2010:4).   
On the morning of 4 October 1861, the avenue of approach and retreat for Cotton Plant 
and Empire is straightforward.  That morning, Cotton Plant and Empire came from the west and 
situated themselves just offshore to begin their bombardment on Camp Live Oak (Brown 
1861b:68; see also Oxford 2013:126-127).  During this engagement, they maintained their 
vantage point; however, if circumstances were to change, the channel offered them a way to 
withdraw.  While they could head in any direction they chose baring there were no shoals, the 
likely bet would be that they would head back in the direction they came.  They knew that there 
was a heavy Union presence further south around Hatteras Inlet.   
For Union forces, the 20th Indiana was already situated at Camp Live Oak, so only the 
avenue of retreat will be discussed.  Since there were no nearby Union ships to send out 
surfboats to recover the 20th Indiana, they could not use the water as a viable retreat option.  
Therefore, the 20th Indiana’s only viable option for retreat was south to the forts at Hatteras Inlet 
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as they were surrounded by water on each side (Loggerhead Inlet to the north, Pamlico sound to 
the west, and the Atlantic Ocean to the east).  The 20th Indiana made a successful retreat to 
Hatteras, resting and taking cover in the trees while on the way (Brown 1861b:68; Oxford 
2013:140-142). 
Examining the events of Monticello’s assault on the following day, the avenue of 
approach for Union ship is quite clear.  Monticello steamed close to shore in the inner channel of 
the Atlantic while it approached and engaged the enemy (Braine 1861:291-92).  Therefore, the 
Atlantic served as the avenue of approach.  Likewise, this could also serve as an avenue of 
retreat for Monticello if it was needed.   
On land, the 3rd Georgia were already present.  They were heading north towards 
Chicamacomico after ceasing their effort to attack the lighthouse (Oxford 2013:154).  As soon as 
they were seen by Monticello, they came under fire.  They only had two avenues of retreat 
available, north up the island to Chicamacomico on foot, or out into the sound to board the 
Confederate ships waiting. 
Conclusion 
Throughout this chapter, two analytical tools (Battlefield Pattern and KOCOA) were 
applied to the data collected during this study.  Data consisted of historical research, 
archaeological findings, and GIS creation.  KOCOA has historically been utilized to focus on 
terrestrial battlescapes; however, its elements were redefined into a nautical context for this 
study.  The battlefield pattern analysis has been used in several studies to examine troop 
movements and is mostly influenced by the historical research and archaeological record.   
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These battlefield analytical tools were utilized to gain a better understanding of what 
occurred during the Chicamacomico Races.  Furthermore, these tools assisted lending credence 
to the archaeological signatures being ordnance that is representative of battle.  Having this in 
mind allows this study to draw conclusions on which archaeological methodology is best suited 








 This chapter concludes the study by utilizing the results of the theoretical analyses to 
address research questions set forth at the project’s beginning.  This study was tasked with 
utilizing a multi-stage methodology to recreate an ephemeral shallow water battlescape 
geospatially, using the Chicamacomico Races as a case study.   
To accomplish this, the historical record along with the archaeological data were 
analyzed utilizing military terrain analysis tools designed to analyze battlefields: KOCOA and 
battlefield pattern analysis.  Similar efforts undertaken by other studies conducted at ECU have 
produced meaningful results, and precedent for the current study (see Bright 2012; Simonds 
2014; Parker 2015).  Additionally, the work throughout this study was influenced by other 
KOCOA naval battlefield studies (see Conlin and Russell 2006; Babits 2010; McKinnon and 
Carrell 2011).  In addition to addressing the primary research objective, several secondary 
research objectives were addressed that sought to determine the potential for certain 
archaeological methodologies for identifying ordnance from a maritime battle area.   
The Chicamacomico Races was hardly a decisive battle for either side, simply because, in 
the end, neither side gained significant advantages to further the war effort.  The South merely 
gained equipment and clothing taken from the 20th Indiana (which kept the 3rd Georgia warm 
for the winter).  Additionally, there were no reports of heavy losses on either side.  It was a 
minor skirmish that appeared as nothing more than a blip in the history books.  This study sought 
to change that by providing a thorough investigation into the battle activity in this area.  To do 
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so, several research questions were generated prior to data collection.  The next part of this 
chapter will address these questions in detail. 
Addressing Research Questions 
As with other studies of this scope, the first step was to comb through the historical 
record to provide a detailed narrative of events leading up to, during, and after the 
Chicamacomico Races.  Additional research conducted involved compiling data on ship 
armament and their capabilities as such was necessary for creating the fields of fire models.  The 
next step in this study involved creating a GIS representation of battle areas.  This assisted in 
designating areas suitable for archaeological survey.  Archaeological survey results outlined the 
perimeters of each battle area of the Chicamacomico Races.  From here, the data from the 
historical record, archaeological record, and GIS model were examined through the analytical 
tools mentioned above.  The theoretical analysis sought to gain an understanding of military 
actions during battle to corroborate the historical record with the archaeological data.   
Once the battlescape analysis was complete, the final step involved determining which 
archaeological methodology was best suited for detecting archaeological signatures to recreate a 
naval battlescape.  Several secondary questions presented along with this studies’ primary 
research question introduced earlier, will be addressed first, as they lend support to answering the 
primary research question. Once all research questions are addressed, the discussion will shift to 
focus on what could have been done differently within this study as there were deficiencies 
identified.  Additionally, suggestions for future research opportunities will be discussed. 
What is the potential of using visual search techniques (diver- or snorkel-based survey) for 
identifying the existence of ordnance and pattern of distribution associated with a submerged 
Civil War battlefield?  
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Through the course of this study, there was no evidence to conclude that visual shoreline 
survey techniques had a high potential to observe and identify ordnance from a historic 
battlescape within a shallow water site.  The conclusion is that this methodology has limited 
potential due to both cultural (c-transforms) and non-cultural (n-transforms) site formation 
processes at work in the area.  Looking at non-cultural site formation processes first, as 
mentioned, the Outer Banks is a dynamic environment that experiences a significant amount of 
coastal change.  Areas that were once sandy beaches could now be marshy wetlands and vice 
versa.  Tidal and sediment change also appear to be more influential in a shallow water zone 
such as the area surveyed, impacting the likelihood of observing ordnance lying on the sound 
floor.  An object such as a piece of ordnance that once rested on the floor was likely buried deep 
beneath more than 150 years of sediment change and vegetation.   
In addition to the effect environmental events had on the site formation process of survey 
areas, cultural processes have also occurred.  Both the Rodanthe and Little Kinnakeet survey 
areas are relatively shallow, so human access is more likely than in a deep-water environment, 
therefore, site disturbance is highly likely.  Looking closely at the Rodanthe survey areas, there 
are likely major impacts from c-transforms.  The Rodanthe survey areas were noticeably active 
with recreational boating, kitesurfing, and commercial crabbing activities during each survey 
day.  Furthermore, this area was designated as a dumping area for dredged material from the 
nearby Rodanthe Ferry channel.  The Kinnakeet survey area was not much different, it also 
experiences human activity albeit at a smaller scale.  Therefore, the potential for uncovering 
ordnance here is low.  Perhaps in a less populated zone, one that is naturally more stable, this 
methodology would have a higher success rate in detecting ordnance in shallow waters.  
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Although the potential for detecting ordnance with this methodology was low there were, 
however, some benefits to the visual shoreline technique.  It was predicted that this methodology 
would serve as checks and balances against the hand-held metal detector survey.  In the event the 
hand-held metal detector indicated a ferrous target, the visual shoreline inspection was useful in 
eliminating targets from consideration of being representative of battle.   
What is the potential of acoustic remote sensing techniques (side-scan sonar) for identifying the 
existence of ordnance and pattern of distribution associated with a submerged Civil War 
battlefield? 
Like the visual shoreline methodology, the ability for acoustic remote sensing had low 
potential for identifying ordnance lying within a shallow water area.  For similar reasons, site 
formation processes within the area account for some of the limitations of this methodology.  
Further limitations involve water depth as the area surveyed was anywhere from 1 to 5 feet deep.  
Since the sonar device was affixed to a pole mounted on the starboard side of the research vessel, 
it was often in danger of grounding in the shallow environment of the survey zone.  This 
effectively limited what the device could “see,” rendering it ineffective in certain areas.   
Once again, looking closely at the Rodanthe survey area, the zone investigated during the 
side-scan sonar survey includes a portion of the Rodanthe Emergency Ferry Channel.  It is likely 
that any material evidence that may have been representative of battle is no longer in situ.  Any 
evidence would likely have been disturbed during initial channel dredging and any follow-up 
maintenance dredging activities that have occurred in the area.   
Like the visual shoreline technique, this methodology had its benefits.  With the same 
predictions in mind, this methodology served as useful checks and balances against the 
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magnetometer data.  It was useful in eliminating several targets such as crab pots, pilings, and a 
nearby duck blind from consideration of being ordnance. 
What is the potential of magnetic remote sensing techniques (magnetometry and metal detection) 
for identifying the existence of ordnance and pattern of distribution associated with a submerged 
Civil War battlefield? 
Research carried out during this study determined that magnetic remote sensing 
techniques (magnetometry and metal detection) had a mid to high potential for identifying the 
existence of ordnance derived from the Chicamacomico Races.  While the potential was mid to 
high, there were some disadvantages associated with each device.  These disadvantages, 
however, were outweighed by the advantages offered from both units.   
A CTX 3030 metal detector was used during the shoreline survey.  It was determined that 
within the scope of this study, this device had some limitations in its ability.  In comparison with 
the magnetometer, the 3030 unit cannot detect objects as deep as the magnetometer (which was 
known when selecting this tool).  While the maximum depth is not disclosed by Minelab in any 
of their literature, a technician from their tech support team stated that it can penetrate deeper 
than other units on the market.  He stated it would likely not detect anomalies as deep as a 
magnetometer.  Based on the objects sought during this study, the magnetometer can detect them 
as deep as 6m at .5 to 1nT (Geometrics 2018).  Therefore, the CTX 3030 unit cannot search an 
area as intensely as the magnetometer.  Additionally, the Minelab manual (2017:40-41) 
suggested using a fast swing speed while using it with the seawater function switched on.  This is 
problematic in areas that are thought to be littered with trash and other refuse articles.  Areas 
such as those require a slower swing speed to mitigate false signals.  Lastly, this device is unable 
to cover a large area in a short window of time, as the magnetometer.   
184 
 
Although there are disadvantages with the CTX 3030 unit, it does have many advantages 
for surveying in a shallow water environment.  First, the costs associated with conducting a 
metal detection survey are low.  The unit is a handheld lightweight device that can be easily 
employed in small survey areas such as the shoreline at Rodanthe and Kinnakeet.  Therefore, 
there is no need for additional costs such as there would be utilizing a boat: rental fee, fuel, and 
other major logistical factors such as food, per diem for the crew and lodging.  Additionally, the 
shoreline survey areas at Rodanthe and Kinnakeet were similar in topography to a typical beach.  
Most beaches are non-mineralized which allows this unit to achieve greater depths (Minelab 
2017:21).  
Another advantage to this methodology is that the data/results were simple to analyze as 
it produced the results in an Excel format.  Data captured by the device were easily uploaded 
onto the computer and integrated into the GIS model for analysis.  While the unit itself could sort 
out certain types of anomalies so that focus can be on what is sought, this study found that this 
type of data was also easy to sort within GIS.  If the properties of ordnance types being sought 
are known ahead of time, then the GIS allows the researcher to set certain parameters in the 
model (SQL statement) to eliminate targets that do not have the potential to be representative of 
battle.  This made data post-processing much quicker and simpler.   
The magnetometer device had reasonable success during this survey, therefore it was 
determined to have a mid-to-high potential for identifying materials with the chance of their 
being ordnance.  In comparison with the hand-held metal detector, it was predicted that it could 
survey a much larger area in a shorter amount of time.  This was confirmed after the 
archaeological survey concluded.   
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The magnetometer methodology worked well due to a working precedence using pBlock 
modeling set by past studies (see Richards 2011 and Parker 2015).  These studies somewhat 
acted as a “how to guide” for this methodology.  This study followed suit and created a pBlock 
model which was helpful in determining which magnetic anomalies fit the criteria of being 
ordnance.  While data processing is a much more cumbersome process with this unit as opposed 
to the CTX 3030 unit, utilizing the pBlock model made it easier, as there were set parameters to 
look for.  Additionally, there are many more accessible post-processing and analytical resources 
for examining the magnetometer data set such as GIS and Hypack.  Although not used for this 
study, Magpick was another resource that was available for data processing and analysis.   
Although the magnetometer methodology has several advantages, there are a few 
disadvantages worth mentioning.  Conducting a survey in a shallow water or deep-water 
environment with this methodology can be very costly as boat usage and fuel costs need to be 
factored into the budget.  Additionally, unlike the handheld metal detection survey that can be 
handled by one person, this type of methodology requires more support and staff.  Conducting a 
survey with a magnetometer device should be at least a 2-3-person operation.  Finally, careful 
consideration must be taken when working with the computer software for this device as well as 
the side-scan sonar.  It was found that inadvertently inputting the wrong survey search 
parameters can be a costly and time-consuming mistake.   
What is the benefit of utilizing a combination of remote sensing technologies to identify the 
existence of ordnance distribution with a submerged Civil War battlefield?  
Throughout the course of this study, it was deemed that there is a noticeable benefit of 
employing different remote sensing methodologies in concert with one another.  During 
fieldwork and post-processing, the visual and acoustic sonar methodologies proved to be reliable 
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checks and balances against the magnetic remote sensing methodologies.  This was apparent 
when several magnetic anomalies were eliminated from consideration of being ordnance when 
the anomaly had a correlating sonar target.  Instances such as this were noticed during the survey 
when surface-level events (such as moving past a duck blind or buoy) occurred.  Similar 
conclusions were drawn during the post-processing phase, when anomalies (detected with 
magnetic remote sensing methodologies) such as crab pots, were revealed in the sonar data.   
Addressing the Primary Research Question 
Using the military actions from the “Chicamacomico Affair” as an example, what are the best 
approaches for reconstructing ephemeral maritime battlefield events from the Civil War?  
Using the Chicamacomico Races as a case study, this study looked beyond just 
determining which archaeological methodology was best suited for this task.  It looked at the 
overall process the study undertook to accomplish its research goals.  This included historical 
research, theoretical applications, archaeological methodologies, and post-processing 
methodologies.  In addition, if not directly stated, the importance of the GIS model was 
showcased throughout this study.   
The final conclusions of this study determined that the best approach for reconstructing a 
shallow water battlescape from the Civil War was to analyze all collated data from the project 
through the analytical tools chosen for this study.  By using the KOCOA and battlefield pattern 
analyses, coupled with an understanding of site formation theories allowed for an efficient 
documentation of the “Chicamacomico Races” battlefield.   
KOCOA sought to understand the battle through an examination of physical factors such 
as historic bathymetry and fields of fire.  By tailoring the elements of KOCOA to a nautical 
context, interpretations of how each belligerent in the Chicamacomico Races tactically reacted 
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and engaged environmental elements within the area were ascertained.  This allowed for an 
efficient recreation of the battle as well as a thorough documentation of the Chicamacomico 
Races.  Additionally, the KOCOA analysis provided an understanding of how Hatteras Island’s 
terrestrial features interacted with the naval scope of the Chicamacomico Races more 
specifically, how the belligerent forces in the water engaged those on land. 
There are, however, some limitations within the KOCOA model for naval studies, that 
were evident while trying to tailor terrain elements to a nautical context.  For instance, cover and 
concealment are not usually present in an open water engagement since vessels are typically 
visible to one another.  For this study, the Chicamacomico Races was a blended mix of naval and 
terrestrial elements, therefore the KOCOA model worked well.  If this study were strictly 
analyzing an open water engagement, the KOCOA model may not work well as a standalone 
framework.  Other naval tactical theories would likely need to be utilized to efficiently recreate 
an open water naval battlescape. 
Examining the data through the battlefield pattern analysis was also concluded to be an 
effective approach for understanding the battle.  The battlefield pattern analysis focused on the 
progression of the battle by analyzing both material evidence potentially representative of battle 
as well as the historical record.  Since battlefield patterning is influenced through historical and 
archaeological data, it not only helped understand certain aspects of battle, it also helped with 
understanding the site formation processes.  More specifically, how material evidence (with the 
potential to be ordnance) went from its systemic context to the archaeological record, i.e. 




During the post-processing phase of this study, it was revealed that there were a few 
errors that occurred during data capture.  The files from days 2 and 3 were somehow corrupted as 
it seems the files were inadvertently captured in the wrong format.  While the sonar images were 
in the appropriate location, this researcher was unable to produce an adequate sonar mosaic in 
the Hypack software.  Multiple calls were made to the Hypack support team for assistance with 
this issue.  In the end, however, they were unable to assist.  Therefore, this study had to rely 
further on the GIS model to analyze the sonar data.  Luckily, the spatial data was not 
compromised, nor were the individual lane tracts.  The main issue was related to being unable to 
stitch all the files together for a sonar mosaic for illustration purposes.  It is unclear exactly what 
caused this issue.   
Study Deficiencies and Shortcomings 
Through an understanding of the historical record, coupled with the fields of fire 
representations in the GIS model, there were much higher expectations of material evidence 
representative of battle being revealed during the archaeological surveys.  The results, however, 
were much lower than expectations.  Several possibilities could account for these results, such as 
site disturbance.  This is a heavily trafficked and active area; therefore, it has likely seen a lot of 
site disturbance.  Furthermore, the Rodanthe Emergency Ferry Channel is within the area 
surveyed, so the initial dredging for the channel as well as maintenance dredging activities could 
have disturbed any ordnance and redeposited them into other areas designated for dredge spoil.   
Conversely, the sparse amount of data discovered could be the result of simply surveying 
the wrong areas.  This would indicate possible inaccuracies in the historical record or simply the 
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author’s misinterpretations historical data.  Moreover, this might also be due to misinterpreting 
the GIS model.  As discussed, the GIS model was merely used as an interpretive tool.  Ship 
locations and fields of fire were approximations based on historical data.  The belligerent ships 
possibly were not where they were reported to be in the historical record.  In the case of 
Monticello, it could have been further north or south of zones that were surveyed.  Additionally, 
it is possible that Monticello was further out into the Atlantic than reported.  If either scenario 
were true, then this would result in inaccurate fields of fire representations.  The same could be 
true for Cotton Plant and Empire’s battle positions.  The only way to know for sure is to conduct 
follow-up surveys in other areas designated as suitable locations.  This study, however, tried to 
account for this by surveying a few areas outside the fields of fire models.  This is evident while 
looking at the results as some data sets were not within the fields of fire cone (see Figure 72).   
Another factor that could account for the sparse amount of material evidence detected 
could be as simple as the survey zones being too small.  Although the area involved in the 
Chicamacomico Races is quite large, this study opted for small survey zones to stay within 
budgetary and time constraints.  This study would likely have benefited from a more expansive 
survey zone.  Perhaps future researchers can obtain funding to encompass a much larger area 
with archaeological survey. 
In addition to improvements on survey locations, there are also things that could be done 
differently as it pertains to the utilization of survey equipment, for instance, the CTX 3030 
device.  This study concludes that the CTX 3030 was not used to its full potential.  Among the 
many features this device offers, there is a “pinpoint” feature to differentiate between different 
types of objects.  This study would have benefited from sampling several different ferrous 
objects that were expected to be discovered in the area with the CTX device.  Taking this step 
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would allow the researcher to differentiate between an iron nail vs. iron ordnance as both are 
listed as high ferrous targets in the CTX 3030 manual (see Minelab 2017:64).  Additionally, this 
researcher should have gathered a collection of different types of metal such as cans, nails, coins, 
and jewelry to create a small database to compare ferrous content and conductivity levels.   
Similarly, there are improvements that could be made for the off shore remote sensing 
survey of Pamlico Sound at Kinnakeet and Rodanthe.  This study concluded that while it 
remained within the lane spacing parameters set forth by the UAB, the survey would likely have 
benefited from tighter lane spacing, however, doing so, would result in covering less space, 
which would affect the overall interpretation of the battle.  This mainly applies to utilizing 
magnetometer lane spacing.  While the raw data collected shows that state regulations 
concerning lane spacing have the potential of working in a shallow water environment, this may 
not be the best option for an in-depth, research-driven battlefield study.  Tighter lane spacing 
may have provided a more dynamic contour map and possibly detected more anomalies. 
As with Richards’ (2011) and Parker’s (2015) studies, there were shortcomings utilizing 
the pBlock model.  The shortcomings arise from this program not being geared or designed for 
use in an archaeological capacity.  This program merely produces and represents a proposed 
gamma range that may be representative of ordnance in the survey areas.  This model is also 
dependent upon what is plugged into it, so if any misinformation is plugged into the pBlock 
modeling program, results and interpolations could be skewed.   
The final shortcomings within this project concern the analytical tools utilized to analyze 
the data collated from this project.  As discussed earlier, the analytical tools utilized were found 
to offer satisfactory conclusions for this study; however, there is the chance this study could have 
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benefited from other analytical approaches such as Principles of War, METT-T or MNTT (see 
Babits 2010; McKinnon and Carrel 2011; Bright 2012; Simonds 2013; Parker 2015).  These 
alternate analytical tools may have provided deeper insight into the battle events at 
Chicamacomico that KOCOA and Battlefield Pattern were unable to adequately address.  
Additionally, utilizing the battlefield pattern analytical tool would likely have benefited from a 
forensic investigation of each anomaly to provide a better understanding of ordnance 
distribution.  However, to accomplish a forensic investigation would have required divers to be 
in the water examining each individual anomaly.  Unfortunately deploying divers to investigate 
each anomaly was not within the scope, time, and budget for this project. 
Recommendations for Further or Future Research 
 This study concluded that there are several opportunities for further study in this area.  
For instance, the core area (where the battle activity occurred) is 226.905 sq. km (87.6085 sq. 
miles) whereas only a total of 5.527 sq. km (2.13410 sq. miles) was surveyed.  This means only 
2.44 percent of the core area was surveyed which included both the Kinnakeet and Rodanthe 
zones.  Furthermore, the entire Chicamacomico Races took place in present-day Rodanthe, 
Avon, and Salvo, however, as mentioned in the historical narrative, the activity began with the 
capture of Fanny.  The area where Fanny was reportedly captured was not surveyed 
archaeologically during this study.  Surveying the zone Fanny was captured would provide the 
opportunity to add new data to the existing data set for a more comprehensive examination into 
the Chicamacomico Races.  Furthermore, as evidenced by the historical narrative, the 
Chicamacomico Races was not solely a naval affair.  There were some terrestrial components to 
the engagement, therefore some signatures representative of battle, are likely buried in the 
terrestrial environment.  Future researchers may find it beneficial to use a combined maritime-
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terrestrial survey, specifically within the fields of fire models, to expand the Chicamacomico 
study area and enhance the battle recreations and interpretations.  Perhaps in doing such a 
survey, the methodologies utilized during this study can be improved.   
While adding to the existing Chicamacomico Races knowledge base, the data sets 
produced during the archaeological fieldwork may be valuable for incorporation into a larger 
analysis that encompasses the entire Outer Banks theatre.  This could be accomplished by using 
similar methodologies to create battlefield studies of each Civil War battle in the area.  This 
would include the Battle of Hatteras Inlet and the Battle of Roanoke Island in addition to the 
present study.  While they are three distinct and separate events, including these would 
ultimately reveal a wealth of information on how the landscape elements within the Outer Banks 
interacted with and influenced battle events.  Additionally, there is still the question concerning 
the definitive location of Camp Live Oak.  Perhaps data compiled from this study could offer 
further areas to investigate.     
Furthermore, data collated from this project can be reanalyzed and applied to different 
types of maritime studies, such as a site formation study or a maritime cultural landscape study.  
Conducting a maritime cultural landscape study, focusing on the lower Outer Banks barrier 
islands would likely produce a wealth of information pertaining to the local economic history.  
Data sets from this study as well as from the Richards and Parker (2017) study offer valuable 
data to contribute to such studies. 
In conclusion, the Chicamacomico Races was a transitional event between two larger 
Civil War battles, the Battle at Hatteras Inlet and the Battle of Roanoke Island, where no ground 
or advantage was gained by either side.  This study served as the first maritime archaeological 
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investigation into the events of the Chicamacomico Races and hopefully future researchers find 
opportunities to expand on this research.  It is hoped that future researchers can close any gaps 
left open by this study.  It is also hoped that this event will no longer be overlooked by history 
books and that this study helped shed new light on the events that transpired during 1 October 





Andrews, Charles H.  
1865 “Third Georgia Regiment: History of its Campaigns from April 26th 1861 to April 9th 
1865.”  Charles H. Andrews Papers 2849.  Southern Historical Collection.  Wilson 
Library.  University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.  
 
Anuszkiewicz, Richard 
1989 Technology, Theory and Analysis: Using Remote Sensing as a Tool for Middle Range 
Theory Building in Maritime and Nautical Archaeology.  In Maritime Archaeology: A 
Reader of Substantive and Theoretical Contributions.  Lawrence E. Babits and Hans Van 
Tilburg, editors, pp. 223-232.  Plenum Press, New York.   
 
Babits, Lawrence E., Gregory Stratton, C.J. Idol, Calvin Mires, and Charles Ewen 
2015 Final Report: Archaeological Test Investigations (Fortification and Camp Live Oak, 
Waves, Dare County, North Carolina).  Report prepared for Mr. Mel Covey, Rodanthe, 
NC. 
 
Babits, Lawrence E. and Annalise Corbin Kjorness 
1995 Final Report on an Archaeological Survey of the Western Pungo River from Wades Point 
to Woodstock Point.  East Carolina University, Greenville, NC. 
 
Babits, Lawrence E. 
2010 Battlefield Analysis: Six Maritime Battles in Maryland, Revolutionary War and War of 
1812.  Report to Maryland Historical Trust, Crownsville, MD, from New South 
Associates, Stone Mountain, GA. 
 
Balicki, Joseph 
2010 Watch Fires of a Hundred Circling Camps: Theoretical and Practical Approaches to 
Investigating Civil War Campsites.  In Historical Archaeology of Military Sites: Method 
and Topic, Clarence R. Geier, Lawrence E. Babits, Douglas Scott, and David G. Orr, 
editors, pp. 57-74.  Texas A&M, College Station. 
 
Ballard, Robert D. and Rick Archbold 
1987 The Discovery of Titanic.  Warner Books, New York, NY. 
 
Barfield, Rodney 
1995 Seasoned by Salt: A Historical Album of the Outer Banks.  The University of North 
Carolina Press, Chapel Hill. 
 
Barrett, Lieutenant-commander Edward 
1863 Naval Howitzer.  Civil War Navy.  < www.civilwarnavy.org/?page_id=321>.  Accessed 






Barrett, John G. 
1963 The Civil War in North Carolina.  University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill.   
 
Bell, Jack 
1941 Civil War Heavy Explosive Ordnance: A Guide to Large Artillery Projectiles, Torpedoes, 
and Mines.  University of North Texas Press, Denton.   
 
Bowens, Amanda 
2009 Underwater Archaeology: The NAS Guide to Principles and Practice. 2nd edition.  
Blackwell Publishing, West Sussex, UK.   
 
Braine, Daniel L. 
1861 Report of Lieutenant Daniel Braine to Captain James L. Lardner.  In War of the 
Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies 
Series 1, Volume IV, pp. 291-92, United States War Department, Washington, DC. 
 
Breiner, Sheldon 
1999 Applications for Manual Portable Magnetometers.  Geometrics, San Jose, CA. 
 
Bright, John, Nathan Richards, Joseph Hoyt, John Wagner, and Tom Allen 
2012 Final Report: The Battle of the Atlantic Expedition 2011: The Battle of Convoy KS-520 
North Carolina, 15 July 1942.  Report prepared for United States Department of the 
Interior, National Park Service, Washington, D.C. 
 
Bright, John 
2012 The Last Ambush: An Adapted Battlefield Analysis of the U-576 Attack Upon Allied 
Convoy KS-520 Off Cape Hatteras During the Second World War.  Master’s Thesis, 
Department of History, East Carolina University, Greenville, NC.   
 
Broadwater, John 
2010 Naval Battlefields as Cultural Landscapes: The Siege of Yorktown.  In Historical 
Archaeology of Military Sites: Method and Topic, Clarence R. Geier, Lawrence E. 
Babits, Douglas Scott, and David G. Orr, editors, pp. 177-188.  Texas A&M, College 
Station. 
 
Brown, Colonel William L. 
1861a “Letter from Colonel William L. Brown to artist George Winter”, November 4, 1861.  
Accessed from <http://leeoxford.com/col-william-lyons-brown-transcript-4-november-
1861-letter-chicamacomico-affair/>. 
1861b Colonel William L. Brown to Report to Colonel Christopher Hawkins.  October 6, 1861.  
In Hawkins, papers, 1861-1920.  John Hay Library, Brown University.  Providence, RI. 
 
Browning, Judkin 
2011 Shifting Loyalties: The Union Occupation of Eastern North Carolina.  1st edition.  




Butler, Benjamin F. 
1861 Major General Benjamin F. Butler Report to Major General John E. Wool.  In The War of 
the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate 
Armies.  Series 1 Volume IV, Edited by Robert N. Scott, pp. 581-86.  United States War 
Department, Washington DC. 
1892 Butler’s Book.  A.M. Thayer & Company, Boston, MA 
 
Carbone, John S. 
2001 The Civil War in Coastal North Carolina.  Division of Archives and History, North 
Carolina Department of Cultural Resources, Raleigh.   
 
Carman, John  
2014 Archaeologies of Conflict.  Bloomsbury Academic, London, United Kingdom.   
 
Canfield, Eugene B. 
1969 Civil War Naval Ordnance.  Naval History Division, Navy Department, Washington DC.  
1960 Notes on naval ordnance of the American Civil War, 1861-1865.  American Ordnance 
Association, Washington, DC. 
 
Canney, Donald L. 




2012 Archaeologies of Conflict.  Bloomsbury, London, UK.   
 
Clark, Walter 
1901 Histories of the several regiments and battalions from North Carolina in the Great War.  
Written by members of the respective commands.  Edited by Walter Clark.  E.M. Uzzell 
printer, Raleigh, NC.   
 
Comly, Charles H. 
1861 “Letter from Sergeant-Major Charles H. Comly to his Quaker Mother, Run into a string 
of bad luck”, October 11, 1861.  Accessed from <http://leeoxford.com/sergeant-major-c-
h-comlys-11-october-1861-letter-to-his-quaker-mother-run-into-a-string-of-bad-luck/>. 
 
Conlin, David L., and Matthew A. Russell 
2006 Archaeology of a Naval Battlefield: H.L. Hunley and the USS Housatonic.  The 
International Journal of Nautical Archaeology.  35(1): 20-40. 
2010 Maritime Archaeology of Naval Battlefields.  In Historical Archaeology of Military Sites: 
Method and Topic, Clarence R. Geier, Lawrence E. Babits, Douglas Scott, and David G. 







Daily National Intelligencer 
1861a “The Capture of the Transport Fanny.,” October 8, 1861.  In the Daily National 







12994814A2C882B0@The%20Capture%20of%20the%20Transport%20Fann>.   
1861b “The Late Affair on Hatteras Beach,” October 18, 1861.  In the Daily National 









October%209%2C%201861>.   
 
Delgado, James P. 
1991 Historical Archaeology and the Recovery to the Past. The Public Historian 13(2). 
http://www.academia.edu/7243165/Historical_Archaeology_and_the_Recovery_of_the_
Past_Review_by_James_Delgado.  Accessed January 2, 2016. 
 
Dougherty, Kevin 
2010 Strangling the Confederacy: Coastal Operations of the American Civil War.  Casemate, 
Philadelphia, PA.   
 
Eldridge, David 
1996 Brick Versus Earth: The Construction and Destruction of Confederate Sea Coast Forts 
Pulaski and McAllister, Georgia.  Master’s Thesis, Department of History, University of 
North Florida, Jacksonville, FL.   
 
Fish, John Perry and H. Arnold Carr 
1990 Sound Underwater Images: A Guide to the Generation and Interpretation of Side-scan 
Sonar Data.  Lower Cape Publishing, Orleans, MA. 
 
Fonzo, Stephen 
2008 Final Report: A Documentary and Landscape Analysis of the Buckland Mills Battlefield 






Fox, Richard A. and Douglas D. Scott 
1991 The Post-Civil War Battlefield Pattern: An Example from the Custer Battlefield.  
Historical Archaeology 25(2), pp. 92-103. 
 
Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper 
1861 “Engraving of the Chicamacomico Races,” November 2, 1861.  In Frank Leslie’s 
Illustrated Newspaper.  Accessed from 
<http://digital.ncdcr.gov/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p15012coll8/id/10247/rec1>.   
Garrity-Blake, Barbara, and Karen Willis Amspacher. 
2017 Living at the Water’s Edge: A Heritage Guide to the Outer Banks Byway.  The University 
of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill.   
 
Geier, Clarence Raymond, Lawrence E. Babits, Douglas Dowell Scott, David G. Orr (editors) 
2010 The Historical Archaeology of Military Sites: Method and Topic. Texas A&M University 
Press, College Station. 
 
Geometrics, Inc. 
2005 Operation Manual: G-882 Cesium Marine Magnetometer. Geometrics, Inc., Operation 
Manual, No. 25919-OM Rev. D. 
 
Gibbon, John 
1880 The Artillerists Manual.  D. Van Nostrand, New York. 
 
Goldsborough, Louis M.  
1861 “Flag Officer Louis M. Goldsborough to Captain James L. Lardner,” In Official Records 
of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion.  Series 1, Volume VI, 
Edited by C.C. Marsh, pp. 260.  Department of the Navy, Washington, DC.   
 
Graham, Lieutenant Matthew J. 
1900 The Ninth Regiment, New York Volunteers (Hawkins’ Zouaves).  E.P. Coby & Company, 
New York. 
 
Haecker, Charles, Elizabeth A. Oster, Angelica Medrano Enriquez, and Michael L. Elliot 
2009 Indian Resistance in New Spain: The 1541 AD Battlefield of Penol de Nochistlan, an 
Exemplar of Indigenous Resistance.  In Fields of Conflict: Battlefield Archaeology from 
the Roman Empire to the Korean War, Douglas Scott, Lawrence E. Babits, and Charles 
Haecker, editors, pp. 174-192.  Potomac Books Inc., Dulles, VA. 
 
Harpers Weekly 
1861a “The Capture of Hatteras Forts,” September 14, 1861.  In Harper’s Weekly.  p. 578, 
584-585.  New York. Accessed from <http://www.sonofthesouth.net/leefoundation/civil-
war/1861/september/slave-proclamation.htm>.   
1861b “Fort Hatteras and Fort Clark,” September 21, 1861.  In Harper’s Weekly.  p. 599.  
New York. Accessed from 
<http://app.harpweek.com.jproxy.lib.ecu.edu/IssueImagesView.asp?titleId=HW&volume
Id=1861&issueId=0921&page=599&imageSize=d>.   
199 
 
1861c “The Capture of the Transport Fanny,” October 19, 1861.  In Harper’s Weekly.  p. 668.  
New York. Accessed from 
<http://app.harpweek.com.jproxy.lib.ecu.edu/IssueImagesView.asp?titleId=HW&volume
Id=1861&issueId=1019&page=668&imageSize=d>.   
1861d “The Monticello Shelling the Rebels Near Hatteras, October 5, 1861,” October 26, 1861.  
In Harper’s Weekly.  p. 673-677.  New York. Accessed from 
<http://app.harpweek.com.jproxy.lib.ecu.edu/IssueImagesView.asp?titleId=HW&volume
Id=1861&issueId=1026&page=677>.   
 
Harrington, Jean Carl.  
1957 New Light on Washington’s Fort Necessity: a report on the archaeological explorations 
at Fort Necessity National Battlefield Site.  Eastern National Park and Monument 
Association, Richmond, VA.   
 
Hawkins, General Rush Christopher 
1861a “Report of Colonel Hawkins to Major General John E. Wool,” The War of the Rebellion: 
A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies.  Series 1, 
Volume IV, Edited by Robert N. Scott, pp. 607-609; 617-620.  United States War 
Department, Washington, DC.   
1861b “Governor’s Correspondence: Colonel Rush C. Hawkins clarifying Union Army 




2009 Battlefield Viewsheds, or What the General Saw: Lookout Mountain Battlefield, 
Chattanooga, Tennessee.  In Fields of Conflict: Battlefield Archaeology from the Roman 
Empire to the Korean War, Douglas Scott, Lawrence E. Babits, and Charles Haecker, 
editors, pp. 75-83.  Potomac Books Inc., Dulles, VA.   
 
Hill, Daniel H., Jr.  
1926 North Carolina in the War Between the States, Bethel to Sharpsburg.  2 vols.  Edwards 
and Broughton Company, Raleigh, NC.   
 
Hinds, John W.  
1998 Invasion and Conquest of North Carolina: Anatomy of a Gunboat War.  Burd Street 
Press, Shippensburg, PA.   
 
Johnson, Charles F. 
1911 The Long Roll: Being A Journal of the Civil War, as Set Down During the Years 1861-3.  
Roycrofters, East Aurora, NY.   
Johnson, Jay K., Marco Giardano, Kenneth Kvamme. 
2006 Remote Sensing in Archaeology: An Explicitly North American Perspective.  University 
of Alabama Press, Tuscaloosa.   
 
Johnson, Matthew 
2010 Archaeological Theory: An Introduction, 2nd Edition. Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, UK. 
200 
 
Kelly, Robert L. and David Hurst Thomas 
2013 Archaeology.  7th edition.  Cengage Learning, Boston, MA.   
 
Lardner, James L.  
1861 “Captain James L. Lardner to Flag Officer Louis M. Goldsborough,” In Official Records 
of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion.  Series 1, Volume VI, 
Edited by C.C. Marsh, pp. 291.  Department of the Navy, Washington, DC.   
 
Libicki, Martin C. and Stuart E. Johnson 
1995 Dominant Battlespace Knowledge.  National Defense University Press Book.  
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 
 
Lighthouse Friends 
2001 “Cape Hatteras, NC.” Lighthouse Friends. 
<http://www.lighthousefriends.com/light.asp?ID=356>. Accessed 24 November 2016. 
 
Logansport Journal 
1861 “Letter from Hatteras,” Logansport Journal 19 October.  Indiana, 
<http://newspaperarchive.com/logansport-journal-oct-19-1861-p-2/.html> 
 
Lowe, David W.   
2000  Battlefield Survey: American Battlefield Protection Program Battlefield Survey Manual.  
Department of the Interior, National Park Service, American Battlefield Protection 
Program, Washington, D.C. 
 
Lydecker, Andrew and Stephen R. James  
2005 Archaeology of the Civil War Naval Operations on the Ogeechee River, Georgia.  
Panamerican Consultants, Memphis, TN.   
 
Mansfield, Brigadier General Joseph K. 
1861 Report of Brigadier General Joseph K. Mansfield.  In War of the Rebellion: A 
Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies Series 1, 
Volume IV, p. 495-595, 626-627, United States War Department, Washington, DC. 
 
Marvel, William 
1991 Burnside.  University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill.   
 
McKinnon, Jennifer and Toni Carrell 
2011 Saipan World War II Invasion Beaches Underwater Heritage Trail.  National Park 
Service, Washington D.C. 
 
Merrill, Catherine 






Merrill, James M.  
1952 “The Hatteras Expedition, August 1861.”  North Carolina Historical Review 29 (2): 204-
219.  The State Department of Archives and History, NC.   
1957 The Rebel Shore: The Story of Union Sea Power in the Civil War.  Little, Brown and 
Company, Boston.  
 
Ministry of Defence 
2013 Joint Doctrine Publication 3-70: Battlespace Management. United Kingdom 





1861 Rebellion Record: A Diary of American Events. G. P. Putnam, New York. 
 
Morrison, John H. 
1861 Civilian Captain Morrison to Commander Rowan.  In Official Records of the Union and 
Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion.  Series 1 Volume IV, Edited by CC. 
Marsh, pp. 276.  Department of the Navy, Washington DC. 
 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
2016a Nautical Charts Collection.  United States Office of Coast Survey 
<http://www.charts.noaa.gov/Interactivecatalog/nrnc.shtml>.  Accessed 4 August 2016. 
2016b Historical Map & Chart Collection.  United States Office of Coast Survey 
<http://www.historicalcharts.noaa.gov/>.  Accessed 10 August 2016. 
 
Naval Historical Center 
2011 Confederate Ships Afloat.  Department of the Navy, Washington, D.C.   
 
Naval History and Heritage Command 
2015a Ceres.  Naval History and Heritage Command, Washington DC 
<https://www.history.navy.mil/research/histories/ship-histories/danfs/c/ceres.html>.  
Accessed 4 October 2015.   
2015b Cotton Plant.  Naval History and Heritage Command, Washington DC 
<https://www.history.navy.mil/content/history/nhhc/research/histories/ship-
histories/confederate_ships/cotton-plant.html>.  Accessed 4 October 2015.   
2015c Curlew.  Naval History and Heritage Command, Washington DC 
<https://www.history.navy.mil/research/histories/ship-
histories/confederate_ships/curlew-side-wheel-steamer.html>.  Accessed 4 October 2015. 
2015d Empire.  Naval History and Heritage Command, Washington DC 
<https://www.history.navy.mil/research/histories/ship-
histories/confederate_ships/empire.html>.  Accessed 4 October 2015.   
2015e Fanny.  Naval History and Heritage Command, Washington DC 
<https://www.history.navy.mil/research/histories/ship-
histories/confederate_ships/fanny.html>.  Accessed 4 October 2015.   
202 
 
2015f General Putnam.  Naval History and Heritage Command, Washington DC 
<https://www.history.navy.mil/research/histories/ship-histories/danfs/w/william-g-
putnam.html>.  Accessed 4 October 2015.   
2015g Junaluska.  Naval History and Heritage Command, Washington DC 
<https://www.history.navy.mil/research/histories/ship-
histories/confederate_ships/junaluska.html>.  Accessed 4 October 2015.   
2015h Monticello.  Naval History and Heritage Command, Washington DC 
<https://www.history.navy.mil/research/histories/ship-histories/danfs/m/monticello-
i.html>.  Accessed 4 October 2015.   
2015i Raleigh.  Naval History and Heritage Command, Washington DC 
<https://www.history.navy.mil/research/histories/ship-
histories/confederate_ships/raleigh.html>.  Accessed 4 October 2015.   
 
New York Herald  






New York Times  
1861a  “Our Hatteras Correspondent.” New York Times 6 October. New York, NY. 
<http://www.nytimes.com/1861/10/06/news/important-hatteras-inlet-vessel-captured-
rebels-our-hatteras-inlet.html>. 
1861b “The Indiana Twentieth on the North Carolina Coast.” New York Times 20 October. New 
York, NY. <http://www.nytimes.com/1861/10/20/news/indiana-twentieth-north-carolina-
coast-more-about-capture-fanny-attack-indiana.html>. 
1861c “The Affair at Chicamacomico.”  New York Times 24 October. New York, 
<http://www.nytimes.com/1861/10/24/news/the-affair-at-chicamicomaco.html>.  
1861d “The Fight at Hatteras.”  New York Times 11 October. New York, 
<http://www.nytimes.com/1861/10/11/news/the-fight-at-hatteras.html>.  
 
New York Tribune  
1861a  “Our Hatteras Correspondent.” New York Tribune 11 October. New York, NY. 
<https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn8303213/1861-10-11/ed-1/seq-1-8/>. 




2006 The Curlew: The Life and Death of a North Carolina Steamboat, 1856-1862.  North 
Carolina Historical Review 83(2): 139-164. 
 
Oxford, Lee Thomas 
2013 The Civil War on Hatteras: The Chicamacomico Affair and the Capture of the U.S. 





2015 “Dash at the Enemy!” The Use of Modern Naval Theory to Examine the Battlefield at 
Elizabeth City, North Carolina.  Master’s Thesis, Department of History, East Carolina 
University, Greenville, NC.   
 
Pilkey, Orrin H., William J. Neal, Stanley R. Riggs, Craig A. Webb, David M. Bush, Deborah F. 
Pilkey, Jane Bullock, and Brian A. Cowan. 
1998 The North Carolina Shore and Its Barrier Islands.  Duke University Press, Durham, NC. 
 
Plog, Stephen 
2011 The Contribution of Behavioral Archaeology and the Research of Michael B. Schiffer to 
the discipline.  Journal of Archaeological Method and Theory 18(4): 278-283. 
 
Pompe, Jeffery J. and Kathleen Pompe 
2011 Altered Environments: The Outer Banks of North Carolina.  University of South Carolina 
Press, Columbia. 
 
Powell, William S., editor 
1989 North Carolina: Through Four Centuries.  University of North Carolina Press, Chapel 
Hill. 
2006 Encyclopedia of North Carolina.  University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill.   
 
Powell, William S., and Michael Hill 




2001 Portrait of the Past: The Civil War on Hatteras Island, North Carolina: A Pictorial Tour.  
2nd of a series.  Aerial Perspective, Mt. Holly, NJ. 
2011 The Chicamacomico Races. Emerging Civil War. 
<http://emergingcivilwar.com/2011/10/10/the-chicamacomico-races/>.  Accessed 14 
April 2015. 
Raab, Mark L. and Albert C. Goodyear 
1984 Middle-Range Theory in Archaeology: A Critical Review of Origins and Applications.  
American Antiquity 49(2): 255-268.  Published by Society for American Archaeology. 
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/280018>.  Accessed March 1, 2016. 
 
Reeves, Matthew 
2010 Civil War Battlefield Archaeology: Examining and Interpreting the Debris of Battle.  In 
Historical Archaeology of Military Sites: Method and Topic, Clarence R. Geier, 
Lawrence E. Babits, Douglas Scott, and David G. Orr, editors, pp. 87-98.  Texas A&M 
Press, College Station.  
 
Richards, Nathan 
2011 Test Magnetic Modeling of a Mark VI Sea Mine.  Unpublished manuscript, Program in 
Maritime Studies, East Carolina University, Greenville, NC.   
204 
 
Richards, Nathan and Adam Parker 
2017 Final Report: Rodanthe-Stumpy Point Ferry Channel Marine Debris/Cultural Resources 
Assessment.  Report prepared for North Carolina Department of Transportation. 
 
Richmond Daily Dispatch 
1861a “Capture of the Federal Steamer Fanny.” The Daily Dispatch 6 October. Richmond, VA. 
<http://www.perseus.etufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:2006.05.0290:article=pos=
78&highlight=fanny>. 
1861b “Capture of the Federal Steamer Fanny—the Chase—Character of the Prize – Effect of 
the News in Norfolk – the Federals on the North Carolina Coast – Lord Tempest, &c.” 
The Daily Dispatch 7 October. Richmond, VA. 
<http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:2006.05.0290:article=35&hi
ghlight=fanny>.  
1861c “War New and Rumors.” The Daily Dispatch 7 October. Richmond, VA. 
<http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:2006.05.0290:article=pos=5
8&highlight=fanny>. 




1861e “From Norfolk.” Richmond Daily Dispatch 10 October. Richmond, VA.  
<http://dlxs.richmond.edu/cgi/t/text/textidx?c=ddr;cc=ddr;view=text;idno=ddr0292.0020.
083;rgn=div3;node=ddr0292.0020.083%3A5.2.20>. 




Ridgely, George H.  
1861 Statement of the Mate of the Fanny, 2 October 1861.  The War of the Rebellion: A 
Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies.  Series 1, 
Volume VI, pp. 276-77, Government Printing Office, Washington, DC. 
Riggs, Stanley R., Dorothea V. Ames, Stephen J. Culver, and David J. Mallinson 
2011 The Battle for North Carolina’s Coast: Evolutionary History, Present Crisis, & Vision 
for the Future.  The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill.   
 
Riggs, Stanley, and Dorothea V. Ames. 
2003 Drowning the North Carolina Coast: Sea-level Rise and Estuarine Dynamics.  North 
Carolina Sea Grant, North Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC.   
 
Rowan, Stephen C. 
1861a “Report of Commander Rowan to Secretary of Navy Gideon Welles,” In Official Records 
of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion.  Series 1, Volume VI, 





1861b “Report of Commander Rowan to Flag Officer Louis M. Goldsborough,” In Official 
Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion.  Series 1, 
Volume VI, Edited by C.C. Marsh, pp. 270-71.  Department of the Navy, Washington, 
DC.   
 
Sauers, Richard 
1996 A Succession of Honorable Victories: The Burnside Expedition in North Carolina.  
Morningside Press, Dayton, OH.   
 
Saunders, Nicholas 




1887 History of the Confederate States Navy from Its Organization to the Surrender of Its Last 
Vessel.  2 vols.  Rogers & Sherwood, New York.   
 
Schiffer, Michael B. 
1972 Archaeological Context and Systemic Context.  American Antiquity 37(2): 156-165. 
1976 Behavioral Archaeology.  Academic Press, New York.   
1983 Toward the Identification of Formation Process.  American Antiquity 48(4): 675-706. 
 
Schneller, Robert J 
[n.d.] The Battle of Hampton Roads, Origins of Ordnance Testing against Armor, and U.S. 
Navy Ordnance Development during the American Civil War. In Naval History and 
Heritage Command.  <www.history.navy.mil/content/dam/nhhc/browse-by-
topic/War%20and%20Conflict/civil-war/The_Battle_of_Hampton_Roads.pdf>.  
Accessed 20 October 2018. 
 
Scott, Douglas D., Dr. Richard A. Fox Jr. Ph.D., Melissa A. Connor, and Dick Harmon 
1989 Archaeological Perspectives on the Battle of Little Bighorn. University of Oklahoma 
Press, Norman. 
 
Scott, Douglas D., Lawrence E. Babits, and Charles Haecker 
2009 Fields of Conflict: Battlefield Archaeology from the Roman Empire to the Korean War.  
Potomac Books Inc., Dulles, VA. 
 
Secretary of the Navy   
1865 Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion.  30 
vols.  Washington, DC 
 
Silverstone, Paul H. 







2013 A Determination Worth a Better Cause: Naval Action During the Battle of Roanoke 
Island, 7 & 8 February 1862.  Master’s Thesis, Department of Maritime History, East 
Carolina University, Greenville, NC.   
 
Sivilich, Daniel M.  
1995 Analyzing Musket Balls to Interpret a Revolutionary War Site.  Historical Archaeology.  
30(2): 101-109.  
 
Skibo, J.M. and Michael B. Schiffer 
2008 People and Things: A Behavioral Approach to Material Culture.  Springer, New York.   
 
Sloan, John A. 
1883 North Carolina in the War Between the States.  R.H. Darby, Washington, DC.   
 
Smekalova, Tatiana and Bruce Bevan. 
2011 Magnetic Properties of the granite aqueduct at Ammaia.   
<https://www.researchgate.net/publication/304404276_Magnetic_properties_of_the_gran
ite_aqueduct_at_Ammaia>.  Accessed 22 October 2018. 
 
Stick, David 
1983 Roanoke Island: The Beginnings of English America.  University of North Carolina Press, 
Chapel Hill.   
 
Sutherland, T.L., M.R. Holst 
2005 Battlefield Archaeology: The Archaeology of Ancient and Historical Conflict, Guidelines 
for the British Archaeological Job Resource (BAJR).  
<http://www.bajr.org/documents/bajrbattleguide.pdf.> Accessed May 31, 2015.   
  
Thompson, Victor D., Phillip J. Arnold, Thomas J. Pluckhahn, and Amber M. Vanderwarker. 
2011 Situating Remote Sensing in Anthropological Archaeology.  Archaeological Prospection 
18(3):195-213.  John Wiley and Sons Ltd. 
 
Trigger, Bruce G. 
2006 A History of Archaeological Thought, 2nd Edition.  Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, England. 
 
Tritech International Ltd. 
2016 StarFish 450F Towed Side-scan System.  Tritech International Ltd., Product 
Specifications Sheet, P/N BP00098.2. 
 
Trotter, William R. 






Tucker, Spencer C. 
2006 Blue and Gray Navies: The Civil War Afloat.  Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD.  
 
Tucker, Spencer; Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr., and William E. White III 
2011 The Civil War Naval Encyclopedia.  ABC-CLIO, Santa Barbra, CA.   
 
Turner, William W. 
1864 “3rd Georgia First Twelve Months.”  The Countryman.  Compiled by Johnnie P. Pearson 
and Mary A. Pearson. From microfilm, University of Georgia, Athens, GA.  
<http://www.3gvi.org/ga3hist3.html>.   
 
U.S. Naval Historical Center 
2011 Confederate Ships Afloat. Lulu.com, Washington, DC. 
 
U.S. Navy History Division 
1959 Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships.  Volume 4.  Naval Historical Center, Navy 
Department, Washington DC.   
 
U.S. Naval Records Office 
[n.d.] Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion.  30 
vols.  Washington D.C.: GPO, 1894-1922.  Available from the University of North 
Carolina Wilmington Civil War collection.   
 
U.S. War Department 
1901 The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and 
Confederate Armies.  70 vols.  Washington: GPO, 1880-1901.  Available from the 
University of North Carolina Wilmington Civil War collection.   
2001 Supplement to the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies.  4 parts.  100 
vols.  Edited by Janet B. Hewett, et al.  Wilmington, NC: Broadfoot, 1994-2001.   
 
Veit, C.L., and R.W. Kuchera 
2011 Handbook for Civil War Naval Reenactors, 4th Edition.  Chuck Veit.   
 
Veninger, Jacqueline 
2015 Archaeological Landscapes of Conflict in Twelfth-Century Gwynedd.  Ph D. Dissertation, 
Department of History, University of Exeter, England.   
 
Welles, Gideon 
1861 “Secretary of Navy Gideon Welles to Commander Rowan,” In Official Records of the 
Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion.  Series 1, Volume VI, Edited 
by C.C. Marsh, pp. 234.  Department of the Navy, Washington, DC.   
 
Weng, Qihao 
2010 Remote Sensing and GIS Integration: Theories, Methods and Applications.  McGraw-




Whitehorne, Joseph W.A. 
2010 Following the Paper Trail: A Historian’s Role at the Snake Hill Excavations, Ontario, 
Canada.  In Historical Archaeology of Military Sites: Method and Topic, Clarence R. 
Geier, Lawrence E. Babits, Douglas Scott, and David G. Orr, editors, pp. 3-10.  Texas 
A&M, College Station.  
 
White, Nancy, D. Reide Corbett, Robert McClendon, John McCord, Adam Parker, Michael 
Piehler, Nathan Richards, J.P. Walsh 
2017 Research to Support Design and Siting of Deposition Areas for Dredged Material from 
the Rodanthe Emergency Channel.  Report to NC Department of Transportation 
(NCDOT Project 14-0790 FHWA/NC/20YY-NN). 
 
Whitney, J.H.E. 
1866 The Hawkins Zouaves (Ninth N.Y.V.) Their Battles and Marches.  Privately published, 
New York, NY.   
 
Whyte, Ian D. 
2013 A Dictionary of Environmental History.  I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd., New York, NY. 
 
Winn, Asa A. 
1861 “3rd Georgia, Asa A. Winn account of the second day of the Chicamacomico Races.” 




1861 “Report of Col. A.R. Wright, Third Georgia Infantry.”  The War of the Rebellion: A 
Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies.  Series 1, 
Volume IV, Edited by Robert N. Scott, pp. 596-597.  Government Printing Office, 
Washington, DC (1882).   
 
Yearns, W. Buck and John G. Barrett 
1980 North Carolina Civil War Documentary.  University of North Carolina Press, Chapel 
Hill.   
Yellowley, Edward C.  
1901 “Chicamacomico, 4 October 1861.”  Letter dated Roanoke Island, 8 October 1861.  
Histories of the Several Regiments and Battalions from North Carolina in the Great War 
1861-’65.  Vol. 5. Edited by Walter Clark.  Nash Brothers, Goldsboro, NC. 
 
Zatarga, Michael P. 
2015 The Battle of Roanoke Island: Burnside and the Fight for North Carolina.  The History 




















Findpoint Ferrous reading 
Conductivity 
Reading Depth (m) 
FP001 21 36 0.26 
FP002 34 13 0.14 
FP003 1 34 0.11 
FP004 35 50 0.09 
FP005 14 44 0.11 
FP006 23 1 0.27 
FP007 1 29 0.12 
FP008 25 32 0.25 
FP009 17 25 0.26 
FP010 14 25 0.06 
FP011 12 28 0.08 
FP012 12 22 0.16 
FP013 6 26 0.1 
FP014 8 18 0.15 
FP015 20 42 0.17 
FP016 15 12 0.09 
FP017 12 15 0.12 
FP018 33 46 0.07 
FP019 11 35 0.06 
FP020 35 45 0.14 
FP021 33 41 0.1 
FP022 35 25 0.22 
FP023 31 43 0.05 
FP024 1 28 0.1 
FP025 2 42 0.13 
FP026 8 19 0.13 
FP027 9 13 0.18 
FP028 17 13 0.18 
FP029 11 26 0.17 
FP030 12 27 0.08 
FP031 24 45 0.05 
FP032 17 8 0.17 
FP033 14 30 0.15 
FP034 12 34 0.08 
FP035 28 48 0.08 
FP036 9 7 0.18 
FP037 10 18 0.1 
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FP038 14 33 0.12 
FP039 12 12 0.1 
FP040 12 24 0.05 
FP041 11 36 0.1 
FP042 10 10 0.18 
FP043 1 21 0.17 
FP044 1 32 0.26 
FP045 35 16 0.06 
FP046 12 41 0.22 
FP047 33 25 0.3 
FP048 35 47 0.15 
FP049 12 47 0.05 
FP050 35 42 0.05 
FP051 35 50 0.08 
FP052 21 9 0.17 
FP053 15 7 0.24 
FP054 14 18 0.21 
FP055 35 46 0.24 
FP056 35 39 0.23 
FP057 11 15 0.1 
FP058 6 30 0.08 
FP059 35 50 0.12 
FP060 33 9 0.29 
FP061 17 25 0.11 
FP062 16 42 0.1 
FP063 13 7 0.1 
FP064 1 13 0.12 
FP065 1 16 0.3 
FP066 13 2 0.19 
FP067 21 43 0.07 
FP068 34 27 0.12 
FP069 12 41 0.09 
FP070 3 12 0.26 
FP071 12 3 0.13 
FP072 1 16 0.07 
FP073 5 21 0.11 
FP074 11 32 0.26 
FP075 10 41 0.06 
FP076 35 49 0.07 
FP077 13 15 0.21 
FP078 20 3 0.2 
216 
 
FP079 35 50 0.07 
FP080 35 44 0.09 
FP081 14 22 0.04 
FP082 25 9 0.1 
FP083 9 37 0.1 
FP084 1 40 0.11 
FP085 15 10 0.16 
FP086 12 43 0.08 
FP087 8 38 0.09 
FP088 21 1 0.24 
FP089 33 49 0.06 
FP090 10 39 0.12 
FP091 6 18 0.17 
FP092 15 24 0.14 
FP093 35 48 0.24 
FP094 26 45 0.14 
FP095 10 30 0.18 
FP096 10 7 0.12 
FP097 20 40 0.28 
FP098 15 12 0.11 
FP099 12 22 0.16 
FP100 10 16 0.1 
FP101 18 21 0.08 
FP102 12 28 0.17 
FP103 8 37 0.1 
FP104 4 26 0.09 
FP105 17 39 0.11 
FP106 29 41 0.19 
FP107 12 36 0.14 
FP108 2 30 0.11 
FP109 35 16 0.19 
FP110 24 42 0.11 
FP111 35 36 0.1 
FP112 35 49 0.09 
FP113 14 43 0.19 
FP114 35 44 0.1 
FP115 28 48 0.21 
FP116 8 2 0.22 
FP117 10 36 0.14 
FP118 13 15 0.12 
FP119 1 30 0.18 
217 
 
FP120 10 41 0.12 
FP121 34 43 0.08 
FP122 10 38 0.07 
FP123 33 39 0.11 
FP124 5 39 0.16 
FP125 19 40 0.22 
FP126 28 48 0.05 
FP127 12 4 0.09 
FP128 26 35 0.15 
FP129 32 44 0.14 
FP130 11 6 0.21 
FP131 8 17 0.23 
FP132 12 15 0.13 
FP133 10 30 0.06 
FP134 32 47 0.05 
FP135 12 17 0.06 
FP136 35 39 0.11 
FP137 9 23 0.05 
 
Table 12. Magnetic anomalies detected from CTX3030 metal detector during the shoreline inspection off Little 





Table 13. Magnetic anomalies detected from CTX3030 metal detector during the Richards and Parker 2017 study.  
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Target Length Width Category 
TAR_01 0.3 11.8 5.9 0.6 Limb  
TAR_02 0.6 8.2 7.8 2.6 Limb  
TAR_03 0.4 6.8 0.5 0.5 Marine_Debris 
TAR_04 0.4 18.1 6.8 1.2 SAV 
TAR_05 0.4 11.3 3.1 9.7 SAV 
TAR_06 0.4 10.1 3.5 1.8 SAV 
TAR_07 0.4 14.2 5.8 0.7 Marine_Debris 
TAR_08 0.3 8 2.6 0.3 SAV 
TAR_09 0.2 5.8 10.3 0.6 SAV 
TAR_10 0.1 9 1.1 1 SAV 
TAR_11 0.3 14 5.2 0.8 SAV 
TAR_12 0.5 6.7 n/a n/a SAV 
TAR_13 0.3 12.1 4 1 SAV 
TAR_14 0.3 16.1 6.7 0.9 Scour 
TAR_15 0.2 4.2 0.7 0.5 False_Target 
TAR_16 0.5 5.8 1.4 6.9 SAV 
TAR_17 0.2 5.5 2.4 2.4 SAV 
TAR_18 0.3 1.1 0.2 0.6 Unknown_Object 
TAR_19 0.4 10.7 17 0.5 SAV 
TAR_20 0.6 6.2 13.4 10.6 Impression  
TAR_21 0.3 10.4 0.3 0.2 SAV 
TAR_22 0.3 6 7.6 4 SAV 
TAR_23 0.5 4.2 0.9 0.3 Marine_Debris 
TAR_24 0.5 17.9 0.9 8.1 Scour 
TAR_25 0.7 10.7 8.5 12.1 SAV 
TAR_26 0.5 6.2 0.5 4.9 SAV 
TAR_27 0.5 4.4 0.9 3.8 Unknown_Object 
TAR_28 0.4 7.5 2.9 1.1 SAV 
TAR_29 0.5 3.5 0.6 2 Scour 
TAR_30 0.5 5.6 0.7 2.7 SAV 
TAR_31 0.4 10.1 9 9.8 SAV 
TAR_32 0.5 16.8 5.2 0.8 Marine_Debris 
TAR_33 0.5 5.8 0.6 0.3 Marine_Debris 
TAR_34 0.5 5.3 5.2 0.6 Impressions  




TAR_36 0.6 6.1 0.9 4.9 SAV 
TAR_37 0.6 13.4 3.3 2.3 SAV 
TAR_38 0.6 11.8 0 0 SAV 
TAR_39 0.6 7.7 0.5 1.4 SAV 
TAR_40 0.5 15.4 6.1 1.6 SAV 
TAR_41 0.5 3.5 0 0 SAV 
TAR_42 0.3 5.1 1.2 0.3 Unknown_Object 
TAR_43 0.3 1.9 0.7 0.2 False_Target 
TAR_44 0.3 1.2 0 0 Unknown_Object 
TAR_45 0.4 12 5.6 0.6 SAV 
TAR_46 0.4 1.9 0.3 0.3 SAV 
TAR_47 0.5 6.5 0.5 0.2 SAV 
TAR_48 0.3 2.2 0.7 0.5 SAV 
TAR_49 0.4 12 0.8 0.9 SAV 
TAR_50 0.3 4.2 0.5 0.4 SAV 
TAR_51 0.3 7.4 8.3 0.5 Impression 
TAR_52 0.5 8 1 0.5 SAV 
TAR_53 0.5 2.2 1.2 0.4 SAV 
TAR_54 0.6 7.2 0.5 1.2 Unknown_Object 
TAR_55 0.4 2.2 0.3 0.1 Unknown_Object 
TAR_56 0.4 6.9 0.6 0.3 Unknown_Object 
TAR_57 0.4 8.4 0 0 SAV 
TAR_58 0.5 16.2 5.4 1.3 SAV 
TAR_59 0.3 9.4 4.6 0.3 SAV 
TAR_60 0.5 11.4 0 0 SAV 
TAR_61 0.7 13.7 7.8 0.9 SAV 
TAR_62 0.6 10.9 0.7 0.8 SAV 
TAR_63 0.7 6.7 9.9 0.7 SAV 
TAR_64 0.7 5.2 0.8 0.4 SAV 
TAR_65 0.4 4.7 0 0 SAV 
TAR_66 0.4 2.9 0.3 0.2 Marine_Debris 
TAR_67 0.4 1.8 0.3 0.1 SAV 
TAR_68 0.3 2 0.7 0.3 SAV 
TAR_69 0.7 3 0.9 0.3 Impression 
TAR_70 0.4 10.8 4.7 0.6 Impression 
TAR_71 0.6 13.7 3.8 0.5 SAV 
TAR_72 0.5 13.2 6 0.6 Unknown_Object 
TAR_73 0.6 2.3 0.3 0.3 SAV 
TAR_74 0.4 9.8 1.7 0.9 SAV 




TAR_76 0.5 7.8 0.4 0.3 SAV 
TAR_77 0.6 6.4 1 0.3 Unknown_Object 
TAR_78 0.3 2.5 0.4 0.1 Scour 
TAR_79 0.4 2.4 2.2 1 SAV 
TAR_80 0 1.3 - - SAV 
TAR_81 0.2 3.5 2.1 2 SAV 
TAR_82 0.2 5.7 - - SAV 
TAR_83 0.5 4.3 0.4 0.6 SAV 
TAR_84 0.2 4.7 0.2 0.1 SAV 
TAR_85 0.3 1.4 0.4 0.2 SAV 
TAR_86 0.4 2.5 0.6 0.4 Unknown_Object 
TAR_87 0.3 2.7 0.4 0.3 Unknown_Object 
TAR_88 0.4 1.3 - - SAV 
TAR_89 0.6 4 0.6 0.4 SAV 
TAR_90 0.3 5 0.6 0.4 Unknown_Object 
TAR_91 0.3 3 0.2 0.1 SAV 
TAR_92 0.4 2.8 0.2 0.2 SAV 
TAR_93 0.5 9.4 1 1.5 SAV 
TAR_94 0.5 4 0.3 0.1 SAV 
TAR_95 0.7 2.2 0.6 0.4 SAV 
TAR_96 0.5 2.3 - - SAV 
TAR_97 0.4 3.2 0.8 0.5 SAV 
TAR_98 0.5 3 0.5 0.2 SAV 
TAR_99 0.5 2.9 1 1 SAV 
TAR_100 0.2 6 0.3 0.4 SAV 
TAR_101 0.2 6 0.8 0.7 Unknown_Object 
TAR_102 0 13.8 2 1.6 SAV 
TAR_103 0 8.1 - - SAV 
TAR_104 0 1.2 0.4 0.1 SAV 
TAR_105 0 2.6 0.7 0.3 Piling 
TAR_106 0 6.8 - - Piling 
TAR_107 0.2 8.1 0.8 0.9 Crab_Pot 
TAR_108 0.2 2.6 0.5 0.6 SAV 
TAR_109 0.3 2 0.3 0.2 SAV 
TAR_110 0.2 0.5 - - Piling 
TAR_111 0.2 2.5 0.7 0.2 Unknown_Object 
TAR_112 0.2 2.7 0.6 0.4 SAV 
TAR_113 0.2 2.7 0.3 0.2 SAV 
TAR_114 0.2 1.4 - - SAV 




TAR_116 0.3 1.6 0.6 0.5 SAV 
TAR_117 0.3 2.3 2 1.4 SAV 
TAR_118 0.3 1.7 - - Piling 
TAR_119 0.4 3.1 0.3 0.2 SAV 
TAR_120 0.6 6.5 0.6 0.6 Marine_Debris 
TAR_121 0.4 7.1 2.9 0.3 Scour 
TAR_122 0.5 2.2 0.9 0.6 SAV 
TAR_123 0.8 3.8 0.9 0.4 SAV 
TAR_124 0.6 13.1 1.2 0.7 Marine_Debris 
TAR_125 0.5 3.2 2 0.4 Scour 
TAR_126 0.5 1.6 - - SAV 
TAR_127 0.3 5.5 - - SAV 
TAR_128 0.3 2.7 0.6 0.4 SAV 
TAR_129 0.5 2.9 1.3 0.3 SAV 
TAR_130 0.5 9.7 - - SAV 
TAR_131 0 14 - - SAV 
TAR_132 0 2.1 0.3 0.6 SAV 
TAR_133 0.2 3.4 3.7 0.2 Scour 
TAR_134 0.2 5.6 - - Scour 
TAR_135 0.2 11.7 - - Duck_Blind 
TAR_136 0.2 2.6 - - False_Target 
TAR_137 0.2 4.1 0.9 0.6 False_Target 
TAR_138 0.6 3.1 2.1 1.3 Unknown_Object 
TAR_139 0.3 1.2 - - Piling 
TAR_140 0.5 2.6 0.7 0.4 SAV 
TAR_141 0.5 4.5 1.3 0.9 SAV 
TAR_142 0.6 7.8 0.9 0.6 Unknown_Object 
TAR_143 0.8 9.1 1 0.6 Unknown_Object 
TAR_144 0.7 8.7 0.4 0.3 Unknown_Object 
TAR_145 0.8 4 0.8 0.4 SAV 
TAR_146 0.8 3.2 0.6 0.4 SAV 
TAR_147 0.8 3 1 1.3 Unknown_Object 
TAR_148 0.7 3 0.3 0.2 Marine_Debris 
TAR_149 0.3 8.9 8.9 0.4 Scour 
TAR_150 0.5 1.5 0.6 0.4 SAV 
TAR_151 0.3 4.5 0.8 0.8 Crab_Pot 
TAR_152 0.4 6 0.8 0.6 Piling 
TAR_153 0.6 2.1 - - False_Target 
TAR_154 0.9 5.7 - - Unknown_Object 




TAR_156 0.4 6.4 0.7 0.3 Unknown_Object 
TAR_157 0.4 1.9 - - SAV 
TAR_158 0.7 2.7 - - Unknown_Object 
TAR_159 0.4 4.1 - - Unknown_Object 
TAR_160 0.8 4 0.5 0.5 Unknown_Object 
TAR_161 0.8 4.3 0.3 0.3 Unknown_Object 
TAR_162 0.8 3.7 0.6 0.2 Unknown_Object 
TAR_163 0.6 7.2 0.8 0.7 SAV 
TAR_164 0.5 4 5.1 1 SAV 
TAR_165 0.3 3 0.4 0.2 SAV 
TAR_166 0.5 3.4 1.4 1.1 SAV 
TAR_167 1 5.3 1.1 0.3 Marine_Debris 
TAR_168 0.8 3.6 0.4 0.5 SAV 
TAR_169 0.7 3.2 - - SAV 
TAR_170 0.8 4.7 0.3 0.3 Unknown_Object 
TAR_171 0.8 3.9 1.1 0.5 Unknown_Object 
TAR_172 0.6 4.9 0.5 0.4 Unknown_Object 
TAR_173 0.6 3.6 1 0.3 Unknown_Object 
TAR_174 0.6 2.3 1.7 0.6 SAV 
TAR_175 0.5 4.7 0.4 0.6 Piling 
Table 15. Visual anomalies revealed during the side-scan sonar survey.  Sonar targets were captured by the Tritech 
Starfish Sonar device during the remote sensing survey off Little Kinnakeet. 
 
 
 
 
